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Abstract 
This thesis is about four ethical problems concerning death. The first two 
chapters are about the reasons we have to prolong our own lives. In Chapter 
1, I argue that we can defensibly maintain that it would not have been in our 
interests to have been brought into existence earlier than we were, while also 
holding that it is often against our interests to die earlier than we otherwise 
would. In Chapter 2, I argue that one can have a reason to continue one’s 
conscious life even when the particular contents of it will not be good on 
balance. The last two chapters are about the morality of taking life. In 
Chapter 3, I argue against the common-sense view that the strength of the 
moral objection to killing a person is unaffected by certain facts about her, 
chief among them what she stands to lose by dying. In Chapter 4, I discuss 
the nature and extent of the obligations that are incurred by those who 
wrongfully kill, or who mistreat people in other ways that seem, on the 
surface, impossible to redress. 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Prelude: Four Lucretian Arguments 
Many of us are distressed by the prospect of death, and Lucretius thought he 
could offer some philosophical therapy:  
      
Look back again to see how the past ages of everlasting time, 
before we are born, have been as naught to us. These then nature 
holds up to us as a mirror of the time that is to come, when we 
are dead and gone.  1
Philosophers have reconstructed Lucretius’ argument in a number of ways, 
only some of which have been adequately distinguished. In this short, prefat-
ory chapter, I will examine four incarnations of the Lucretian argument and 
conclude that only one of them has a chance of being successful. That one is 
the version that aims to establish that an earlier death cannot be bad for its 
subject, on the grounds that an earlier birth would not have been good for 
her. In the first chapter of the thesis that follows, I argue that even this Lu-
cretian argument fails. 
 Bailey (trans.), 1963, Book III, §ii, lines 973–5.1
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FOUR LUCRETIAN ARGUMENTS 
Lucretian arguments are a species of those arguments that aim to dispel or 
undermine some attitude or belief X by showing that it ought to conform to 
another attitude or belief Y. There are two ways in which an argument like 
this might, in the way I will use the phrase, “fail on its own terms”. The first 
is when no actual person holds X. The second is when the reason people hold 
X is manifestly because of properties of it that are not also properties of Y. I 
shall attempt to show that all but one version of Lucretius’ argument fails in 
one of these two ways. The other versions either target an attitude or belief 
that no one actually holds, or else rely for their success on pointing to prop-
erties of prenatal nonexistence that are not shared by nonexistence due to 
death.  2
We can begin by isolating two broad kinds of Lucretian argument. The 
first kind of argument targets the negative emotional responses we have to-
ward death: fear, dread, anxiety, dismay, and so forth. At the risk of oversim-
 It is implausible, of course, that an individual begins to exist precisely at birth. I simply 2
use the word as a placeholder for whatever event does mark the beginning of one’s existence.
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plification, I will limit my arguments to fear and its cognate emotions. This 
version of the argument, then, holds that because we do not, as a matter of 
fact, have emotions or attitudes comparable to fear toward the nonexistence 
that preceded our births, we are rationally required not to have them toward 
death, either. I shall call these “attitudinal arguments”.  
The other kind of argument targets not an attitudinal or emotional re-
sponse to death but rather a normative proposition about it. Conceived this 
way, the Lucretian argument is meant to show us that death is not bad for 
us, or alternatively that we have no prudential reason to want not to die. 
These arguments hold, roughly, that because the nonexistence that preceded 
our births was not bad for us, neither is that which will follow our deaths. I 
shall call these “normative arguments”. 
There are also two targets against which either kind of argument can be 
levelled, depending on how we conceive of death. The first comes from con-
ceiving death as the event-type that is the cessation of one’s own existence, 
whenever it happens. For simplicity’s sake, I will henceforth call this concep-
tion of death “death itself”. Alternatively, a Lucretian argument can be lev-
elled against an attitude or belief we have about a particular token death as 
compared to some alternative death that we would otherwise have had in-
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stead. I assume that in the context of the Lucretian argument the relevant 
alternative death is a later one, such that the argument is meant to change 
some attitude or belief we have about dying earlier than we otherwise would.  3
In short, we have four possible versions of the Lucretian argument—some of 
which, we shall see, have more nuanced variations of their own.  
Of these four arguments, the only version which has a chance of being 
successful, on its own terms, is this last one. The others either target an atti-
tude or belief that no one actually holds or else rely for their success on fea-
tures of the nonexistence that precedes birth that are clearly not present 
when it comes to the nonexistence that follows death. 
Attitudinal arguments  
I begin with those Lucretian arguments that aim to show that fear is an irra-
tional emotional reaction to death, whether conceived as death itself or as an 
earlier death. Note that the sense of “irrational” at play here is not the sense 
in which an emotion is irrational whenever it is bad for us and it is in our 
control to rid ourselves of it. Our emotional attitudes toward death are often 
 For a comprehensive discussion of how to individuate these alternatives, a difficult issue 3
from which I will prescind entering into here, see McMahan (2002), pp. 98–107.
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negative experiences in themselves, and they may prevent us from doing 
things that would be good for us. Lucretian arguments that the fear of death 
is irrational use the word in its other sense, according to which an attitude is 
rational if and only if it is a fitting or appropriate response to its object. Still, 
even those who think that the fitting-attitude conception of rationality is not 
action-guiding should care about whether fear is an appropriate response to 
death. Coming to believe fear is not a fitting attitude to have toward some-
thing may be the most effective way to disabuse ourselves of it.  
DREAD OF DEATH ITSELF 
Before continuing, we should distinguish two distinct senses of the word 
“fear”. The failure to draw this distinction can lead to mistakes. Thus Shelly 
Kagan has argued that, although it can be perfectly rational to fear an earli-
er death, which for all one knows might happen, it is never rational to fear 
death itself.  His reasoning is that fear is an attitude that is appropriate only 4
toward things about which we are reasonably uncertain, of which death itself 
is not one. But Kagan’s argument is unsuccessful because it presupposes that 
the sense of “fear” in which we might fear an early death is the same sense of 
 Kagan (2012), pp. 292–297.4
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“fear” in which people fear certain death. But there are, it seems to me, two 
relatively distinct emotions that are sometimes called “fear”. The first is in-
deed an emotion that we typically have only toward events which we perceive 
to be bad and are uncertain will occur; to avoid ambiguity I will call this 
emotion “trepidation”. The other is an attitude that we have toward events 
which we perceive as bad and are reasonably certain they will occur; I will 
call this sense “dread”.  
To see the difference, imagine driving down the highway at night, in the 
middle of nowhere and realising that your car is nearly out of fuel. In the 
sense of “fear” which means “trepidation”, you will probably fear running out 
of fuel. But once you discover that there is no chance at all of passing a 
filling station before your tank runs dry, this emotion would disappear. You 
would not continue to feel trepidation about the prospect running out of fuel. 
But you might nonetheless dread the coming night, which you recognise will 
inevitably be passed in your car in the bitter cold. 
I grant that, in the sense of “fear” that means “trepidation”, it is indeed 
irrational to fear one’s inevitable death. But Kagan’s intention is to disabuse 
us of an attitude we actually have, and no one, I submit, feels trepidation 
about her inevitable death. Rather, those who fear their inevitable death fear 
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it in the sense that means “dread”, in that it fills them with terror when they 
think of it. Suppose a white-hot iron is certain to be held against my skin 
tomorrow. It does not seem irrational to dread this event. Indeed, a person 
who greeted the prospect with equanimity would seem bizarre, or at best su-
perhumanly unflappable—an unreasonably high bar for rationality for mor-
tals. Since, presumably, most people who profess to be afraid of death are 
under no illusions that they will escape it in the end, it is safe to assume that 
if the object of their fear is simply death itself, then the emotion they have is 
dread.  
 In the Woody Allen film Whatever Works, the protagonist’s wife 
awakens to his panicked screams. 
—“I’m dying! I’m-I’m dying!” 
—“Should I call an ambulance!?”  
—“No, not now. I mean eventually!”  
Insofar as we dread death, we might dread it whenever it may happen. With 
the distinction between trepidation and dread in hand, we can ask whether 
there is a Lucretian argument to show that the dread of certain death is irra-
tional.  
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As a rally against the dread of death, the Lucretian argument appears 
to be this:  
(1) We do not dread the nonexistence before our birth, but 
(2) There is no difference between that and the nonexistence that 
follows our death that could make the latter more worthy of dread 
(“nature’s mirror”), and 
(3) It is irrational to dread one thing but not another if there is no 
difference between them that could make the one more worthy of 
dread than the other, so 
(4) It is irrational for us to dread death. 
Of course, it may be that, in the end, it is our attitude toward the nonexist-
ence before our birth that should be brought into line. Then, of these four 
claims, we would conclude that we should revise the attitude cited in (1) in-
stead of accepting (4). I shall not dwell on this possibility here, which may be 
a third way in which a Lucretian argument fails “on its own terms”.  
Now, there is a sense of “dread” and some of its synonyms whereby to 
dread something is, roughly, to anticipate it with horror. Because it may be a 
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psychological fact that we cannot anticipate what we believe has already 
happened, this argument may seem to fail trivially on the grounds that (2) is 
false. But because we will not experience being dead, the only sense of “anti-
cipation” in which we can anticipate death with horror is the sense that 
means that we believe it to be in the future. Though as a matter of fact we 
may dread only those events we believe to be in the future, it does not follow 
that these are the only events that are worthy of dread, or some comparable 
emotion. It may well be that not only do we not dread the nonexistence that 
preceded our birth, we also think it of as unworthy of dread, and so reflection 
upon it will lead us to conclude the same about death. 
Insofar as we dread death itself, we might dread either the event itself—
the cessation of existence—or else the period of postmortem nonexistence 
that follows death. The Lucretian argument against the dread of the event 
itself fails because there is no comparable event when it comes to our prenat-
al nonexistence. The relevant analogue to the event of death is the event of 
coming into existence.  
The most natural reading of Lucretius’ poem is that his target is not 
the reader’s dread of the event of death but rather of the period of nonexist-
ence that follows it. The Lucretian argument against the dread of the period 
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of postmortem nonexistence fails for another reason: this dread is directed at 
a property not shared by the period of nonexistence that precedes our birth. 
As Frances Kamm has pointed out, unlike the nonexistence that follows one’s 
death, the nonexistence that precedes one’s existence will eventually end—it 
will end when one begins to exist.  Had he been certain of his resurrection 5
four days after his (first) death, Lazarus would not, I think, have dreaded his 
midlife nonexistence. Indeed, he may well have regarded it with all the 
calmness Lucretius recommends. This seems to show that what we dread 
about postmortem nonexistence is not that it is a state of affairs in which we 
do not exist, but that it is one in which we will never exist at a later time. 
The very feature we might dread about it is the one that is absent when it 
comes to the nonexistence that preceded our lives. 
DREAD OR TREPIDATION ABOUT AN EARLIER DEATH 
Although the Lucretian argument cannot undermine the dread of death itself, 
it might be levelled instead against the dread of dying an earlier death than 
one could have. As I have said, while the sense of fear that means “trepida-
 Kamm (1993), pp. 42–44.5
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tion” is rational only toward events we are reasonably uncertain will occur, 
the sense that means “dread” does not have that condition. We can begin, 
then, by asking whether the Lucretian argument can show that it is irrational 
to dread an earlier death—even when it is certain—and then ask whether it 
can show that it is irrational to feel trepidation about dying early. 
Does anyone actually dread an early death, such that the attitude they 
have toward it would be present even if that early death became reasonably 
certain to occur? There is some reason to think so. Suppose I am extremely 
confident that I will die in 2030. I then come to realise that that belief was 
justified but false. A new mountain of evidence leads me to become just as 
confident that I will instead die in 2025. My dread of dying in 2025 would be 
much greater than was my dread of dying in 2030. Perhaps this shows that 
we do in fact dread dying an earlier death. 
But the explanation of this is not that I dread dying earlier but rather 
that I dread death itself, and if an event is already an object of one’s dread, 
then that dread intensifies as the event draws nearer to the present. That is, I 
now dread dying in 2025 more than I dreaded dying in 2030 not because in 
the former case my death is earlier, but because it is sooner. 
To see this, compare: 
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(a) My dread, in 2020, of my death in 2025 rather than 2030. 
(b) My dread, in 2025, of my death in 2030 rather than 2035. 
(c) My dread, in 2020, of my death in 2030 rather 2035.  
The intensity of (a) and (b) would not be that of (c). And (a) would be 
roughly of the same intensity and character as (b). This suggests that insofar 
as I dread an earlier death I dread it not because it is earlier, in the sense 
that it is (more) pre-mature, but because it is sooner. Because we do not feel 
a distinct sense of dread for early death, the Lucretian argument against that 
emotion would not be on target.  
Recall Shelly Kagan’s argument that fearing death is irrational: 
  
(1) It is rational to fear something only if it is reasonably 
uncertain it will occur, but  
(2) Death is not reasonably uncertain, so  
(3) It is not rational to fear death.  
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I said earlier that this argument is not useful, since insofar as (1) is true, the 
sense of “fear” it employs is not the same sense impugned by (3). The negat-
ive attitude we have toward certain death is one that is appropriate toward 
something we will undergo which seems to us very severe, regardless of how 
likely it is. But, as Kagan allows, in the sense of “fear” I have called “trepida-
tion”, it can be rational to fear early death. Is there a Lucretian argument to 
the effect that trepidation about the possibility of dying earlier than we 
might is irrational if we do not have a similar feeling toward the possibility of 
being born later than we might have been?  
I do not think there is an independent Lucretian argument to that ef-
fect. If the prospect of an earlier death gives rise to trepidation, that is be-
cause we feel trepidation about the loss of good life of which dying earlier 
will deprive us. And whether someone feels trepidation about the loss of 
something depends on whether they believe it would have been good for 
them to have it. Simply as a matter of fact, most people do not feel that be-
ing born earlier than they were would have been good for them, at least not 
to anything like the degree to which they believe that a later death would be 
good. The success of the Lucretian argument that trepidation toward the 
prospect of an earlier death is irrational depends on the success of the Lucre-
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tian argument (or another argument to the effect) that dying a later death is 
not good for its subject. Reflection on our actual emotion toward the possib-
ility of a later birth can do nothing on its own to show that trepidation 
about the prospect of an earlier death irrational, for that trepidation would 
be irrational only if we have already come to believe, independently, that 
early death is not bad for us. 
Normative arguments 
THE BADNESS OF DEATH ITSELF 
The other target of a Lucretian argument is not an emotional response to 
death but a normative proposition: roughly, that death is bad for the person 
who dies. On this type of argument, we begin not with an empirical observa-
tion about how we in fact feel about the time before our birth, but rather 
with the premise that nothing about that time was bad for us. As before, I 
begin with death itself. Insofar as the Lucretian argument is meant to show 
that the period that follows death is not in itself bad for a person, it seems to 
me useless; no one believes that it is in itself bad for a person not to exist. 
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For reasons akin to those we considered when discussing the dread of 
death itself, there is also no viable Lucretian argument against the claim that 
the event-type “ceasing to exist” is bad for a person. There are some reasons 
to think that it is in itself bad for a person to cease to exist; for example, 
that death takes from her the continuation of the goods of life that she 
already possesses, or that death means that everything is “all over” for her.  6
But there is no comparable consideration when it comes to birth or what 
precedes it. 
THE BADNESS OF AN EARLY DEATH 
We have covered three Lucretian arguments so far: those against the fear of 
death itself, the fear of an early death, and the badness of death itself. Let us 
turn, then, to the final Lucretian argument, which holds that early death is 
not bad for a person because later birth was not. Of course, there is one 
sense in which it would be more-or-less straightforwardly good for a person 
either to have had an earlier birth or to have a later death. Provided the ex-
tra life it would afford her is on balance good, and provided it does not, for 
 Kamm (1993). I will discuss the possibility that death is in itself bad for its subject at 6
length in Chapter 2.
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derivative reasons, lower the quality of the life she would anyway have had, 
then by having an earlier birth or a later death the person would have had a 
longer, better life. Indeed, a number of philosophers accept what has been 
called the “Life Comparative Account” (LCA) of the badness of death, ac-
cording to which death is bad for a person just in case it makes her lifetime 
wellbeing lower on balance than it would otherwise have been.  7
Because the LCA seems, at first blush, to have as a corollary that an 
earlier birth would have benefitted someone if the life she receives thereby is 
good, a proponent of the account who is unhappy with that result must try 
to show that the LCA doesn’t have it.  But the Lucretian has the opposite 8
problem. She needs to be able to say why the LCA is not the right account of 
the badness of death. 
A Lucretian might argue as follows: “I would not have had a better life 
by being born earlier. Therefore, the LCA is false”. But it is hard to see how 
being born earlier could not have given me a better life. Surely the length 
and quality of a life largely determine how good a life it is. 
 The name is McMahan’s (2002), p. 105. Defenders of the LCA, or of a relevantly similar 7
view, include Thomas Nagel (1970), Fred Feldman (1992), John Broome (1993; 2004); and 
Ben Bradley (2008; 2009).
 As Feldman (1992, p. 155) does. At least one defender of the Life Comparative account is 8
willing to accept that it would have been better for a person to be born earlier when that 
would have her increased her lifetime wellbeing, however—see Bradley (2009), p. 64. 
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A better response on the part of the Lucretian is this: “There is an im-
portant sense of ‘good’ according to which having a better life is not always 
ipso facto good for a person. Therefore, the LCA is at most an incomplete 
account of when and why death is bad for its subject.”  
In what sense of “good” could it be true that having had a better life 
might not have been good for its subject? I suggest that it is in the sense 
captured by what one has a present prudential reason to want.  We can co9 -
herently maintain that by having been born earlier a person’s life would have 
contained a greater sum of wellbeing or value, while denying that at every 
given time within it the person has a prudential reason to want that to be 
the case. The Lucretian opponent of the LCA can therefore say the following. 
“Although having been born earlier than I was might have made my life bet-
ter, in the sense that it contained less total wellbeing or value, it is not now 
in my interest to have in that way achieved a better life.”  
This fourth and final Lucretian argument has considerable force. It does 
not fail on its own terms—most of us do not regret that we were not born 
earlier, but do regret that we will not live longer with a life that is good; and 
there is at least no obvious feature of deprivations of life due to death that is 
 Alternatively, it is the sense captured by what we have a present time-relative interest in 9
having. I will discuss this notion in the next chapter.
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not also a feature of deprivations of it due to a later birth. After all, death 
seems bad in large part because of all the good things it takes from us, and 
similarly good things might have been ours, had we only begun to exist 
earlier.  
How death can be bad for its subject is something like the central or-
ganising question of this thesis. In the first chapter that follows, I will at-
tempt to refute this last and most significant incarnation of Lucretius’ argu-
ment. In the chapters which follow that, I will try to show how the ways in 
which death can be bad for its subject bear on some fundamental ethical is-
sues—some familiar and others largely untrodden—regarding how we should 
think about our own lives and how we should respect the lives of others.  
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Summaries of the Chapters 
Chapter 1: Was I born too late? 
Most if not all of us have the asymmetrical attitudes toward birth and death 
identified by that fourth and final Lucretian argument. Provided we believe 
the life we would have gone on to live would have been overall good, it seems 
to us a deep misfortune that we must die sooner rather than later. But upon 
considering the possibility that we came into existence earlier than we did, 
few of us would consider this a comparable misfortune. In the first chapter of 
this thesis, I will argue that these asymmetrical attitudes toward birth and 
death are just what they should be.  
I first consider the idea that the difference in our attitudes is justified 
on the ground that it is impossible to have come into existence earlier than 
when one did. Though I will argue that this argument ultimately fails, I will 
also show how it is more interesting than has been assumed by its opponents.  
I then turn to the mainstream explanation for why we care more about 
dying later than about being born earlier: that we are biased toward the fu-
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ture. It is widely believed that this difference in attitudes arises from a more 
general phenomenon according to which human beings more-or-less systemat-
ically prefer positive experiences to be in the future rather than the past, and 
negative ones to be in the past rather than the future. It is also widely 
thought that the source of that bias, in turn, is a implicit conviction in the 
objectivity of time’s passage. 
But we are not, I argue, biased toward the future, so that cannot be the 
explanation. Moreover, our preferences about birth and death have nothing 
to do with the belief that time passes, and truths about the metaphysics of 
time are irrelevant to whether or not those preferences are defensible. In-
stead, I claim, our actual attitudes track a concern for what happens to those 
stages of ourselves that are causally downstream from the present moment. 
Finally, I defend the novel position that the relation which underwrites 
rational prudential concern is itself asymmetric. More specifically, I argue for 
what I call the “One-Directional View” against the prevailing “Two-Direc-
tional View”. The One-Directional View tells us that although we should of-
ten have prudential concern for what happens to those stages of ourselves 
that are causally downstream, those stages ought to have no intrinsic pruden-
tial concern for what is happening to us now. If I am right, then what previ-
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ously appeared to be a temporal bias is justifiable on the basis of the rational 
prudential concern relation itself. Because a person’s death is downstream 
but her birth is not, the One-Directional View implies that our attitudes to-
ward them are justifiable.  
Chapter 2: Is Conscious Life Itself a Good? 
I then turn to the question of when one has a prudential reason to go on liv-
ing. I defend the position that conscious life itself has non-instrumental 
prudential value for its subject. Accordingly, a person can have a reason to go 
on living even when the particular constituents of her conscious life are not 
themselves good on balance.  
I begin with a brief clarification of that position and a reply to a criti-
cism of it. I then introduce my central case, in which one can choose between 
death now and living for a while longer with a conscious life that is otherwise 
neutral overall in the elements of wellbeing it contains. It seems to me that 
most people would choose to go on living, which provides at least a prima 
facie case for my conclusion. 
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Some philosophers would say that I have a reason to go on living in this 
case because the end of conscious experience is in itself bad for me. I offer 
some objections to the arguments that have been advanced for that position, 
a direct argument against it, and several reasons to think that, even if the 
end of my conscious life really is in itself bad for me, this fact is still unlikely 
provide a reason for me to continue living.  
I then consider some more direct objections to my central argument. I 
attempt to show why the intuition it evokes cannot be dismissed either on 
the ground that we tend to be overly optimistic about how good our future 
will be or on the ground that we are subject to some other bias that renders 
it epistemically unreliable.  
Finally, I return in more detail to the idea that conscious life has posit-
ive value for its subject over and above its particular contents, and suggest a 
deeper reason why this might be the case.  
Chapter 3: Not All Killings Are Equally Wrong 
Many people would balk at the idea that it could be less seriously wrong to 
kill someone simply because he is particularly old, sick, or unhappy. This is 
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curious, since these factors typically affect how harmful death is, and the 
strength of the moral objection to an act usually correlates with its harmful-
ness, other things being the same. The view that the wrongness of killing 
someone does not depend upon factors like these, a view whose most promin-
ent contemporary proponent is Jeff McMahan, is known as the “Equal 
Wrongness Thesis”. 
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen has argued that we should reject the Equal 
Wrongness Thesis on the basis of the moral equivalence of killing someone 
and knocking someone unconscious. Several authors have raised objections to 
his arguments, however, and there are other issues with his approach that 
have not yet been noted. In this chapter, I argue that by drawing on some of 
his insights we can, nonetheless, show that killing someone and knocking her 
unconscious are morally equivalent in the way that is sufficient to refute the 
Equal Wrongness Thesis. 
I begin with an analysis of Lippert-Rasmussen’s own argument. I identi-
fy what I take to be its key premise, discuss the various ways this premise 
can be attacked and defended, and suggest that his own defence is at best 
incomplete. The rest of the chapter is an extended argument for the following 
claim: 
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(C) It is as wrong to deprive someone of a certain amount of con-
scious life by knocking her temporarily unconscious in the middle 
of her life as it is to deprive her of the same amount of conscious 
life by killing her, other things being the same. 
Together with the Equal Wrongness Thesis, (C) implies that it is as wrong to 
knock someone temporarily unconscious for (say) a month in the middle of 
her life as it is to kill someone who would otherwise have had decades of 
happy life ahead of her. Because that result is absurd, I conclude that we 
should reject the Equal Wrongness Thesis if (C) is true. 
Chapter 4: Non-Compensable Harms 
In the final chapter, I turn from questions about the wrongness of killing to 
the question of what we should do when we have killed. Killing someone, at 
least on the face of it, is a paradigmatic example of what I call a “non-com-
pensable harm”. A non-compensable harm, as I use the phrase, is any harm 
whose victim cannot be fully compensated by its perpetrator. This interest-
ing class of actions has received little attention from philosophers. I will try 
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to show how it raises a number of intriguing questions whose answers have 
important and far-reaching consequences both practical and theoretical.  
I begin the chapter by sorting non-compensable harms in two categor-
ies. The first category comprises those harms whose perpetrators can do 
nothing to compensate their victims, at least beyond a certain point. The 
second category comprises those harms whose victims can be compensated 
further, but cannot be compensated fully. This chapter is divided into two 
extended sections, each corresponding to one of these two categories of non-
compensable harms.  
In the first main section, I defend what I call the “Non-Compensable 
Harms Thesis”. According to that thesis, to the extent that he cannot com-
pensate his victim, the perpetrator of a wrongful harm has an undirected 
duty to promote the impartial good. I offer a defence of that thesis and close 
the first section by discussing two practical consequences of it.  
The second section of the chapter focuses on the largely unexplored 
question of the limits of proportionality in the liability to compensate. Be-
cause in cases of non-compensable harms full compensation is impossible, we 
have to ask how much compensation, if any, is enough.  
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I proceed by discussing some structural similarities between compensa-
tion and self-defence. I then turn to an examination of what I call the “Re-
ceived View” of proportionality. To oversimplify, in the context of defence, 
this view tells us that the amount of defensive harm an aggressor is liable to 
bear to avert the threat he poses is a function of the magnitude of the harm 
he threatens and the magnitude of the harm which averting the threat will 
cause him. In the context of compensation, the Received View says, analog-
ously, that the amount of cost a perpetrator is liable to bear to compensate 
his victim is a function of the cost to him of paying it and the benefit to the 
victim of receiving it.  
The remainder of the chapter is a set of arguments against the Received 
View as it applies to both compensation and defensive harming. My primary 
criticism of the Received View is that it cannot account for an important in-
terpersonal dimension of harming; namely, how well off a perpetrator is relat-
ive to his victim. I defend the principle that when a perpetrator is culpable 
for the fact that his victim is worse off than he is, he is liable to compensate 
her at least until he is no better off than she is—a principle which conflicts 
with many of the Received View’s judgments about what amount of com-
pensation is disproportionate. 
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After arguing against the Received View as it applies to the liability to 
compensate, I argue for what I call the substantive symmetry of defensive 
harm and compensation. This is the thesis that whenever a person is liable to 
bear some cost to avert a harm that he threatens, he is also liable to bear 
that cost to counterbalance the harm should it eventuate, and vice versa. 
That conclusion is, I hope, significant in its own right. But, more importantly 
for my purposes, together with my arguments about the limits of the liability 
to compensate, it implies that the Received View of proportionality in self-
defence is false. 
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Chapter 1: Was I Born Too Late? 
As a general characterisation of our actual attitudes, it is hard to deny that 
we feel very differently about the life we might lose out on by dying earlier 
and the life we might have lost out on by being born later than we could 
have been.  Imagine you wake up in the hospital and temporarily cannot 1
remember whether you are forty or fifty years old. What you do know is that 
in either case your expected lifespan is sixty years; if you are forty, you can 
expect to live another twenty years, if you are fifty, you can expect another 
ten. Most of us would hope to turn out to be forty. And the salient difference 
between the two prospects is whether an additional ten years in one’s life 
comes from being born earlier or from dying later.  
This indicates that we care less about the additional life we could have 
had by being born earlier than we care about additional life we could go on 
 As before, I will generally use the term “birth” loosely, to refer to the beginning of one’s 1
existence. 
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to have by dying later. But Lucretius claimed not just that we care less 
about having had additional life by being born earlier, but that we do not 
care at all about the additional good life an earlier birth could have afforded 
us. Suppose, instead, that regardless of whether you turn out to be forty or 
fifty, you will die in six months. If we are truly indifferent about any addi-
tional past life, one would expect us in this case to be indifferent between be-
ing fifty and being forty. But several authors have reported, and I can add 
myself to their ranks, that in a case like this they would rather be fifty. Does 
this not indicate that we place at least some value on the life we could have 
had by being born earlier than we were? 
Frances Kamm and Jeff McMahan have both proposed that the reason 
we place at least some value on having been born earlier is that we will then 
be more likely to have accomplished more in our lives.  This seems plausible. 2
For suppose I were to learn that, regardless of whether I am forty or fifty, I 
will have accomplished the same things in my life. In this case I would care 
much less whether I am forty or fifty. More generally, several philosophers re-
port that, like Lucretius, they are unconcerned about past experiential goods 
and bads, like pleasures and pains,  but when it comes to non-experiential 3
 Kamm (1993), pp. 36–37; McMahan (2005a), p. 219.2
 Parfit (1984), pp. 173–4, 180–81; Brueckner and Fischer (1986); Hurka (2003), p. 61.3
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goods like successes and failures, a number of philosophers have also reported 
having no intrinsic preference about their temporal location relative to the 
present moment.  And the fact that a longer life is ceteris paribus more likely 4
to contain more and greater non-experiential goods can explain why the 
asymmetry in our attitudes toward birth and death is at least a bit weaker 
than Lucretius proclaimed.  
I shall return to the issue of the temporal location of non-experiential 
goods much later. In the meantime, to make progress, let us grant Lucretius 
his stronger claim as it applies to experiential goods. To the extent that the 
prudential value of the additional life in question is measured in experiential 
goods only, I care about having additional good life by dying later, but not 
about having had it by coming into existence earlier. 
So far I have spoken only of our actual attitudes, having said nothing 
about whether or not these attitudes are justifiable. But whether we have a 
reason to want to die later, or lack a reason to want to have been born earli-
er, is another matter altogether. That is the question I am concerned with 
answering in this chapter.  
Let us label the thesis that this pair of attitudes is, in fact, justifiable 
“the Asymmetry”. 
 Hurka (2003), pp. 61–62; Kamm (1993), pp. 36–37; McMahan (2005a), p. 219. 4
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The Asymmetry: One has a prudential reason to want more good 
life by dying later, but no prudential reason to want more good life 
by having come into existence earlier, at least when the life in 
question is good only in virtue of the experiences it contains.  
It might sound odd to speak of a prudential reason to “want” to have 
been born earlier, since perhaps it seems we can have a reason to want only 
those things that can actually still happen. I use this phrase in its loose 
sense, whereby one has a prudential reason to want something just in case it 
would be in one’s present rational self-interest to have or have had it. Anoth-
er way to put it is in terms of what McMahan has called an individual’s 
“time-relative interest”.  The Asymmetry, as I will construe it, is the claim 5
that at a given time an individual has a time-relative interest in those good 
experiences she would secure by postponing her death, but not in those she 
would have secured by having come into existence earlier than when she did. 
Let me add to this clarification a few other preliminary remarks. 
First, I will generally assume that any additional life one could have 
had, whether by having been born earlier or by dying later, would not have 
increased the number or quality of the non-experiential goods or bads in her 
 McMahan (2002), pp. 105–6, 170–74. 5
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life. I will also assume, unless I specify otherwise, that the additional period 
of life in question is of the same length and quality whether it is appended to 
the beginning of one’s life or its end, and that it is on-balance good life to 
live. Lastly, I will take for granted that, insofar as a period additional life is 
worth wanting, it is worth wanting for its own sake. If I would not have my 
current back pain had I been born earlier than I was, then that itself would 
generate a reason to want to have been born earlier, but the reason is merely 
instrumental and thus it is not a counterexample to the Asymmetry as I am 
conceiving it. 
Now, if we reject the Asymmetry, we will then think that we have as 
much reason to want to have been born earlier as we have to want to die 
later. (I won’t consider the possibility that we have a reason to want to have 
been born earlier but not to die later, which seems to me unmotivated.) We 
might therefore reconcile our pre-theoretic attitudes in one of two directions, 
concluding either that we have as much reason to want to be born earlier as 
we previously took ourselves to have to want to die later, or else that we have 
as little reason to want to die later as we previously took ourselves to have to 
want to have been born earlier.  
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Lucretius himself would have wanted us to take the latter path, thereby 
accepting that we cannot be made worse off when we die earlier than we oth-
erwise would have.  It is very hard to believe that a death which deprives its 6
subject of decades of wonderful existence is not bad for her. But it is also 
highly intuitive that early death is worse for its subject than late birth. Un-
less we can show how the Asymmetry is defensible, then, we may well be 
forced to accept one strongly counterintuitive conclusion. 
I shall argue that the Asymmetry is true. In the following section, I will 
begin by discussing, but ultimately rejecting, a well-known argument to the 
effect that we cannot have a reason to want to have been born earlier because 
to have been so is metaphysically impossible. Following this discussion, I will 
consider the prevailing explanation for why we prefer later death to earlier 
birth: that we are in general biased towards the future. I will consider and 
reject several arguments both for and against the Asymmetry that proceed 
from this claim. Ultimately, I will concede that if the bias toward the future 
 As I noted in the Prelude, the famous “nature’s mirror” passage in Lucretius has sometimes 6
been interpreted as a rally against the fear of death, as opposed to an argument that death 
is not bad for us. But elsewhere in his poem Lucretius is clear that he endorses the latter 
view. He argues for example: “For, if by chance there is to be grief and pain for a man, he 
must himself too exist at that time, that ill may befall him” (1963, Book III, §ii, lines 862–
4).
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really is the source of our preference for later death over earlier birth, then it 
is more likely than not that the Asymmetry is false.  
But the bias toward the future is not, I claim, the source of that prefer-
ence, because we are not biased toward the future. I will show that our pref-
erence for later death over earlier birth is independent of our attitudes to-
ward time, and, consequently, that truths about the metaphysics of time are 
irrelevant to whether or not that preference is justifiable. I then offer an ac-
count of what our actual attitudes are, which I call a bias towards the “suc-
cessive self”.  
I then defend the novel view that the grounds of egoistic or prudential 
concern (what is sometimes styled “what matters in survival”) are asymmet-
ric. In other words, it can be true that a person should now have prudential 
concern with what happens to her later but that she should not later have 
prudential concern with what is happening to her now. More specifically, I 
defend what I call the “One-Directional View”, according to which one ought 
to be prudentially concerned for only those stages of oneself that are causally 
downstream, but those downstream stages themselves should have no pruden-
tial concern with what is happening to one now.  
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Discussants of whether temporal bias is justified have approached the 
question by assuming that a certain type of good is prima facie prudentially 
valuable in the absence of any specification of its temporal location relative 
to the present, and then asking whether the temporal properties it does have 
can affect the extent to which it is in one’s interest to have it. In contrast, I 
suggest that what was previously assumed to be a bias toward the future is 
justifiable on grounds that are internal to the rational prudential concern re-
lation itself. Obviously enough, because death is causally downstream and 
birth is not, the One-Directional View implies the Asymmetry. I conclude by 
showing how my position can also account for our relative indifference as to 
when in our lives non-experiential goods occur. 
1.1. Could I have come into existence earlier? 
I will begin with a well-known argument for the Asymmetry. In a celebrated 
article, Thomas Nagel argued that although we have a reason to want to die 
later when doing so will secure us more good life, we have no reason to want 
to have been born earlier, on the grounds that it is metaphysically impossible 
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for someone to have begun to exist earlier than when she in fact did. In his 
words:  
[A]side from the brief margin permitted by premature labor, [one] 
could not have been born earlier: anyone born substantially earlier 
than he was would have been someone else. . . . Distinct possible 
lives of a single person can diverge from a common beginning, but 
they cannot converge to a common conclusion from diverse 
beginnings.  7
In brief, since I could not have been born earlier, I can have no reason to 
want to have been, but because I can die later, I can have a reason to want 
that.  
Derek Parfit’s response to this argument seems to have been to reject 
the premise that things cannot be worse for us even if it is metaphysically 
impossible that they were otherwise.  By way of illustration, Parfit suggests 8
that it was rational for the Pythagoreans to regret the fact that the square 
root of two is an irrational number, even once they came to accept that it 
 Nagel (1970), p. 79 (emphasis in original).7
 Parfit (1984), p. 175.8
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would have been logically (and hence metaphysically) impossible for it to 
have been anything else.  9
But this does not show that things can be worse for us even if they 
could not have been otherwise; all it shows is that regret can be an appropri-
ate attitude to take toward those things. While that more modest conclusion 
may have been Parfit’s aim, the more important version of Lucretius’ argu-
ment concerns not our emotional attitudes toward being born when we were, 
but whether being born earlier would have been better for us. If Nagel is 
right that I could not have begun to exist other than when I did, then any 
possible world in which I was not born when I was is a world in which I never 
exist. And while there is some plausibility to the claim that it can be better 
for a person to exist than not to exist,  there is scant plausibility to the re10 -
verse claim—namely, that it can be better for a person never to exist than to 
exist. While the disappointment the Pythagoreans felt upon learning the 
truth about the square root of two may well have been rational, the only les-
son we can draw from this is that we can rationally regret something that did 
not make us worse off. 
 Ibid., p. 175.9
 See, for example Arrhenius and Rabinowicz (2010).10
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Let us therefore grant to Nagel that if I could not have been born sub-
stantially earlier, then being born when in fact I was could not be bad for 
me. Several authors have taken issue with the other premise in his argu-
ment—namely, that one could not have come into existence earlier than when 
she in fact did. Since Nagel seems to allow that a slightly earlier birth would 
not have prevented one from coming into existence, and since it is anyway 
not plausible that an individual comes into existence precisely at birth, pre-
sumably he intended birth to function as a proxy for whatever event does 
mark the start of one’s existence—for example, conception. Nagel appears to 
have thought that whatever that event is, had it occurred earlier, I would 
never have existed. 
Unfortunately, Nagel does not say why he thinks it would have been 
impossible for us to come into existence earlier than we did. A natural inter-
pretation of his argument, however, is that it appeals to the standard inter-
pretation of Saul Kripke’s doctrine of the “necessity of origin”, whereby one 
could only have developed from the substance from which one in fact de-
veloped, for instance a particular sperm and egg.  Nagel’s discussants have 11
assumed that this is the thought he was invoking in claiming that an earlier 
 See Kripke (1980); Forbes (1985; 1986); Noonan (1983).11
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birth is impossible.  But as these discussants have also pointed out, it seems 12
false at least of some people that they could not have existed earlier on this 
condition: we might imagine that the sperm and egg that fused to bring 
about a person’s conception had been frozen many years earlier and then 
thawed.  McMahan suggests that maybe even those individuals who were 13
conceived in more traditional ways could in fact have begun to exist earlier 
than they did.  14
But some of Kripke’s comments also indicate a different, less widely dis-
cussed rationale for the necessity of origin, which I think may have been what 
Nagel really had in mind. Kripke’s other argument for the necessity of origin 
concerns the conditions for transworld identity. According to a standard ap-
proach, to find the possible world relevant for analysing a counterfactual 
statement we hold fixed the history of the actual world up until the point at 
which the counterfactual event would have occurred, and then insert that 
event and ask how things would have played out. On the “no-branching” cri-
terion for transworld identity, some object or individual in the actual world is 
identical to an object or individual in the relevant possible world only if it 
 Kamm (1993), p.26; McMahan (2005a); Kagan (2012) pp. 228–9; Johansson (2013); 12
Brueckner and Fischer (1986), p. 220n6.
 Kamm (1993); McMahan (2005); Kagan (2012) pp. 228–9; Johansson (2013).13
 McMahan (2005a) pp. 215–16. 14
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exists in both worlds prior to the time at which they diverge—namely, prior 
to the time at which the relevant counterfactual event would have 
happened.   15
This deeper metaphysical thesis might have been what Nagel had in 
mind when he said that different possible lives of a single person cannot con-
verge from different beginnings. If the no-branching criterion for transworld 
identity is correct, then an individual could not have begun to exist earlier 
than when she did in the actual world, because this would require her to ex-
ist in both the actual and possible world prior to the specified event. This 
premise implies that it is metaphysically impossible for an individual to have 
begun to exist earlier than she did, even if, for instance, the gametes from 
which she was eventually formed already existed then.  16
For all that I have said, though, Nagel’s “impossibility” justification for 
the Asymmetry is unsatisfactory. Even if it is true that I could not have 
come into existence earlier than when I did, there are simple analogues of the 
Asymmetry that cannot be defended on that ground. Suppose you learn 
three surprising things about your life. First, immediately after you came into 
 Kripke (1980), pp. 113–114. More explicit supporters of the no-branching criterion include 15
J. L. Mackie (1974); Penelope Mackie (2006); and George Sher (1979; 2005).
 Kripke (1980), pp. 112–114.16
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existence you were placed into suspended animation and revived ten years 
later. Second, at some point in the future, you will be placed into suspended 
animation for ten years, after which you will die without being revived, but 
had you not been placed into it, you would have lived those ten years nor-
mally and happily. And third, your date of death would have been the same 
whether or not you had passed the first ten years of your existence in sus-
pended animation. If you had not been placed into it, then you would have 
had an extra ten conscious years in the past, and your future thereafter 
would have been no different.  
If you are anything like me, you would feel that the badness of the 
deprivation of conscious life that results from the suspended animation you 
underwent during the first decade of your life is dwarfed by comparison with 
the deprivation that will result from passing your final ten years in it. What 
is more, in the case we have been considering I would have the selfsame 
asymmetrical attitudes towards the deprivation of future and past conscious 
life that I have in the ordinary case, in which the deprivation, if there is one, 
is due to nonexistence.  
For convenience, I shall continue to compare deprivations of good life 
due to early death with those due to coming into existence later than one 
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could have, on the assumption that the latter is indeed metaphysically pos-
sible. But even if it is not possible, the analogue sketched above raises all the 
same puzzles. For that reason, the Asymmetry cannot be defended along the 
lines Nagel proposes. 
1.2. The “biased toward the future” answer 
While Nagel maintains that the impossibility of being born earlier justifies 
having asymmetrical attitudes towards birth and death, he is careful to deny 
that this provides the explanation for why we have the relevant attitudes. 
That explanation, he surmises, requires “a general treatment of the difference 
between past and future in our attitudes toward our own lives.”  Nagel is 17
hardly alone in thinking that the explanation for Lucretius’ observation is 
just a particular case of a more general asymmetry between our attitudes 
toward past and future goods. The claim has been repeated by many authors, 
among them Parfit, Kagan, McMahan, Meghan Sullivan, and Samuel 
Scheffler.  18
 Nagel (1970), p. 80n3.17
 Parfit (1984); Kagan (2012); McMahan (2005a); Sullivan (2018) chapter 7; Scheffler (2018) 18
chapter 4.
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Call a person “biased toward the future” or “future-biased” if for a giv-
en good she prefers it to be in the future rather than the past or for a given 
bad she prefers it to be in the past rather than the future, and does so 
merely on the basis of its temporal location relative to the present.  (I use 19
“bias” in a non-normative sense.) In a widely discussed article, Anthony 
Brueckner and John Martin Fischer claim that the proposition that future-
bias is the source of the relevant attitudes is alone sufficient to justify the 
Asymmetry. As they write: 
If death occurs in the future, then it is a deprivation of something 
to which we look forward and about which we care—future 
experienced goods. But prenatal nonexistence is a deprivation of 
past experienced goods, goods to which we are indifferent. Death 
deprives us of something we care about, whereas prenatal 
nonexistence deprives us of something to which we are 
indifferent.  20
In short, they claim that because it is bad for us to be deprived of 
something we care about, but not of something about which we are indiffer-
ent, the Asymmetry is rationally defensible. 
 Parfit (1984), p. 165.19
 Brueckner and Fischer (1986), p. 219.20
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Brueckner and Fischer’s argument has generated a good deal of discus-
sion, much of which has centred on the question of whether desiring some-
thing is necessary for it to be in one’s interest to have it. Thus, Jens Johans-
son replies that things can be good for us as long as we would have wanted 
them had we had them,  and Fred Feldman argues that pleasures can be 21
good for even those individuals who lack the capacity to desire them.  22
But we might instead wonder whether desiring something is sufficient 
for it to be in one’s interest to have it. Brueckner and Fischer argue from the 
thought that we are future-biased to the conclusion that our attitudes toward 
birth and death are justified. On their account, our more general pattern of 
desires regarding the past and the future simply comes pre-justified, on the 
grounds that we have a reason to want something whenever we actually want 
it. But that is a controversial assumption. 
So-called “Humeans about reasons” believe that I have a reason to want 
something when and only when it would fulfil, or help to fulfil, some desire 
that I have.  And among those who are not Humeans about reasons, many 23
are preference-satisfactionists about wellbeing, some of whom hold that 
 Johansson (2013; 2014). 21
 Feldman (2013).22
 The most famous contemporary defence of this position, which is also called “reasons in23 -
ternalism”, is Williams (1979). 
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something is in one’s self-interest to have if and only if it would satisfy, or 
help to satisfy, at least one of her current, actual preferences.  But these 24
philosophers would not think that there is an independent puzzle about 
whether the attitudes in question are rational. They may be curious why we 
have these attitudes, and one plausible hypothesis for that psychological 
question is that we have them because in general we are biased to prefer 
good experiences be in the future rather than the past. But those who believe 
that something is in our interest whenever we desire it should not have 
doubted the Asymmetry in the first place.  
For those who, like me, are neither Humeans about reasons nor actual-
preference-satisfactionists about wellbeing, it is an open question whether we 
have a stronger reason to want to extend our lives by postponing death than 
we have to extend them by having begun to exist earlier. And it is not clear 
how Brueckner and Fischer have provided any answer to that question. 
As I say, those who have discussed the Asymmetry generally all agree 
that our preference for a later death over an earlier birth is explained by the 
 Preference-satisfactionists of other stripes, such as those who think that a satisfied prefer24 -
ence contributes to my wellbeing only if it is informed or ideally rational, should still find 
Brueckner and Fischer’s argument unsatisfying. For it remains an open question whether we 
would prefer a later death to an earlier birth with full information and after due delibera-
tion.
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fact that we are biased toward the future. It is instructive to ask why, in 
turn, we are thought to be biased toward the future in the first place.  
Some claim that the explanation is our belief that the future is open or 
undetermined in a way that the past is not, or, relatedly, that we can affect 
the future but not the past. But these explanations are not persuasive. As 
Parfit pointed out, we would not normally care either more or less about 
some experience in the future—some pain, for example—merely when and 
because we could be sure that we could do nothing to prevent it occurring.  25
The much more plausible and widely endorsed explanation is that we 
exhibit the bias toward the future because of a deep-rooted conviction in the 
passage of time. We all feel, intuitively, as though time moves forward—what 
is present will become past, what is future will become present, and what is 
already past will retreat further away from the present as time flows onward. 
This conviction seems to provide a natural explanation of the bias toward the 
future. In short: we care about experiences precisely because of what it’s like 
to undergo them in the present, and future experiences, but not past ones, 
will one day be present. As Kamm puts it, 
 Parfit (1984), pp. 168–70. Kamm (1993, p. 28) also objects on this basis to the explana25 -
tions in question. 
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Presumably the preference for future over past experienced goods 
is related to the fact that a person in the present, though not now 
enjoying either past or future goods, is yet to experience the future 
because of time's passage.  26
This provides a plausible explanation for why I would care much less 
about having an earlier birth than about postponing death. Because I in-
stinctively believe that time passes, I feel that by delaying my death I will 
secure additional good life that I will one day get to experience in the 
present. But by the same token, I also feel that whatever good life I might 
have realised by having begun to exist earlier than I did could never again be 
experienced. 
The alleged connection between future-bias and our belief in the pas-
sage of time has led some philosophers to infer that whether future-bias is 
justified will ultimately depend on truths about the metaphysics of time. 
Thus Parfit concluded that “[i]f time's passage is an illusion, temporal neut-
rality cannot be irrational”—by which he meant that if it is an illusion then 
we cannot have more reason to care, for its own sake, whether an experience 
is in the past or the future.  Other authors have more explicitly argued that 27
 Kamm (1993), p. 28. See also Parfit (1984), p. 178.26
 Parfit (1984), p. 181.27
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if time’s passage is real then the Asymmetry is true.  Parfit himself ex28 -
pressed some scepticism whether even the reality of time’s passage would be 
sufficient to justify the bias toward the future, but ultimately he left that 
possibility open. He was clear, though, in his belief that if time’s passage is 
not real then future-bias in general, and the Asymmetry in particular, are 
indefensible.  29
Unfortunately, as far as I can tell Parfit never spelled out in detail his 
argument to that effect. But Meghan Sullivan has suggested an argument 
which corresponds well to some of Parfit’s own remarks and may have been 
what he had in mind.  Sullivan’s argument against the bias toward the fu30 -
ture exploits an analogy between time and space. If we believe that there are 
objective, mind-independent facts about what times are past, present, and 
future, we accept what is known as the “A-Theory” of time. If we deny this, 
we accept what is called the “B-Theory”. According to the B-Theory, the 
temporal location of an event in time is analogous to its location in space. 
Just as there is no non-indexical fact of the matter about what is “here”, 
 Deng (2015); Robson (2014).28
 Parfit (1984), pp. 175, 181. 29
 Parfit (1984), p. 178; Sullivan (2018), pp. 109–110. Note that Sullivan stops short of en30 -
dorsing the argument, for she does not want her arguments against future-bias to depend on 
the metaphysics of time and does not herself affirm the B-Theory. 
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there is, according to the B-Theorist, no non-indexical fact about what is 
“now”. Just as “London is here” is true if and only if uttered in London, 
“2019 is present” is true if and only if uttered in 2019. Only if the A-Theory 
is true can time’s passage be mind-independent and real. The argument 
against future-bias from the B-Theory of time seems to be this:  31
(1) If the B-Theory is true, the temporal location of an event 
relative to the present is like the spatial location of an event 
relative to what location is here. 
(2) The spatial location of an event is arbitrary from the rational 
point of view. 
(3) Hence, the temporal location of an event is also arbitrary from 
the rational point of view. 
Premise (1) follows by definition. In support of (2), let us grant for the 
sake of argument that it is in itself bad for me when my partner is unfaithful, 
even if I never learn about this fact. Surely, I should not care, for its own 
sake, whether my partner was unfaithful to me here or elsewhere. According 
to the argument at hand, then, if the B-Theory is true it would also be no 
 Sullivan (2018), pp. 109–110.31
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worse for me if my partner is unfaithful in the past rather than the future, all 
else equal.  
We have already seen, though, that the temporal location of non-experi-
ential goods does not matter much to us. Yet when it comes to experiential 
goods and bads, the argument at hand is not as straightforward as it has 
been made out to be. The reason is that experiences are essentially spatially 
indexed in a way that other events are not. It is not true that an experience I 
am having could be anywhere but here. And if, counterpossibly, an experi-
ence I am now having could be elsewhere, then it is unclear that its location 
would be arbitrary from a rational point of view. So it is not clear why we 
should accept (2) when it comes to the very sort of goods to which the bias 
toward the future is meant to apply.  
Someone who wants to reject the bias toward the future on the basis of 
the metaphysics of time should not, I think, appeal to the metaphysical sim-
ilarity of time and space to defend that premise. But it seems to me that a 
better argument is available. If the B-Theory is true, there is a sense in which 
we should view all times as equally present, or, alternatively none of them as 
present. Although only one set of my experiences is taking place now (to wit, 
taking place at the time this sentence is being read), all of my experiences 
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are still happening in the tenseless sense of that verb. Perhaps in that tense-
less sense of happening, we should not care, for its own sake, whether these 
experiences are happening last year or happening next week.  
If successful, this argument would provide a powerful case against the 
Asymmetry. Many physicists and philosophers accept the B-Theory of time, 
and that theory suggests that one does not have an independent reason to 
care, for its own sake, whether some experience is in the past or the future. 
On the assumption that our attitudes toward earlier birth and later death 
really are, as many authors have claimed, the products of the more general 
bias toward the future, then this is itself a prima facie case against the 
Asymmetry. For if we come to believe that a normative attitude we hold is 
based on a metaphysical claim that is false, we should take this to constitute 
a presumption against the attitude, since any independent support for it 
would obtain only by coincidence.  
1.3. We are not biased toward the future 
But the bias toward the future is not the source of these attitudes, for we do 
not, in fact, care more about deprivations of life on the basis of their location 
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in time. Furthermore, once we get clear on what our attitudes toward various 
deprivations of goods actually involve—a bias toward what I’ll call the 
“subjective future”—we shall see both that their source is unrelated to any 
independent conviction that time really passes and that the metaphysics of 
time can do nothing whatsoever to undermine them. 
 To begin with, suppose that tomorrow I will either die or else travel 
back in time to the year 1350, in which case I will live out the remainder of 
my days happily in the fourteenth century. I would greatly hope to travel 
back in time and, by comparison with that prospect, would regard dying in-
stead to be a grave misfortune. More importantly, however, I would regard 
living out the rest of my life in the fourteenth century to be no worse a pro-
spect than living the same length and quality of life as usual, here in the 
twenty-first century. Of course, I have contingent reasons to want to stay in 
my own epoch. Perhaps I am eagerly anticipating the 2024 Olympics; per-
haps I would be sad to part with my friends and family (though we might, 
without issue, just suppose I can take them with me). But when I factor out 
these extrinsic considerations, living out the rest of my days in an age long 
before my birth seems about as good as living them here in the present day. 
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One thing this case seems to show is that, contrary to what Lucretius 
his discussants have taken for granted, far from being indifferent toward peri-
ods of nonexistence that precede our birth, we sometimes regard them with 
the same concern we have toward the nonexistence that will follow our death. 
Much more importantly, however, it seems to be a case in which, when it 
comes to securing additional good life, the strength of my preference for it is 
unaffected by its temporal location relative to the present. 
Before going any further let me pause to forestall two objections. First, 
it may be said that our intuitions about far-fetched cases involving backward 
time travel can tell us nothing about how we ought to apportion our pruden-
tial concern in the real world. But at this stage I am not concerned to answer 
that normative question. My intention is just to bring out our actual atti-
tudes toward deprivations of life in the past and the future. When we ima-
gine this case, and the others to come, we have strong reactions about them, 
so even if physical or philosophical investigation revealed backward time 
travel to be impossible, this would do nothing to undermine this observation 
about the structure of our actual attitudes.  32
 Parfit (1984, p. 199) makes a similar point about the conceivability of his famous tele32 -
transportation cases. See also Unger (1990), pp. 84–85. 
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Second, it may be said that when we imagine travelling back in time in 
this case, and respond to it as we do, we are implicitly conceiving the four-
teenth century to be in the metaphysical future. If that were true, then the 
case would do nothing to show that we are not future-biased, since the 
strength of the desire to go on living in the fourteenth century would be 
based on our impression that we would thereby go on living as usual in the 
future.  But I think that when we imagine this case we do fully grasp that to 33
live on in the fourteenth century is to live on in what is now the past. To see 
this, we need only pick some event that is scheduled to occur later than the 
date of my time travel; say, the return in 2061 of Halley’s Comet. If, as this 
objection holds, I were really implicitly imagining the fourteenth century to 
be in the future when considering the case at hand, then, upon believing that 
I was soon going to travel back in time, I would conceive of the 2061 return 
of Halley’s comet as though it would happen 700 years from now. But I do 
not think of it in that way. Rather, I understand both that forty-odd years in 
the future Halley’s Comet will breach the inner solar system and that by that 
time I will have long since travelled back to the fourteenth century. That 
 Of course, I do not deny that there is a way in which it would seem to me as though the 33
fourteenth century is in the future. One day I would be in the twenty-first century and the 
next I would be in the fourteenth century; absent external markers, my perception of time’s 
passage is the same whether or not I travel back in time.
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seems to answer the objection that in this case I am implicitly conceiving the 
fourteenth century to be in the future. In any event, whatever one thinks of 
this reply, the next case I offer is not vulnerable to the objection. 
Now suppose that I have successfully travelled back in time. I have 
settled into my new life here in the fourteenth century. One day I awaken in 
the sick-house, having just recovered from a brief bout of the Plague. I find 
myself unsure whether I am forty or fifty years old, because I cannot remem-
ber whether the year of my birth is 1986 or 1976. I would, I submit, have no 
more concern for whether my date of birth is in 1976 or 1986 than I ordinar-
ily have. And yet, as I ponder this question from my sickbed, I would under-
stand that my birth is in the future. I would gaze forward to a time, long 
after my death, and understand that after all the intervening historical 
events, I will be born. But the fact that I conceive my birth to be in the fu-
ture does nothing whatsoever to make me care more about securing addition-
al good life by being born earlier. My desire for an earlier birth is unchanged 
with respect to the ordinary case. 
Let me take stock. We have, first, a case in which I regard delaying my 
death no differently whether the additional life I would thereby secure would 
be in the future or the past; and, second, a case in which I regard having an 
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earlier birth no differently whether the additional life it would secure is in the 
past or the future. And in neither case do the relative intensities of my atti-
tudes differ from those in the cases in which my birth and death are in the 
customary temporal directions from the present. 
These cases show that our asymmetrical attitudes toward birth and 
death do not betray a bias toward the future. Moreover, they show those at-
titudes to be independent of any implicit conviction in the objectivity of 
time’s passage. Consider my first time travel case. Relative to the present, 
the good life I stand to gain by travelling back to the fourteenth century is in 
the past, whereas the good life which I stand to gain by living on in the usual 
way would be in the future. But I regard the deprivation of one to be no 
harsher than the deprivation of the other. If my attitudes about the temporal 
locations of experiential goods were really based on the belief that only goods 
in the future will one day be present, then I would find living on by traveling 
back in time markedly less desirable than living on in the usual fashion. But 
I do not. My preference for later death over earlier birth has nothing to do 
with whether the life I stand to gain is earlier or later than the present mo-
ment. The assumption that the source of these attitudes is a bias toward the 
future is a red herring. Far from the metaphysics of time determining wheth-
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er these attitudes are rational or not, neither our belief in the passage of time 
nor the truth of that belief has anything to do with them. 
Let me conclude this section by noting that there are straightforward 
parallel arguments that the bias toward the future is not the explanation for 
our attitudes toward good and bad experiences which do not affect our 
lifespans. Here is an example. Suppose that at midnight I might or might not 
travel back in time. I would care no less, for its own sake, about a pain or a 
pleasure that occurs a week after I arrive in the past than I would care about 
one that would occur in a week’s time here in the twenty-first century, should 
it turn out that I will not travel back.  
1.4. Our actual attitudes 
I shall take myself to have established that our attitudes toward deprivations 
of life at different times are not attitudes about the temporal location of 
events relative to the present. We can now ask what our attitudes toward 
those deprivations actually are. As a natural first step, borrowing some 
terminology from David Lewis, we can distinguish external time from 
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personal time.  When tomorrow I will travel back to 1350, the year 1375 is 34
in my future in personal time: between now and then my beard will continue 
to grow, my wristwatch will count the passing hours as usual, and so forth. 
But in external time, 1375 is in the past: the fourteenth century is earlier 
than the present day.  
A natural first try, then, is to say that what matters to me is not the 
procurement of additional good life in the external future but rather addi-
tional good life in my personal future. But a moment’s reflection shows this 
will not quite do. For in the second case I considered—in which I have 
already settled in the fourteenth century—my birth is then in my personal 
future—it’s just that it occurs at a time long after my death.  And yet, as 35
we saw, in the fourteenth century I do not care much at all about how early 
or late my date of birth is. When it comes to extending our lives, it seems 
that our preference is for that good life which is not only in our personal fu-
tures but also before our deaths (or after our counterfactual deaths, depend-
ing on the question we are asking). Let us call that portion of a person’s life 
her subjective future. When it comes to extending my life, I am, it seems, 
biased toward the subjective future. 
 Lewis (1976a), pp. 147–48. 34
 It is in what Lewis called my extended personal future. Lewis (1976a), p. 147. 35
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We can next distinguish a person from that person’s life, where a life is 
not identical to a person, as these terms are sometimes used, but is rather 
what she lives—it is the sequence of events that happen to her.  What 36
defines that part of a person’s life that is in her subjective future? It is, I 
submit, that part of her life which will be lived by those temporal stages of 
herself which are causally downstream from her present self, connected to it 
by unbroken chains of causal dependence. Certain stages of oneself are caus-
ally dependent on oneself now, in the sense that they arise out of or continue 
the current stage. What properties are involved in that dependence will 
simply be those specified by the correct theory of personal identity over time; 
perhaps the properties are mental or physical or both.  And what counts as 37
the right kind of dependence is just whatever counts in other cases of person-
al identity (I shall return to this question in more detail later).  
We can now clarify how, in the fourteenth century, I do not care much 
whether my date of birth is in 1976 rather than 1986. Although by being 
born in 1976 I would secure an extra decade of good life, and although that 
 As far as I know Kagan (1993) was the first to explicitly identify this difference.36
 For more developed discussions of the nature of this causal dependence see Lewis (1976b); 37
Nozick (1981); Shoemaker (1984); Parfit (1984); Sidelle (2011). 
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life would be in the future, that segment of my life will not be lived by a 
temporal stage of myself that is causally downstream from me now.  
Philosophers who have discussed the bias toward the future have, un-
derstandably, been tempted to describe it as the special concern one has for 
one’s “future self”. But, as I hope is now clear, characterising the pattern of 
concern using temporal concepts is problematic. Let us therefore call those 
stages of me that are in my subjective future my successive selves, and say 
that all of them together constitute my successive self.  My special concern 38
with what happens in the part of my life that constitutes my subjective fu-
ture is really a special concern for what happens to my successive self. (Of 
course, in ordinary cases, that concern coincides with my concern for what 
happens in the external future. It is in cases involving backward time travel 
that my concern for my successive self and my concern about what happens 
in the future diverge.) 
Having established that our attitudes toward birth and death track not 
a bias toward the future but rather a special concern for our successive 
selves, we can now ask whether that attitude is justified. To that end, let us 
leave time travel behind, and confine our discussion to cases in which one’s 
 I borrow these phrases from Parfit (1984, p. 301), who uses them interchangeably with 38
“future selves” and “future self”.
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subjective future coincides with the external future. In what follows I want to 
suggest that the desire for a given good experience to be in our subjective 
future is justified on the same basis as the desire to want good experiences at 
all.  
1.5. Personal identity and prudential concern:  
 another asymmetry 
The last half-century has witnessed a profusion of interest in the question of 
the grounds of rational prudential concern for what happens at other times—
what is sometimes styled “what matters in survival”.  This question concerns 39
when and why I should now regard something that will happen to an 
individual at another time with that same special sort of egoistic solicitude 
with which I would ordinarily regard it were it happening to me, as opposed 
to how I would ordinarily regard it were it happening to somebody else. For 
instance, Parfit famously argued that personal identity itself is not among the 
bases of rational prudential concern, and accordingly that a person should 
 Parfit (1984), p. 298 and elsewhere.39
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not be rationally concerned with the end of her existence so long as certain 
other relations will continue to hold between her and someone else.  40
It is a striking fact about all discussions of the bases of rational pruden-
tial concern of which I am aware that they consider only cases that involve 
one’s relationship to future individuals. Thus Bernard Williams titled his 
early and influential essay on the topic “The Self and the Future”, and in it 
considers cases in which one will undergo certain drastic, potentially identity-
altering changes, and asks the reader to consider whether he or she would re-
gard a subsequent episode of torture with same the dread she would have to-
ward it were the changes not to take place.  Peter Unger generalises and de41 -
fends Williams’s methodology, exploiting at length what he calls the “sacri-
fice for future wellbeing test”; in these cases, one can sacrifice some amount 
of present wellbeing for the sake of the wellbeing of some future individual 
who may or may not be oneself.  Many others have employed the sacrifice 42
for future well-being test either explicitly or implicitly, and most have also 
made use of Parfit’s well-known examples of brain division and teletransport-
 Parfit (2007) later admitted to having conflated the so-called “desirability” and “pruden40 -
tial” questions of what matters in survival. I am concerned here with the (more general) 
prudential question, which is the one I describe. For a useful analysis of the demarcation see 
also Unger (1990), pp. 93–97.
 Williams (1970).41
 Unger (1990).42
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ation, all in an attempt to uncover the true bases of rational prudential con-
cern.   43
But Williams never considers whether, if the torture had already oc-
curred and was followed by the drastic changes to oneself, one would regard 
it to be as bad as a past episode of torture after which no such changes had 
occurred. Nowhere in his otherwise impressively comprehensive book does 
Unger consider a sacrifice for past wellbeing test. Parfit does not ask whether 
having half the brain of a previous individual, or being recreated according to 
the scan of the brain and body of someone else, is as good as having 
survived.  To the best of my knowledge, the other authors who make use of 44
these and other cases never consider the conditions under which rational 
prudential concern is preserved between oneself and an individual in the past. 
And yet, in reading all these authors, one might be forgiven for suppos-
ing that they have in mind that the conditions they entertain or defend 
would apply between oneself and individuals that exist at any time, not just 
times in the future. By fixating on cases that involve one’s relationship to fu-
ture individuals, those who aim to discover the grounds of rational prudential 
 For instance, Holtug (2010); Noonan (2019); McMahan (2002); Otsuka (2017). 43
 Interestingly, Parfit does consider these cases in an argument that reductionism about per44 -
sonal identity implies that no one can deserve to be punished for past wrongs (1986a, pp. 
838–840), but never extends the discussion to prudential concern for past individuals. 
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concern have thus neglected to consider whether the answers they entertain 
can be generalised to give us the grounds of rational prudential concern for 
individuals at any time. 
Now, when it comes to the question of personal identity across time, the 
assumption that the conditions for identity to a future individual will gener-
alise to the conditions for identity to an individual at any time is warranted. 
That is because the identity relation is symmetric. A relation is symmetric 
when its converse is the same relation as itself. (The converse of a binary re-
lation is the unique relation that obtains when its elements are reversed—the 
converse of “child of”, for instance, is “parent of”.) “Sibling of” is an example 
of a symmetric relation. And because identity is symmetric (if A=B then, ne-
cessarily, B=A), the converse of any relation that is necessary or sufficient for 
identity to hold between oneself and an individual in the future will also be 
necessary or sufficient, respectively, for identity to hold between oneself and 
an individual in the past.  45
Note that this is true even if the relation that underwrites identity is 
not itself symmetric. For, while some relations sometimes thought to play a 
role in personal identity are themselves symmetric—spatio-temporal continu-
 I here take for granted that we are reductionists about personal identity, but this assump45 -
tion is not necessary for my eventual main argument, which concerns not the grounds of 
identity but those of rational prudential concern.
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ity, for example—others are asymmetric, like those involved in anticipation, 
intention, and memory. The converse of “remembers having the experiences 
of”, for instance, is “is currently having experiences that will be remembered 
by”. Still, because identity is symmetric, if it turns out that Y is the same 
person as X whenever Y remembers having the experiences of X, then X 
must be the same person as Y whenever X is currently having experiences 
that will be remembered by Y. 
Since personal identity is symmetric, it is natural to assume that the 
prudential concern relation is, too. After all, it is generally unquestioned that 
in conventional cases in which identity across time is preserved, what matters 
in survival is also preserved.  But I will assume, for well-known reasons, that 46
personal identity itself is not necessary for rational prudential concern.  And 47
if that is right, then it is an open question whether the prudential concern 
relation is also symmetric. Suppose, for the sake of illustration, that it is true 
that at t1 (which is now) I should be prudentially concerned with what hap-
pens to me at t2 because, at t2, I will remember having the experiences I am 
 The exception being cases involving infancy and early childhood, of which it is not un46 -
common to deny that the grounds of rational prudential concern track identity. See, for in-
stance, McMahan (2002). 
 In particular, I have in mind cases involving the fission of one individual into multiple in47 -
dividuals.
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now having. It remains an open question whether at t2 I should be concerned 
with what happened to me at t1. 
Why has the possibility that the prudential concern relation is asym-
metric been largely overlooked? I have already suggested one possible explan-
ation: it is typically taken for granted that throughout most parts of most 
lives rational prudential concern and personal identity coincide, and the iden-
tity relation is symmetric. But the primary explanation, I conjecture, is just 
that discussions of the grounds of rational prudential concern have confined 
themselves to what matters in survival—to cases involving one’s relationship 
to individuals, or to temporal stages of individuals, that exist at times later 
than the present moment. Those who restrict their investigations in this way 
will never confront the question of whether or not the prudential concern re-
lation is symmetric. 
1.6. In defence of the Asymmetry 
It is my contention that the grounds of rational prudential concern for what 
happens at other times are indeed asymmetric. In particular, I claim, they 
hold only between oneself and individuals, or the temporal stages of 
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individuals, that are causally downstream from oneself now. We can put this 
claim in terms of one’s time-relative interest in having some good. Relative to 
a given time, I will argue, a person has an interest in having some good only 
if she is having it now or it will be had by her successive self. To prevent 
misunderstanding, I do accept that there are some prudential reasons to be 
concerned with what happened to oneself at times that are not in one’s 
subjective future, and I shall have more to say about what those reasons are 
later. I maintain, however, that even those reasons are merely derivative: they 
obtain only insofar as they improve the condition of oneself now or of one’s 
successive self. 
We can begin our investigation with the modest observation that almost 
every contemporary account of the conditions for rational prudential concern 
across time includes among those conditions some kind of causal continuity. 
Accounts vary widely with respect to both the relevant states of individuals 
that are to be continuous if the prudential concern relation is to hold, as well 
as with respect to the scope of causal dependence that is sufficient for that 
continuity. Parfit’s position, for example, seems to have been that the relev-
ant states are psychological ones, and that almost any kind of causal depend-
ence will do. Other philosophers place physical states among the relevant 
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ones, and yet others agree with Parfit that the only relevant states are psy-
chological but think the causal dependence must be narrower for the grounds 
of prudential concern to be preserved, perhaps requiring the continuity of 
parts of the brain.  
What all these accounts have in common, however, is that they seem to 
implicitly assume what we might call the “Two-Directional View”: 
Two-Directional View: The causal condition on rational prudential 
concern is symmetric. Provided the right states obtain in X and Y, 
and provided Y’s states depend causally on X’s in the right way 
such that X should be prudentially concerned for Y, then Y should 
be prudentially concerned for X. 
In contrast, I defend the “One-Directional View”:  
One-Directional View: The causal continuity condition on rational 
prudential concern is asymmetric. X should be prudentially con-
cerned for Y if and only if the right states obtain in X and Y and 
Y’s states depend causally on X’s.  48
 It is worth noting that in his discussion of temporal biases, Parfit rejects the claim that 48
the “direction of causation” justifies the bias toward the future (1984, p. 168). But by the 
direction of causation he means only the proposal that the bias could be justified on the 
grounds that it matters whether or not I can affect the future. His arguments there do not 
concern, and go no way toward undermining, my own thesis that the direction of causation is 
among the grounds of rational concern themselves.
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At the risk of stating the obvious, let me be explicit about how this all 
relates to the Asymmetry. On the Two-Directional View, the prudential con-
cern relation runs in either causal direction. If that view is true, then the 
Asymmetry is prima facie unjustified. If it is to be justified, it must be so on 
the basis of some independent premise that supplements the rational pruden-
tial concern relation. On the One-Directional View, the Asymmetry is prima 
facie justified. What once appeared to be a bias toward the future, and which 
we now know is actually a bias toward one’s successive self, is built into the 
prudential concern relation itself. 
In weighing up these two views, it is helpful to begin by asking why 
causal continuity has been thought indispensable in the first place. The reas-
on is that its inclusion is necessary to avoid the counterintuitive implication 
that rational prudential concern is preserved in cases of “random 
duplication”.  These are cases in which, at some time after your death, a mo49 -
lecule-to-molecule duplicate of you just happens to pop into existence. This 
duplicate will not be created by scanning your body and reproducing it from 
 See for example Nozick (1970), pp. 41–2; Shoemaker (1984), pp. 115–120; Unger (1990), p. 49
67. Kolak and Martin (1987) and Elliot (1991) maintain that these cases preserve identity; 
they are also the only authors I know of who have attempted to reject the causal condition 
wholesale.
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new matter according to the scan—there is no counterfactual dependence at 
all. It is simply a random quirk of chance that happens to occur. 
Many of us would regard the prospect of random duplication to be a 
very bad one. Suppose you know that you will be vaporised tonight in your 
sleep and a random duplicate of you will later pop into existence, replacing 
you in your bed. If you are anything like me, this prospect fills you with hor-
ror. True, because presumably your duplicate will carry out the life you oth-
erwise expected to live, this may not be as bad as vaporisation without re-
placement. For instance, some desires you now have will go on to be fulfilled, 
desires which would not be fulfilled had you not been replaced by a duplicate. 
But, intuitively, vaporisation is nonetheless a profound misfortune. Even if it 
would not be as bad as ordinary death, it seems far closer to it than to or-
dinary survival. 
Because this instance of vaporisation-replacement is in your subjective 
future, the One- and Two-Directional Views treat it the same. Both correctly 
imply that the prospect would be very bad for you, since all the good life you 
would otherwise have had in the future will now accrue to somebody who is 
causally discontinuous with you.  
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Suppose now that you learn you were mistaken: in fact, the vaporisation 
took place yesterday, and you are the random duplicate. If you are like me, 
this news does not disturb you in the same way. It simply does not feel to me 
like I have lost something of profound prudential value. There are grounds to 
regret being a duplicate and I shall shortly discuss some of them. For now, 
however, it suffices to note that learning that I am soon to be vaporised and 
randomly replaced is very different to learning that someone else was vapor-
ised and randomly replaced by me. 
Now, if the explanation of why in ordinary cases we care about having 
good experiences in the future rather than the past was that we believe in 
time’s passage, a defender of the Two-Directional View could account for why 
we react differently to these two cases as follows. Upon learning that we are 
the duplicates, we are less concerned about the past good life we have lost 
because it seems to us that the experiences it contains are forever in the past. 
When we will be vaporised tonight, on the other hand, the prudential con-
cern relation is severed between us and someone whose experiences will one 
day be present.  
But as we have seen, pace Parfit and many others, our preference about 
when good experiences happen is independent of our belief that time passes 
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and cannot be explained by the conviction that, unlike future experiences, 
those in the past will never again take place.  
The One-Directional View, on the other hand, implies that our reac-
tions to the two duplication-replacement cases are what they should be. 
When I will be vaporised tonight, I stand to lose out on all the good life that 
would otherwise have accrued to stages of myself that are downstream from 
me now. In contrast, when I learn that I am the random duplicate of some-
body who was vaporised yesterday, the good experiences I have lost are not 
something I had a prudential reason to want in the first place, because they 
would have belonged to stages of myself that are causally upstream.  
At this point it may be objected that restricting the causal condition to 
a single direction is a move that is ad hoc or arbitrary. But its endorsement 
could be no less arbitrary than the endorsement of the already widely-as-
sumed Two-Directional View, since the chief motivation for the inclusion of 
causal condition in the first place is to exclude future random duplication 
cases, and the One-Directional View handles those equally well.  
Moreover, the fact that the One-Directional View can easily account for 
our intuitions about both duplication cases is already an additional reason to 
accept it. Lastly, for those of us who think coherence between a principle and 
Was I Born Too Late? |  73
case-based judgments provides additional justification for each, the fact that 
the One-Directional View implies the bias toward the successive self already 
provides some support for both. Since at this point the Two-Directional View 
has no advantages of its own, that is already reason, I believe, to accept the 
One-Directional View—and with it the Asymmetry.  
For all that, however, I accept that some theory better according with 
our intuitions than its alternatives is not by itself enough to warrant high 
confidence in its truth. For that, we need some intuitively compelling under-
lying rationale for why the view would actually matter. While the Two-Direc-
tional View faces the same challenge—showing why causal dependence in 
either direction matters in the first place—ideally we can find some inde-
pendent, normatively satisfactory reason to think that not just casual de-
pendence, but causal dependence in one direction only, is rationally signific-
ant. Is there any such rationale available? 
I believe that there is. When what is now my future self is also my suc-
cessive self, it is someone I will become; into whom I will grow and evolve.  50
Many of my present thoughts, desires, and intentions will develop into new 
thoughts and desires or give rise to actions. My successive self is someone 
 Indeed, Michael Otsuka (2017) contends that prudential concern is rational only for those 50
individuals whom one will “be or become”. Taken literally, the verb “become” applies only to 
the relationship between oneself now and one’s successive selves.
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who will continue me. That these considerations matter has a ring of truth to 
it that its converse—that I have an egoistic interest in what happens to the 
individual whose life I have continued—lacks.  
I will conclude my discussion by considering an objection. There may 
seem to be one respect in which our attitudes toward later death and early 
birth do not accord with the picture I have been defending. At the beginning 
of this chapter, I restricted the Asymmetry to experiential goods only, on the 
grounds that arguably it is in a person’s interest to have non-experiential 
goods like accomplishments and successes at any moment in her life, not just 
in her subjective future. Does the One-Directional View fail on this count? 
I suggest that it does not. The reason is that having had more non-ex-
periential goods in one’s past makes one better off in the present. Other 
things being equal, it is better for a person now to exist within a life that 
contains more and greater accomplishments. Think back to the case we con-
sidered at the beginning of this chapter, of which we asked whether it would 
be better to now be forty or fifty years old, given that one’s date of death 
would be the same in either case. When I reasoned that if I am fifty rather 
than forty I am likely to have achieved more worthwhile things, it does not 
seem to me a stretch to say that I was reasoning that if I turn out to be fifty, 
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then I am better off now. Existing within a grander life is, on this picture, a 
higher-order good that one has an interest in having at any given time within 
the life, which in turn explains why we have a reason to want non-experien-
tial goods that are not in our subjective futures. Of course, this way of look-
ing at things assumes that a person can be made better off at a given time in 
virtue of things which have no intrinsic effect upon her at that time, but 
those who believe in non-experiential goods must already accept that possib-
ility.  
We can note, in closing, that this point also explains why I should not 
be wholly unconcerned, even on purely egoistic grounds, to learn that I am 
the random duplicate of someone vaporised yesterday. If I am a duplicate, 
then all the things I believe I have achieved are not, in fact, part of my life. 
For that reason, if I am a duplicate, I am worse off, now, than I would oth-
erwise be.  
1.7. Conclusion 
Most of us wish we could live on at least for a while longer than we in fact 
will, yet care little that we were not born earlier. This pair of asymmetrical 
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attitudes is, I have argued, defensible. We are perfectly right to want to die 
later but not to care much about having been born earlier. I have tried to 
show that is pair of attitudes is not, as has been supposed, the product of a 
more general preference for experiential goods to be in the future rather than 
in the past. Instead, it tracks the preference that good things happen to a 
part of oneself that is downstream from the present.  
Philosophers have assumed that if I have a non-instrumental reason to 
want some good to be located at one time rather than another, this must be 
because the event’s temporal location is itself rationally significant. In other 
words, the established order of investigation has begun by taking for granted 
that I should be equally prudentially concerned with goods for their own sake 
in the absence of any specification of their temporal properties, and then ask-
ing whether there is something about a good state or event occurring in the 
past that makes it less worth wanting than it would be were it in the future.  
I have argued that this picture gets things the wrong way around. There 
is nothing about the temporal location of a good experience relative to the 
present that makes it less valuable to have—rather, its causal relationship to 
the present already determines whether it is in one’s interest to have it. Our 
typical interest in having good experiences in the future rather than the past 
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is justified internally, on the basis of the same considerations that ground our 
interest in having good experiences at all. Unlike the good experiences I will 
lose out upon by dying earlier than I otherwise would have, the good experi-
ences I would have had by being born earlier than I was are not in my in-
terest to have had.  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Chapter 2: Is Conscious Life Itself a Good? 
In the previous chapter, I argued against one of the major challenges to the 
common view that death can be bad for its subject. I concluded that a 
person can have a prudential reason to go on living in virtue of the good 
things that would thereby accrue to someone who is causally dependent on 
her in the right sort of way.  Of course, the flip-side of that thought is that a 1
person has a competing prudential reason not to go on living in virtue of the 
bad things that would happen to her successive self. This raises the obvious 
question of when a person has an all-things-considered prudential reason to 
go on living.  
 Here is a natural answer to that question: “You have a prudential reas-
on to go on living just in case your future will contain more good than bad 
on balance.” One way this answer might be thought incomplete is the follow-
ing. Some would say that even if my future will not be on-balance good when 
 To avoid unnecessary distractions, I will take for granted that if a good is in the future it is 1
also in one’s present subjective future.
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taken on its own, if it would positively contribute to the value of my life as a 
whole then that would give me a prudential reason to live it. I shall not con-
sider that reply further here. A more interesting way in which the natural 
answer might be incomplete is if the prudential value of existence has positive 
prudential value in its own right. Perhaps, as Samuel Johnson is said to have 
declared, by contrast with death “mere existence is so much better than 
nothing, that one would rather exist even in pain, than not exist.”  2
It is doubtful, though, that Johnson would have thought it better to live 
on in a persistent coma than to cease to exist. On the plausible assumption 
that living on in a coma is no better for its subject than death, one way to 
rescue the claim that existence is worth wanting for its own sake is to main-
tain that being in a persistent coma is bad for a person to an extent that 
outweighs whatever positive value is afforded by existence itself. But no as-
pect of existence seems positive when it is spent in a total coma. A more 
charitable construal of Johnson’s assertion is that there is positive value not 
in existence tout court but in conscious existence. 
This was roughly the picture that Thomas Nagel sketched, unfortu-
nately without further argument, in his well-known study of death. He wrote: 
 Boswell (1953/1799), p. 950.2
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There are elements which, if added to one’s experience, make life 
better; there are other elements which, if added to one’s 
experience, make life worse. But what remains when these are set 
aside is not merely neutral: it is emphatically positive. . . . The 
additional positive weight is supplied by experience itself, rather 
than by any of its consequences. . . . That is what is meant, I 
think, by the allegation that it is good simply to be alive, even if 
one is undergoing terrible experiences.  3
One way to understand Nagel’s idea is that every individual constituent of 
one’s overall conscious state (for example, the sound of the clock tolling one) 
is in one way valuable for its subject, just in virtue of the fact that it is an 
experience. But there does not seem to be anything to be said for the pain 
one feels in one’s foot, for example. A more plausible understanding of what 
he meant would distinguish the constituent elements of experience from the 
whole unified experience one has over a period of time. Although there is no 
way in which I benefit from experiencing a given pain, I am in one way made 
better off, relative to not being conscious, by the fact that I am experiencing 
anything at all. On this picture, if going on living with pain was the only way 
to go on living at all, one might have some reason to do so. But it is not the 
 Nagel (1970) p. 74. (In the text, the last sentence of the quoted passage precedes the ones 3
before it.)
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pain that would generate that reason but the fact that one is experiencing at 
all, despite the pain, that does. I shall call the extended state of having ex-
periences “conscious life”. The plausible claim that was probably intended by 
Johnson is that a period of conscious life has some positive value for its sub-
ject over and above the particular good and bad things that together consti-
tute it.  
The thought that conscious life is itself good for its subject has not re-
ceived too much attention, but Joseph Raz has taken up the task of criti-
cising it. Raz asks us to imagine a person whose waking life involves nothing 
but agony, terror, and racing paranoid thoughts.  He thinks we will agree 4
that there would be nothing of prudential value in this person’s life. From 
this he infers that experience (by which I will assume he means a period of 
conscious life) is not worth wanting for its own sake. “It all depends”, he 
writes, “on its content”.  5
That this person’s life seems to have nothing of value in it is, I think, 
questionable. It is not so implausible that this hapless person might, in her 
more lucid moments, find some solace in the fact that she is alive to experi-
ence anything at all. Even if Raz is right about the intuition his case evokes, 
 Raz (2001), p. 117. 4
 Ibid.5
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there are two further problems with his argument. First, he will have shown 
at most that a period of conscious life is not in any way valuable when its 
only contents are very bad. It does not follow that a period of conscious life 
is not in any way valuable when at least some of its contents are either neut-
ral or good, or even when the bad contents it has are only somewhat bad. 
The more pressing problem with his example, however, is that it may only 
appear that nothing speaks in favour of the person’s wretched life because its 
many horrors eclipse the positive value derivable from conscious life alone. 
To avoid the swamping problem that a case like Raz’s faces, we should 
ask whether there seems to be something independently valuable about a 
period of conscious life that is not as bad as all that. Ideally, we could ask 
whether a person’s conscious life has value for her when its contents are over-
all neutral (either because the contents of experience are all themselves neut-
ral, or because the good and bad ones cancel each other out in the final ac-
count).  
Let us try to do so. Imagine the Grim Reaper appears and informs you 
it’s your time to die. Because he is in a good mood, however, he will offer you 
the following deal. Instead of immediate death, you may have another five 
years of conscious life. But the particular contents of your experience will be 
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neutral on balance, and the same will be true of any non-experiential goods. 
He clarifies: for each positive element of wellbeing, with the (possible) excep-
tion of the element of wellbeing that is having a conscious life itself, there 
will be a corresponding negative one, such that one would be indifferent 
between having both elements and having neither. 
I believe that most people would readily accept the Grim Reaper’s offer. 
This provides a prima facie case that conscious life itself is among the ele-
ments of wellbeing. In what follows, I will argue that this position is the cor-
rect one. Of course, if I am right, it follows that the future the Grim Reaper 
is offering would not be overall neutral. We might simply think of the posi-
tion I will defend in the following way. There is some list of the things we 
ought to fill our lives with to make them go well. Prominent candidates for 
inclusion on that list are happiness, accomplishment, knowledge, personal re-
lationships, goodwill towards others, and the fulfilment of desires. We should 
also place, on that list, the much more general good that is the having of ex-
perience itself, independent of its contents.  
I will begin by giving some reasons for doubting a competing justifica-
tion for accepting the Grim Reaper’s offer: that we have a reason to go on 
living because by doing so we temporarily avoid the non-comparative bad 
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that is the permanent loss of conscious existence. I will then respond to sev-
eral challenges to the claim that the Grim Reaper case shows that conscious 
life is in itself good for its subject. These challenges aim to show that the 
case does not reveal a genuine preference for prolonging our conscious life, 
either because we do not grasp what such a life would really be like or be-
cause we are subject to a bias that colours our judgment about it. After 
replying to these challenges, I will return to the thesis that conscious life is 
valuable in its own right. I will try to spell out that thought in more detail 
and offer a rationale for why it might be so.  
2.1. Is the goodness of life the badness of death? 
Some events or states are bad for us in virtue of the alternatives they 
preclude. For example, it may be bad for a person to lose her car keys, not 
because losing them is itself bad for her but because it means she cannot 
attend the party she wanted to attend. Of course, preclusion cannot be the 
only way in which something can be good or bad for a person; the regress 
must end somewhere. We would then hold that misplacing her keys is 
comparatively bad for her in virtue of depriving her of something that is non-
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comparatively good. Obviously enough, there are also comparative goods and 
non-comparative bads. Taking painkillers may be comparatively good for a 
person in virtue of preventing the non-comparative bad that is the pain she 
would have otherwise suffered. 
Many philosophers believe that death—or the non-fatal permanent end 
to consciousness—can be comparatively bad for a person; Chapter 1 was an 
attempt to refute one prominent argument against that view. But some 
philosophers have suggested that death can also be bad in the non-comparat-
ive sense.  Some of those philosophers also think that the non-comparative 6
badness of death gives us a reason to postpone it. If they are right, this 
might explain why it would be in one’s interest to accept the Grim Reaper’s 
offer. 
One of the main reasons given by proponents of the view that death is 
non-comparatively bad cannot be used to show that one has a reason to ac-
cept the Grim Reaper’s offer. It has been claimed that one way in which 
death is non-comparatively bad is that it involves the loss of the continuation 
of the good things in life we already have, and the loss of something good is 
in itself bad, irrespective of the comparative badness that comes from its sub-
 Kamm (1993; 2017); Kagan (2012); Benatar (2017).6
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sequent absence.  While this idea has some plausibility, it cannot by itself 7
justify accepting the Grim Reaper’s offer. Unless there is already something 
valuable in a period of conscious life over and above its particular contents, 
having a future that is on-balance neutral in those contents would involve no 
smaller a loss than death would. 
There are, however, other properties of death that might make it non-
comparatively bad and which may seem to justify accepting the offer. Frances 
Kamm—perhaps the most forceful contemporary defender of death’s non-
comparative badness—suggests that the permanent end of consciousness is 
non-comparatively bad in part because it means that “everything is all over 
for one”.  If everything being all over is in itself bad for me, then it might 8
make sense to prolong my conscious life even if to do so would not be non-
comparatively good for me.  
Accordingly, it could be in a person’s interest, Kamm thinks, for him to 
postpone his death by entering suspended animation for millions of years 
after which he will regain consciousness, even though doing so will not change 
the length or quality of his conscious life (Kamm dubs this person the 
 Kamm calls this the “Insult Factor” (1993, p. 40; 2017, pp. 735–6); see also Kagan (2012), 7
pp. 278–9 and Benatar (2017), pp. 102–110.
 Kamm (1993), p. 19.8
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“Limbo Man”).  By doing so, this person could ensure for as long as possible 9
that his conscious life is not all over. She believes that the Limbo Man’s de-
cision is rational and that this in turn provides evidence that the permanent 
end of consciousness can be non-comparatively bad.  10
Not all philosophers share Kamm’s intuition about this case.  In any 11
event, since I maintain both that reason we have for extending our lives is 
not the non-comparative badness of death and that there is no positive 
prudential value in unconscious life, I must deny that the Limbo Man has a 
reason to enter suspended animation. To that end, consider 
Local Time Freeze: The human race can together enter a collective 
limbo by triggering a temporary “time freeze” that is localised 
only to our planet. If we do so, it will seem to us as though no 
time has elapsed from one moment to the next, but in external 
time thousands of years will have gone by. 
I believe that there is no relevant sense in which triggering a local time freeze 
would be in anyone’s interest. If the decision were mine alone, I believe I 
would have no reason at all to trigger it. This seems to show that it is not 
 Ibid., pp. 19, 49–50.9
 Ibid.10
 Thomas Scanlon does not, for one. (2015), p. 490.11
Is Conscious Life Itself a Good? |  88
the mere postponement of death that is in one’s interest. An alternative ex-
planation for the force of the original Limbo Man case, insofar as it has force, 
is that by entering suspended animation the Limbo Man’s will get to experi-
ence a distant and exotic future.  
Someone might disagree that a collective time freeze would be in no 
one’s interest, or point to some feature of the limbo man case I have over-
looked to show that it does not have this implication. Or else one might ac-
cept that one lacks a reason to enter a limbo state, but does have a reason to 
go on living provided the life one would have is conscious on the basis of 
some other feature of death that makes it non-comparatively bad. I shall, 
therefore, offer a more direct argument against the proposition that death 
can be non-comparatively bad, and afterward give a reason to think that, 
even if it was non-comparatively bad, this still would not, on its own, provide 
a reason to go on living.  
If death really is a non-comparatively bad thing to happen to someone, 
we should in principle be able to ask how bad it is for her. In the first place, 
however, it is utterly unclear how to go about assigning to a given death a 
non-arbitrary value such that it is equivalent, for example, to some degree 
and duration of pain. But let us grant that we can assign it a value, if only 
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an imprecise one. It is still implausible that a person’s death constitutes a 
non-comparative bad for her, for it is implausible that there is any significant 
amount of non-comparative good that it could outweigh. Suppose, for the 
sake of exposition, that death’s non-comparative badness is such that to off-
set its presence in a person’s life she would need to live for at least three 
happy years. Then a life of two happy years would not be worth living, a life 
of one year worse still, and so on. But I cannot believe that the life of a child 
who dies after two happy years was overall bad for her. If anything, most 
people would be glad for the child’s own sake that she got to live at all.  
Of course, perhaps death is just not as bad as all that. Let us suppose it 
is only bad enough to outweigh three happy months. Would anyone conclude, 
upon the discovery of an extra-terrestrial species whose members die pain-
lessly after only one merry summer, that the total prudential goodness in the 
universe is lower than previously thought? Defenders of the position that 
death is non-comparatively bad for its subject might reply that the position 
applies to persons only, but things seem no different if we clarify that these 
extra-terrestrials come into existence as fully-formed persons. For my part, it 
is hard to believe that death could be non-comparatively bad enough to out-
weigh even one happy day. 
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Suppose that this argument does not succeed; death really is non-com-
paratively bad. For all that, it is still not obvious that this could provide a 
prudential reason to postpone death. Were immortality possible, then choos-
ing to live forever might be in one way good for me, since only then could I 
escape the non-comparative badness of death. But I must die eventually, and 
when I do my death will be no less bad for having been rescheduled. For 
death’s non-comparative badness to justify postponing death in the Grim 
Reaper scenario, or for that matter in the Limbo Man case, it seems that it 
must also be true that it is in a person’s interest to undergo a bad event later 
rather than sooner. That is a questionable premise which to my knowledge 
has not been adequately defended.  
It may be replied that one needn’t appeal to the mere temporal distance 
of death to explain how its non-comparative badness provides a reason to 
postpone it. Instead, the following explanation might be proposed. Suppose 
we accept that identity is not what grounds rational prudential concern 
across time, and suppose we also accept that what does ground it comes in 
degrees (degrees of psychological connectedness and continuity between per-
son-stages, for instance). It may then seem that I now have a present time-
relative interest in postponing my death when and because this would mean 
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that the non-comparative badness it will bring is suffered by a stage of myself 
to whom I am more weakly connected in the relevant way, and hence to a 
stage for which I should now have less prudential concern. But this cannot be 
right. If identity is not what grounds rational prudential concern, then at a 
given time it seems that it would be equally bad to die as to come to lack the 
prudential concern relation to any successive individual.  And if the rational 12
prudential concern relation comes in degrees, then to the extent that I will be 
less-than-fully connected in the relevant way to myself at the moment of my 
death, I will have already suffered the non-comparative badness of death 
gradually, by way of the weakening of the connections that determine how 
much prudential concern I should have about the bad things that happen to 
me at that time. On a reasonable interpretation of time-relative interest ac-
count, then, there is a sense in which a person dies only gradually, until at 
last she dies completely by way of her literal death. 
 For good measure I repeat that I am assuming for simplicity that one’s subjective future 12
coincides with the external future.
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2.2. Do we really want a life that is neutral in its contents? 
Because I believe that the reason one has for continuing conscious life is not 
that by doing so she can avoid the non-comparative badness of death, I 
maintain that the better explanation for the Grim Reaper case is that 
conscious life is non-comparatively good. At this point, an opponent might 
object that the Grim Reaper case at best only seems to show that. It might 
be said that despite our intuitive reaction to the case it does not establish 
what I say it establishes, either because when we react as we do we are not 
correctly imagining the future we are getting, or else because even if we are 
correctly imagining it, we think we have a reason to want it that we do not 
really have.  
To begin to answer the first of these worries, let us try to see what a 
period of conscious life that is on-balance neutral in its contents would be 
like. In filling in the details, two variables stand out. First, we need to specify 
the elements of wellbeing or ill-being in the period at each given moment, as 
well as their respective intensities. The second variable is how the value of 
the part of a life supervenes on the elements of wellbeing occurring at each 
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moment. It is at least not obviously true that this value is just a sum of mo-
mentary wellbeing, just as it is not obvious in the case of a whole life.  13
We can attempt to skirt these issues by concentrating on a life whose 
only particular contents are experiences that are themselves roughly neutral 
(call this the “flat-line future”). At least the first issue does not arise, and it 
seems unlikely that there would be either an additional higher-order good or 
a higher-order bad generated by the shape of a totally flat-line period of life. 
It is unclear what the day-to-day details of this flat-line future would look 
like. Parfit suggested facetiously that a life just barely worth living would 
contain only muzak and potatoes.  That may be already taking into account 14
the value of conscious life itself, on the assumption that it has value. Would 
the contents of a conscious life neutral in its contents be only potatoes? (No 
one who has been on hold with a call centre could deny that a life of only 
muzak is worse than death.) 
Still, it is not as though we have no idea how to imagine such a life. 
Picture a future existence consisting of humdrum wanderings about, think-
ing, but about nothing much in particular, and the occasional spell of day-
time TV. Perhaps this is as close as we can get to a period of neutral con-
 See, for example, Velleman (1991); Kamm (1993), pp. 67–71; Dorsey (2015).13
 Parfit (1986b).14
Is Conscious Life Itself a Good? |  94
scious life that is recognisably our own. (I shall have something to say later 
about lives that are not recognisably our own). These seem close to neutral 
experiential contents. When I try to picture a future like this one, admittedly 
I cannot help but imagine some mild contentment. But I also imagine bore-
dom, loneliness, and a dim awareness of the relative meaninglessness of my 
existence. The latter elements of experience are not neutral but decidedly 
bad, so it is not clear that the overall value of the contents of the future I am 
imagining is overall better than neutral. Yet I still think this future is far 
preferable to death. And if others agree, that would seem to indicate that we 
take the continuation of our conscious life itself to be good for its own sake.  
It might be said that when I am told I am getting neutral future, the 
future I think I am getting is better than the one I am actually getting. Many 
philosophers have argued that we are systematically overoptimistic about 
how good a period of life will be, and psychological research supports that 
claim.  At this stage it is important to distinguish what we might call de15 -
scriptive optimists and normative optimists. We can best illustrate the differ-
ence by an example, in which a person is imagining what it will be like to eat 
a certain chocolate bar. If the person is a descriptive optimist, then she over-
 Schopenhauer (1851/1981); Mackie (1985); Tännsjö (1992); Huemer (2008); Benatar (2006; 15
2017). For a survey of the psychological research to that effect, see chapter 3 of Benatar 
(2006).
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estimates how much enjoyment she will get out of eating it. When it comes 
down to it, it will be less enjoyable than she thought. But it is conceivable 
that this person might correctly imagine just how much enjoyment she will 
get out of the chocolate bar while mistakenly thinking that the reason she 
has to want that enjoyment is stronger than it really is. She would then be a 
normative optimist.  
Much of the literature which argues that we are optimists focuses on 
descriptive optimism. But if we are systematically overoptimistic in that 
sense, this is no obvious challenge to the Grim Reaper argument. For the op-
timism that I have has already been added, in the manner of a background 
assumption, to my evaluation of the period of life I am being offered. If I be-
lieve the experiential contents of the life I am imagining are neutral overall, 
and I would still prefer living on to dying, then that must be because I am 
placing value on conscious life itself. I may, for example, be imagining more 
happiness in the future there will actually be. But because I (mistakenly) 
judge the life to be neutral, if I prefer it, then it seems that would be for 
something besides the happiness itself. 
Normative optimism, on the other hand, is a problem for the Grim 
Reaper argument. If I am a normative optimist, then even if I could correctly 
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imagine what a conscious future neutral in its contents would look like, I will 
mistakenly believe I have more reason to want it than I actually have. And 
there may be good reason to think we are normative optimists about continu-
ing our conscious lives. 
2.3. Am I mistaking the reasons I have?  
One reason to think we are normative optimists is that it seems that our 
evolutionary ancestors would have evolved the predisposition to prolong their 
lives when possible. Sharon Street has pointed out “how beneficial (in terms 
of reproductive success) it would be to judge that the fact that something 
would promote one’s survival is a reason in favour of it”.  Street’s target is 16
realism in metaethics, but it is easy to see how the same observation 
threatens the first-order judgment elicited by the Grim Reaper case. 
Believing one had a reason to prolong one’s life would have been 
advantageous to our ancestors. So it seems that the disposition to judge that 
one had a reason to continue living would have been naturally selected for 
whether or not one really did have that reason. So we should expect that we 
 Street (2006), p. 114.16
Is Conscious Life Itself a Good? |  97
would find the Grim Reaper’s offer attractive whether or not it was really in 
our interest to accept it. If we would accept the offer whether or not we 
ought to accept it, then our acceptance is no evidence for the claim that it is 
in our interest to accept it. 
We should bear in mind that evolutionary debunking arguments like 
this threaten to undercut many other evaluative beliefs we would be reluctant 
to let go—that it is in our interest to avoid pain, for example.  Indeed, an 17
evolutionary story can probably be told for most of the mainstream constitu-
ents of wellbeing, so it would be prejudicial to treat the evolutionary objec-
tion as a special challenge to the claim that having a conscious life itself has 
positive value for its subject. 
 Even still, it is not obvious that Street’s argument can wholly debunk 
the intuition evoked by the Grim Reaper case. The belief that one has a 
reason to stay alive for its own sake would have been advantageous only in 
those cases in which it enabled one to reproduce or to make a significant con-
tribution to the survival and reproduction of one’s descendants. But people 
who are beyond the age at which their continued existence is useful for those 
ends do not lose their will to live. Indeed, since by staying alive these indi-
 Ibid. For an argument to the effect that any evolutionary debunking argument with im17 -
plications for normative ethics also implies that pain is not bad, see Kahane (2011). 
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viduals would consume resources that could instead be used to promote the 
survival of younger generations, if anything we should expect evolutionary 
pressures to push in the other direction after a certain age. Of course, I do 
not claim that no evolutionary story can be told to account for this and other 
related complications. But to my knowledge none currently exists. And until 
we have a plausible and non-ad hoc explanation, rejecting the Grim Reaper 
intuition on the basis that having it would have been evolutionarily advant-
ageous is too hasty. 
I shall consider two final objections to the Grim Reaper argument. 
First, it might be said that the only reason I would accept his offer is that I 
am afraid to die. (Of course, I might fear death precisely because it deprives 
me of more conscious life, which I recognise to be non-comparatively valu-
able, but clearly that would not challenge what the case is supposed to 
show.) But consider a case in which I can secretly accept the Reaper’s offer 
on behalf of someone else whose wellbeing I was concerned to promote, but 
whose death I would not be alive to experience, such as my grandchild. It 
seems that to do so would be to confer upon that person a benefit, but fear 
of my own death cannot plausibly explain that intuition. 
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Lastly, it may be allowed that we desire more conscious life for its own 
sake, but said that it is a “mere” desire, not something we have an independ-
ent reason to desire. If that is so, then while there may be something of in-
terest in my proposal as a psychological observation, it has little obvious 
philosophical significance. One way to respond to this worry is the one I have 
just given: I would take myself to have a reason extend the conscious life of 
someone else who would otherwise die, even if I could be assured that the 
particular contents of the additional period of life would be on-balance neut-
ral; and I would feel that to do so would be to confer a benefit on her. It 
might be said that this is just an inference to the fact that this person would 
want to extend her life in that way, just as I myself would, and I have a reas-
on to help her realise what she wants. At this point, I can only retreat to the 
phenomenological argument that it feels that I want to extend my conscious 
life because I have an independent reason to do so, not that what reason I 
have to extend it is parasitic on the desire. In the end, I know of no other 
way to distinguish a mere desire from what we have a reason to desire. 
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2.4. When conscious life might be good 
I conclude that there is good reason to think that conscious life is 
prudentially valuable for its subject in its own right. We should ask, finally, 
when exactly it is valuable and why. On the most extreme view, any period 
of conscious life, irrespective of its content, is in one way prudentially 
valuable for its subject. But suppose that in place of dying one could enter a 
minimally conscious state in which one will experience only muted colours, 
white noise, and the faint sensation of bedclothes on skin. Is there anything 
to be said for this painless but pleasureless future, which nonetheless contains 
experience itself? For my part, I see no reason to want this life, which seems, 
if anything, worse than death.  
It might be replied that one would not have a reason to want such a life 
either because it would be too psychologically discontinuous with oneself 
now, or alternatively because the moment-to-moment psychological connec-
tions would be so weak as to have little prudential value for the one whose 
life it is at any given moment. I shall have a bit more to say about this in the 
next chapter, but we can note for now that this is probably too restrictive a 
view to take of a psychological view about either identity or the grounds of 
prudential concern. At any given time, much of a person’s psychology is non-
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conscious. It seems that someone in a minimally conscious state might be re-
lated to me in the way necessary to ground rational prudential concern even 
if he was too benumbed to be aware of who he was.  
The better suggestion is, I think, the somewhat Millian one that if con-
scious life is to be seriously worth wanting it must be sufficiently sophistic-
ated. In his conditional defence of preference-hedonism against its rivals, Par-
fit cited James Griffin’s observation that toward the end of his life Freud re-
fused sedating painkillers—preferring instead to suffer with a clear mind—
and suggested that, given his preference, Freud’s life went better for it.  An 18
alternative explanation for why this was better for Freud is that he was able 
to continue to enjoy the richness of experience that is necessary for additional 
conscious life to be good for the one whose life it is. (This suggestion is com-
patible with the possibility that Freud’s tacit recognition of that value is 
what explained his preference.)  
Of course, not least because the complexity of consciousness itself exists 
on a continuum, it would be implausible to think that there is any sharp cut-
off point here. We should say that independent of its particular contents, a 
given period of conscious life is more valuable for the one whose life it is the 
more complex it is. Hence, a year of the conscious life of a slug has at most 
 Parfit (1984), pp. 493–4.18
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minimal value for it, a year of the conscious life of a pig more valuable, and a 
year of the conscious life of a normal adult human being better still. The 
rough explanation for the difference, I suggest, is that while a person’s nor-
mal conscious life continues on, she remains “around”; aware of and engaged 
with herself and her surroundings. Obviously that is not so when one is in a 
coma, but it is also not true of a being that is only barely conscious. As op-
posed to being minimally conscious or a corpse, the continuation of the ro-
bust and complex life of a person means that she remains a subject in the 
world. 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Chapter 3: Not All Killings Are Equally Wrong 
Ronald Dworkin once observed that “most people think . . . that the murder 
of a depressive handicapped octogenarian misanthrope is as heinous, and 
must be punished as seriously, as the murder of anyone younger or healthier 
or more valuable to others.”  Jeff McMahan, a prominent defender, calls this 1
view the Equal Wrongness Thesis.  As he puts it, the moral objection to 2
killing persons “does not vary with such factors as the degree of harm caused 
to the victim, the age, intelligence, temperament, or social circumstances of 
the victim, whether the victim is well liked or generally despised, and so on.”  3
Whether the Equal Wrongness Thesis is true is of obvious theoretical 
interest. It also has important practical implications, since any factor (age, 
for example) that is irrelevant to the strength of the moral objection to 
killing  a person is ipso facto irrelevant to its overall permissibility. Suppose 
 Dworkin, (1993), p. 85.1
 McMahan (2002). See also McMahan (1995).2
 McMahan (2002), p. 235. 3
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we must decide, as the German Federal Constitutional Court once did, 
whether to pass legislation permitting the gunning down of hijacked passen-
ger planes when doing so is necessary to prevent their use as a terrorist 
weapon to kill many people.  If how wrong it is to kill a person is unaffected 4
by how bad it is for her to die, then it makes no difference to the permissibil-
ity of shooting down these aircraft that the passengers on board them would 
almost certainly have died soon anyway.  
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen has argued that we should reject the Equal 
Wrongness Thesis on the basis of the moral equivalence of killing someone 
and knocking her unconscious. Several authors have raised objections to his 
argument for that equivalence, however, and, as I shall show, there are other 
issues with his approach that have not yet been noted. Nevertheless, in what 
follows I shall argue that killing someone and knocking her unconscious are 
indeed morally equivalent in the way that is required to show that not all 
killings are equally wrong.  
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In section 3.1, I clarify the 
Equal Wrongness Thesis. In section 3.2, I introduce Lippert-Rasmussen’s ar-
 Bundesverfassungsgericht, Judgment of the First Senate of 15 February 2006. Of particular 4
relevance is paragraph 132, in which the court argues that “[h]uman life and human dignity 
enjoy the same constitutional protection regardless of the duration of the physical existence 
of the individual human being.”
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gument against that thesis and discuss some of the ways I believe it falls 
short. In sections 3.3 and 3.4, I defend the claim that, other things being 
equal, it is no less wrong to deprive someone of a certain amount of conscious 
life by knocking her unconscious than it is to do so by killing her, regardless 
of when in her lifetime it takes place. I conclude, in section 3.5, by explaining 
why that claim is sufficient to defeat the Equal Wrongness Thesis. In brief, 
along with the Equal Wrongness Thesis, it implies that knocking someone 
temporarily unconscious for a short period is just as wrong as killing someone 
with many good years left to live. Because that result is absurd, we should 
reject the Equal Wrongness Thesis. 
3.1. Preliminary remarks 
Several initial clarifications of the Equal Wrongness Thesis are necessary. 
First, as McMahan explains, the sense of “wrongness” that is relevant for the 
Equal Wrongness Thesis is one that admits of degrees.  An act’s wrongness in 5
this sense is the degree to which it is morally objectionable: one act is more 
wrong than another insofar as it is subject to a moral objection that is harder 
 McMahan (2002), p. 190. See also Lippert-Rasmussen (2007), p. 717. Cf. Soto (2013), pp. 5
551–4.
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to outweigh by competing morally-relevant considerations. It is important to 
note, though, that the Equal Wrongness Thesis applies only to acts of killing 
considered on their own. Suppose that on Monday I kill a young person and 
on Tuesday I kill an old person. The Equal Wrongness Thesis tells us that 
what I do on each day is equally wrong and would have been equally difficult 
to justify. But two acts being equally hard to justify does not imply that in a 
choice between them we ought to be indifferent. Suppose we must choose 
between killing a young person and killing an old person, for example as a 
necessary side effect of averting the deaths of many other innocent people. It 
is consistent with the Equal Wrongness Thesis that in this case we ought to 
kill the old person.  6
Second, following McMahan and others, I understand the Equal Wrong-
ness Thesis to be restricted in scope to a certain class of killings.  It does not 7
apply to killings that differ in morally relevant but extrinsic ways, such as 
their effects (positive or negative) on third-parties, or the relationship 
between the perpetrator and the victim. Nor does it apply to killings that 
differ with respect to the presence or absence of potential justifying consider-
 McMahan (2002), p. 237. 6
 McMahan (2002), pp. 236–7. Other discussants of the Equal Wrongness Thesis also apply 7
these restrictions to it. See Lippert-Rasmussen (2007), pp. 718–19; Soto (2013), p. 544; 
Hanser (2013), pp. 392–409.
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ations, such as the victim’s moral responsibility or her free consent to being 
killed. It also does not apply to killings that differ in their modes of agency—
for instance, whether the victim is killed as a means to some end or as a side 
effect of the pursuit of that end. Lastly, the Equal Wrongness Thesis concerns 
only the killing of individuals who satisfy the conditions of personhood, 
whatever those conditions are. It is compatible with any view about the 
wrongness of killing non-persons. I will usually omit the preceding qualifica-
tions and take them to be understood when I discuss an instance of killing.  
3.2. Lippert-Rasmussen’s trilemma 
In “Why Killing Some People Is More Seriously Wrong than Killing Others”, 
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen challenges the Equal Wrongness Thesis by way of 
a trilemma consisting of the following three claims : 8
(1) The Equal Wrongness Thesis: The degree to which different 
killings of persons are wrong does not vary: all such killings are 
equally wrong.  
 Lippert-Rasmussen (2007).8
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(2) The Unequal Wrongness of Renderings Unconscious Thesis: 
For any period ω, it is more wrong to render a person unconscious 
for a period longer than ω  than it is to render a person 
unconscious for ω, other things being the same. 
(3) The Equivalence Thesis: It is neither more, nor less, wrong to 
deprive a person of a certain amount of conscious experience by 
killing her than it is to deprive her of the same amount of 
conscious experience by rendering her unconscious, other things 
being the same. 
To see that these three claims cannot all be true, consider the following two 
pairs of acts. In the first pair, I kill someone with fifty years left to live and 
then kill someone with just one year left to live. According to (1), these two 
acts are equally wrong. In the second pair, everything is the same but instead 
of killing them I administer to each a powerful drug that induces a total 
coma that will last until her death. According to (2), now what I do to the 
person who will live another fifty years is more seriously wrong than what I 
do to the person who will live for just another year. Yet if the two preceding 
judgments are correct, then (3) cannot be true. For if depriving someone of a 
certain amount of conscious experience by killing her is no more or less wrong 
than doing so by knocking her unconscious until her death, the relative 
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wrongness must be constant across both pairs. Lippert-Rasmussen argues 
that of these three claims we should give up the Equal Wrongness Thesis.  
I take the crucial premise in Lippert-Rasmussen’s argument to be (3). 
There are a number of ways to challenge this premise. For one thing, unlike 
when she is knocked unconscious, when a person is killed she will never re-
gain consciousness. Since it may matter for the wrongness of an act whether 
it deprives its victim of her last period of conscious life, we might doubt that 
depriving someone of a given amount of conscious experience by knocking her 
unconscious is morally equivalent to killing her.  
Lippert-Rasmussen suggests two individually sufficient ways of respond-
ing to this worry. The first is to restrict (3) so that it covers only instances of 
unconsciousness that persist until the victim’s death.  (Whether we take this 9
restriction to be covered by a suitable interpretation of the premise’s ceteris 
paribus clause or else to constitute a revised version of the premise itself is 
not a substantive matter.) If we take this route, it cannot be argued that the 
two types of act are morally different on the grounds that it makes a differ-
ence whether or not the victim will regain consciousness.  
The other response is to keep the more expansive, unrestricted version 
of (3), and argue independently that it is not in itself morally significant 
 Ibid., p. 727. 9
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whether an act deprives its victim of what would have been her last period of 
consciousness. To that end, Lippert-Rasmussen proposes that it only seems 
more wrongful to deprive someone of what would have been her last con-
scious period because we mistakenly assume that it would be an especially 
great loss for her, or that it is especially disrespectful to do so.   10
With respect to the deprivation of what would have been a victim’s last 
conscious period constituting an especially great loss for her, Lippert-
Rasmussen notes that there is no reason, in principle, as to why the final 
period of a person’s life is more valuable or important than any other.  It is 11
worth noting that he does not consider one reason it might be more valu-
able—namely, that the permanent end of consciousness is non-comparatively 
bad for a person—but I have already argued against that view in the previ-
ous chapter. In any event, however, it not far-fetched to think that ensuring 
that someone will never again experience anything is particularly egregious in 
its own right. In a similar vein, Daniel Cohen and Morgan Luck have argued 
that the wrongness of a given deprivation of consciousness depends on how 
much of the victim’s remaining conscious life it eliminates.  Before we can 12
 Ibid., p. 726.10
 Ibid.11
 Cohen and Luck (2009), pp. 396–401.12
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accept the more expansive version of (3), we need to show that the wrongness 
of knocking someone unconscious does not depend on when in the victim’s 
life the period of unconsciousness occurs. 
Because of these issues with the more expansive construal of (3), per-
haps an opponent of the Equal Wrongness Thesis should restrict (3) in such a 
way that it covers only those instances of knocking someone unconscious that 
last for the rest of her life. Lippert-Rasmussen suggests that restricting (3) in 
this way is already sufficient to answer the worry at hand, since the version of 
the trilemma that emerges is just as forceful as the unrestricted one.  In the 13
first place, however, even if that is right, it may still be doubted that de-
priving someone of consciousness by killing her is morally equivalent to doing 
so by knocking her unconscious until her death. Lippert-Rasmussen offers 
several arguments for their equivalence, but, as I will argue in section 3.3, 
none is wholly convincing. There are also disanalogies between killing 
someone and knocking her unconscious that he does not consider. For ex-
ample, Matthew Hanser has since objected that the fact that killing someone 
terminates all her basic biological operations is a factor in making killing 
 Lippert-Rasmussen (2007), p. 727.13
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wrong.  Alternatively, it might matter simply that by killing someone, but 14
not by knocking her unconscious, one causes the victim to cease to exist.  
There is a deeper problem with restricting (3) to cover only deprivations 
of consciousness that continue to the end of the victim’s life. If we take this 
route, then in order for the trilemma to go through, (2) must also be under-
stood to apply only between instances of knocking someone unconscious that 
last for the rest of the victim’s life. But the original, unrestricted version of 
(2) may have been compelling in the first place because of an implicit as-
sumption that the instances of making people unconscious that it compares 
do not involve ending the victim’s conscious life forever. Lippert-Rasmussen 
states that he will not pursue an independent argument for (2).  But for 15
those who, like me, believe the Equal Wrongness Thesis has considerable 
prima facie plausibility, it may not be obvious that the wrongness of render-
ing someone permanently unconscious does depend on the amount of con-
scious life she loses. Since the force of the trilemma lies precisely in the inde-
pendent plausibility of the Equal Wrongness Thesis, if we restrict (2) and (3) 
to cover only  those acts that permanently end their victims’ conscious life, 
 Hanser (2013).14
 Lippert-Rasmussen (2007), p. 722.15
Not All Killings Are Equally Wrong |  113
there is probably insufficient reason to resolve the trilemma by rejecting the 
Equal Wrongness Thesis, rather than by rejecting (2). 
To defeat the Equal Wrongness Thesis, therefore, we need to show both 
that the wrongness of knocking someone unconscious does not depend on 
when in the victim’s life the unconsciousness occurs and that any other prop-
erties of killing someone that distinguish it from knocking someone uncon-
scious—such as the fact that killing someone ends her life—are not them-
selves morally relevant.  
 The rest of this chapter is an attempt to do just that. In particular, I 
shall argue for the following claim:  
(C) It is as wrong to deprive someone of a certain amount of 
conscious life by knocking her temporarily unconscious in the 
middle of her life as it is to deprive her of the same amount of 
conscious life by killing her, other things being the same. 
My strategy is to first defend, in a novel way, the restricted version of (3)—
namely, that killing someone and knocking her unconscious until her death 
are morally equivalent, other things being the same. With that conclusion 
established, I will then offer a number of arguments to show the wrongness of 
knocking someone unconscious for a given period is unaffected by when in 
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the victim’s lifetime it takes place. Together, these two premises entail (C), 
which is sufficient to refute the Equal Wrongness Thesis. That thesis implies 
that killing someone a month before she would otherwise have died is as 
wrong as killing someone with fifty good years left to live. Hence, if we accept 
(C), we can maintain the Equal Wrongness Thesis only by accepting that it 
is just as wrong to knock someone temporarily unconscious for a month as it 
is to kill someone with fifty good years left to live. Since that result is absurd, 
we should abandon the Equal Wrongness Thesis. 
3.3. The moral equivalence of killing someone and knocking her 
unconscious until her death 
In this section, I will defend my argument’s first premise, which is the restric-
ted version of Lippert-Rasmussen’s Equivalence Thesis mentioned earlier: 
(A) It is as wrong to deprive someone of a certain amount of 
conscious life by knocking her unconscious until her death as it is 
to deprive someone of the same amount of conscious life by killing 
her, other things being the same. 
Not All Killings Are Equally Wrong |  115
In his own defence of that thesis, Lippert-Rasmussen employs a pair of cases 
in which  
(1) I kill a person twenty years before he would otherwise have 
naturally died;  
(2) I knock a relevantly similar person unconscious for twenty 
years, at the end of which he dies a natural death, and I do so 
knowing that he will not regain consciousness before dying.  16
Lippert-Rasmussen proposes, first, that these two acts are equally bad for 
their victims.  But the fact that two acts are equally bad for their victims 17
does not imply that they are equally wrong. (Indeed, if an act’s wrongness 
always correlated with its harmfulness we could reject the Equal Wrongness 
Thesis out of hand.) Lippert-Rasmussen acknowledges this, but argues that 
in the absence of an explanation for why two acts differ morally the fact that 
they are equally harmful is a reason to believe them equally wrong.  But if 18
 Ibid., p. 722.16
 Ibid. He adds that any cost it would be permissible to impose upon me to prevent my do17 -
ing (1) could also be permissibly imposed upon him to prevent him doing (2). I agree with 
Matthew Hanser (2013, p. 379n17) that this argument would sway only someone to whom 
these acts already seem morally equivalent. 
 Lippert-Rasmussen (2007), p. 722.18
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two acts seem to differ morally, then even lacking an explanation for why 
they differ, we are probably unwarranted in concluding them to be equally 
wrongful on the sole basis that they are equally harmful—and it is question-
able that most people would intuitively believe that (1) and (2) are equally 
wrong. Moreover, there are a number of reasonable candidate explanations 
for that difference: for example, that killing someone ends that person’s life, 
whereas knocking her unconscious does not. 
The other argument Lippert-Rasmussen gives for the moral equivalence 
of killing someone and knocking her unconscious is that their equivalence fol-
lows from existing theoretical accounts of why killing is wrong.  If the factors 19
that explain why killing someone is wrong are present in equal measure for 
knocking someone unconscious, it seems reasonable to assume that the two 
types of act are morally equivalent. For instance, if the intrinsic wrongness of 
killing is wholly explained by its harmfulness, then, on the assumption that 
being knocked unconscious is no better or worse for a person than being 
killed, it is reasonable to conclude that the strength of the moral objection is 
the same for both types of act. Alternatively, suppose the wrongness of 
killing is fully explained by its disrespectfulness to the victim. Then, on the 
assumption that the factors that make killing someone disrespectful apply 
 Ibid., pp. 723–4.19
Not All Killings Are Equally Wrong |  117
equally to knocking her unconscious, quite probably the two types of act are 
morally equivalent.   20
The general problem with this argument is that whether or not all 
killings are equally wrong is itself a major consideration that any account of 
why killing is wrong must accommodate. Indeed, it is primarily on the basis 
of his conviction that all killings are equally wrong that McMahan rejects 
theoretical accounts of the wrongness of killing that imply otherwise, and it is 
also on the basis of that conviction that he proposes his own Intrinsic Worth 
Account, whose chief selling point is that it entails the Equal Wrongness 
Thesis.  If knowing whether the Equal Wrongness Thesis is true is necessary 21
to adjudicate among competing accounts of the wrongness of killing, we can-
not justifiably use accounts of the wrongness of killing themselves to decide 
whether the Equal Wrongness Thesis is true.  
 Ibid., p. 724. In defence of his claim that knocking someone unconscious is ceteris paribus 20
no less disrespectful than killing her, Lippert-Rasmussen points to the fact that persons de-
serve respect not simply in virtue of being alive, but rather in virtue of "certain cognitive 
and emotional capacities”. But an unconscious person might retain her capacities for cogni-
tion and emotion. Furthermore, this argument seems to conflate the bases of respect for per-
sons and the manner in which we should respect them. That we should respect people in 
virtue of certain capacities they have does not imply that respect for them consists in respect 
for those capacities. 
 McMahan (2002), pp. 241–3.21
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In the rest of this section, I will attempt to establish the moral equival-
ence of killing someone and knocking her unconscious until her death in a dif-
ferent way. My argument runs as follows. If, other things being equal, killing 
someone really is more wrong than knocking her unconscious until her death, 
then killing someone must have some wrong-making property not shared by 
knocking someone unconscious until her death. But there is no such property. 
Therefore, the two acts are morally equivalent. 
I take it that the conceptual difference between killing someone and 
knocking her unconscious until her death is that the former causes the vic-
tim’s death, whereas the latter merely ends her conscious mental activity un-
til she dies in a causally unrelated way. Thus, how we should conceptually 
distinguish the two kinds of act will depend on how we define death. Though 
many definitions of death (and by extension of killing) have been offered, all 
of them fall into one or the other of two categories. The first category, which 
we can call the Existence Conception of death, identifies a person’s death 
with the cessation of her existence. If death is the end of existence, then 
metaphysical difference between killing someone and knocking her uncon-
scious until her death is, roughly, that the former ends the person’s existence, 
while the latter merely causes her to have no conscious mental activity until 
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she ceases to exist for a causally unrelated reason. As we shall see shortly, as 
a conception of killing, this notion needs fine-tuning, but this rough charac-
terisation of it will do for the moment.  
The second category of definitions of death, which we can call the Bio-
logical Conception, identifies a person’s death with the cessation of function-
ing of one or more of her basic organismic processes. On the Biological Con-
ception, the difference between killing a person and knocking her unconscious 
until her death is that the former causes the permanent cessation of the vital 
biological processes while the latter merely causes her to have no conscious 
mental activity up to the time that those processes cease due to independent 
causes.  
These two conceptions—Existence and Biological—cover all plausible 
definitions of death. Hence, they cover all plausible views about what distin-
guishes killing someone from knocking someone unconscious until her death. 
Therefore, if it can be shown that on neither conception of death does the 
fact that one causes it constitute a wrong-making property of an act, we will 
have shown that the two types of act are morally equivalent. 
I begin with the Existence Conception of death. On this conception, 
killing ends someone’s existence while knocking someone unconscious until 
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her death merely causes her conscious mental life to cease up to the time that 
her existence ends for other reasons. Hanser sometimes adopts this concep-
tion of killing, for instance when he writes that killing a person is more seri-
ously wrong than knocking her unconscious because “[s]omeone who has been 
. . . knocked unconscious continues on in an impaired state; someone who has 
been killed does not continue on at all.”   22
This point recalls one made by Frances Kamm. She writes: 
Suppose we put someone into a coma, knowing that he will never 
recover from it . . . In such a case, we would not, I believe, be 
treated as harshly as if we had killed someone . . . The fact that 
one person determines the nonexistence of another against his 
will . . . is a factor in making killing wrong.   23
Conceiving killing simply as causing non-existence for the purposes of moral 
analysis is a mistake, however, because of well-known branching cases in the 
theory of personal identity, whereby an individual is caused to cease to exist 
in ways that seem morally quite unlike killing her. 
Consider first a stock case of what looks like a wrongful killing: 
 Hanser (2013), p. 399. 22
 Kamm (1993), p. 21.23
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Riding Roughshod: I am driving to the hospital to receive an 
urgent life-saving treatment when I notice you crossing the road 
ahead of me. Pressed for time, I run you over, killing you.  
Now contrast that case with the following one: 
Your Involuntary Division: I am driving to the hospital to receive 
an urgent life-saving treatment when I notice you crossing the road 
ahead of me. I press a button on my dashboard that causes you to 
divide amoeba-like into two individuals and then deposits each of 
your two “fission offspring” on either side of the road, where my 
car passes safely between them. 
Like Riding Roughshod, pressing the button in Your Involuntary Division ar-
guably causes you to cease to exist. It does so because, for well-known reas-
ons I shall not rehearse here, you would not be numerically identical with any 
individual who exists afterward.  Yet to press this button is plainly not as 24
objectionable as fatally running you over. My own intuitions are that causing 
your nonexistence en route to saving my own life is impermissible in Riding 
Roughshod but permissible in Your Involuntary Division. But whatever one 
 See Parfit (1984), pp. 255–260.24
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thinks about the overall permissibility of these two cases, it is clear enough 
that the moral objection to my action is weaker in the second case than in 
the first.  
At this point, someone who would still like to conceive killing as causing 
nonexistence might reply in the following way. Unlike causing your nonexist-
ence by running you over with my car, causing your nonexistence by splitting 
you into two individuals preserves, or mostly preserves, “what matters in 
survival”. That is why, it may be said, it is less objectionable to kill you in 
that case. Since this reply presupposes that the moral objection to causing a 
person’s nonexistence depends on the badness for the victim of ceasing to ex-
ist, though, to affirm it is already to reject the Equal Wrongness Thesis. 
I do not deny that there is some moral objection to causing a person to 
divide in two against her will. But it seems that whatever objection there is 
does not arise from the bare fact it brings about her nonexistence. It arises, 
rather, from the fact that it involves the violation of the victim’s bodily in-
tegrity or some cognate consideration concerning her moral rights against in-
terference. For that reason, Your Involuntary Division should not be de-
scribed as an instance of killing—at least not on the conception of that term 
that is useful for analysing the moral wrongness of killing people. 
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These remarks show that analysing killing as causing nonexistence is 
inadequate. But they should not, I think, lead us to abandon the Existence 
Conception wholesale. Instead, we should accept that there are two morally 
salient ways of causing an individual’s nonexistence, which we might label 
“killing by annihilation” and “killing by duplication”. Killing by annihilation 
is a matter of causing an individual to cease to exist by eliminating its essen-
tial intrinsic properties (i.e., those intrinsic properties of it which it could not 
possibly lack). Killing by duplication is a matter of causing an individual to 
cease to exist by eliminating its essential extrinsic properties—for example, 
by creating one or more “continuers” of it, each of which is at least as good a 
candidate for numerical identity to the original individual as another candid-
ate, and none of which is numerically identical to the original. 
The version of the Existence Conception of killing that is useful for 
moral theorising about killing is killing by annihilation, and I shall henceforth 
understand the Existence Conception of killing to refer only to that way of 
causing someone to cease to exist. Recall now that (A) claims that depriving 
someone of a given amount of conscious life by knocking her unconscious un-
til her death is as wrong as depriving her of the same amount of conscious 
life by killing her. In light of our more sophisticated understanding of the Ex-
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istence Conception, to assess (A), we need to consider the various candidates 
for what intrinsic properties of a person are essential. I shall now argue that 
on none of the mainstream accounts of these properties is there a moral dif-
ference between killing someone and knocking her unconscious until her death.  
 Consider, first, the psychological continuity view, according to which a 
person will exist in the future if and only if there will be one person to whom 
she is appropriately connected via overlapping beliefs, memories, desires that 
lead to actions, and so on.  Because most of our psychology can exist 25
without being consciously active, on a plausible understanding of the psycho-
logical continuity condition it will be possible to knock someone unconscious 
until her death without causing her to cease to exist. On this condition for 
continued existence, the difference between killing someone and knocking her 
unconscious until her death is that the latter does not cause the nonexistence 
of the psychological states that ground her persistence.  
Next, consider what McMahan calls the “embodied mind account”.  26
According to this view, a person continues to exist if and only if there is the 
unique physical and functional (or potentially functional) continuity of 
enough of those parts of the brain to retain the capacity for consciousness. 
 Shoemaker (1970; 1984); Perry (1972); Lewis (1976b); Parfit (1984).25
 McMahan (2002). Parfit (2012) later defended a similar view.26
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On the embodied mind account, the difference between killing someone and 
merely knocking her unconscious until her death is that only the killing in-
volves the destruction of enough of the relevant parts of the brain. 
I believe that on neither the psychological continuity condition, nor on 
the embodied mind account, is it morally relevant whether one’s action 
causes someone to cease to exist. To see why, it will be instructive to consider 
two real ways a human being can be biologically alive even though she will 
never again be conscious.  The first is a permanent vegetative state, in which 27
the victim has permanently lost consciousness because of irreversible damage 
to her cortex and limbic system. In a permanent vegetative state, the only 
parts of the brain that retain any functional capacity are the brainstem’s ve-
getative centres: those responsible for heart rate, blood pressure control, 
temperature control, and respiration. The other way involves damage to the 
ascending reticular activating system, a network of cells in the brainstem that 
is necessary for any consciousness to occur.  A patient with localised damage 28
to the reticular activating system retains the capacity for consciousness, as 
well as the bulk of her distinctive psychology, which is stored in (or consti-
 For illuminating surveys of these phenomena, see McMahan (2002), especially pp. 423–455, 27
and Horne (2009).
 Zeman (2001); McMahan (2002); Horne (2009).28
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tuted by) parts of the cerebrum. But because of the damage, as a matter of 
fact she will never again have any conscious experience. 
Suppose that the conditions for an individual to continue to exist are 
either the continued existence of her psychology or the physical and function-
al continuity of those parts of the brain that have the capacity for conscious-
ness. If it was in itself morally objectionable to terminate a person’s exist-
ence, then on either of these accounts it would be objectionable to end a pa-
tient’s life by terminating life support if she was in a total coma from which 
she would never recover due to damage to the reticular activating system, 
but not to remove life support from a patient in a permanent vegetative 
state. That is because the former ends the continuity of the patient’s psycho-
logy as well as the capacity for consciousness, whereas in a permanent veget-
ative state they have already been destroyed. It is very hard to believe that 
there is this difference.  
The preceding argument shows, I believe, that on neither of these two 
accounts of what it takes for someone to continue to exist is it in itself mor-
ally objectionable to cause a person’s nonexistence. But it shows this by ap-
pealing to atypical cases in which the conscious life of the victim has already 
ended forever. It might be replied that terminating a person’s existence is 
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especially objectionable, but only so long as the conscious life of the victim is 
not already over. On this view, the wrongness of ending a person’s existence 
is a “combination effect”: when ending a person’s existence also ends her con-
scious life, the former constitutes an additional moral objection over and 
above the wrongness of the latter. It would not, however, be more wrongful 
to cause a conscious person to be in a permanent vegetative state than it 
would be to cause her to be permanently unconscious by destroying her re-
ticular activating system. That is so even though only the former would in-
volve the termination of psychological continuity as well as the destruction of 
those parts of the brain that have the capacity for consciousness. It is not 
plausible that there is a stronger moral objection to ending someone’s con-
scious life forever based only on which part of the brain one damages. Al-
though the psychology of a patient with permanent damage to her reticular 
activating system survives, it is only “stored”. The fact that a person’s non-
conscious psychology is not destroyed would not, by itself, mitigate the 
wrongness of terminating her conscious life. 
Lastly, consider a biological continuity condition of existence, according 
to which a person will exist in the future if and only if her organism contin-
ues to exist and function biologically.  If continued existence is conditional 29
 Olson (1997); Snowdon (2014).29
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upon biological continuity, however, then being killed on the Existence Con-
ception of death coincides with being killed on the Biological Conception. Be-
cause I will also argue that killing someone and knocking her unconscious un-
til her death are morally equivalent when killing is understood on the Biolo-
gical Conception, I can argue that they are morally equivalent on the biolo-
gical version of the Existence Conception incidentally, since my arguments 
will also apply to it. 
Let us turn, then, to the Biological Conception of death, according to 
which the difference between killing someone and knocking her unconscious 
until her death is that the former but not the latter involves the termination 
of the victim’s vital biological processes. In some passages, Hanser seems to 
be adopting this conception of killing, instead of the Existence Conception. 
He writes: 
An agent arguably interferes with someone in a much more 
fundamental way by killing him than he does by knocking him 
unconscious . . . The former causes the complete and permanent 
cessation of the victim’s basic life-sustaining (or life-constituting) 
bodily operations; the latter leaves the victim alive but, for a time, 
Not All Killings Are Equally Wrong |  129
unable to exercise a variety of his practical and perceptual 
capacities.  30
Hanser here cites two distinct properties of killing someone which al-
legedly make it more wrong than knocking someone unconscious. One is that 
it causes the cessation of the victim’s vital bodily operations; the other is the 
permanence of that cessation. These components are separable. Medical ad-
vances might one day permit the biological resuscitation of a body that has 
ceased to function completely. 
We should ask which of the two properties (or both) is morally signific-
ant. Consider first the appeal to the permanence of the state that killing 
brings about. Of course, assuming that one’s victim is mortal, knocking her 
unconscious does not change the fact that there will be some time at which 
she will be permanently dead. So, if killing a person is more objectionable 
than knocking her unconscious because of the permanence of death, that 
must be because by killing someone one is the cause of her permanent biolo-
gical death. To see whether this is a wrong-making property of killing, con-
trast a pair of cases in which, absent any interference, the victim would have 
lived forever: 
 Hanser (2013), p. 399.30
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(1) I cause my victim’s vital biological operations to permanently 
cease at t1, thereby pre-empting their permanent cessation at t2.  
(2) I cause my victim’s vital biological operations to cease for the 
interval t1–t2. At t2, they will be made to cease permanently by 
some independent process (one I fully foresee but do not cause). 
That other process would have occurred when it did whether or 
not I had interfered with my victim first. 
It seems to me that what I do in (1) is no more wrong than what I do in (2), 
even though in only the former case do I cause the victim’s permanent biolo-
gical death. Causing the temporary cessation of someone’s biological func-
tions which will thereafter cease permanently without ever regaining func-
tioning is no less wrong than causing their permanent cessation. In support 
of this claim, consider an analogous pair of cases in which the harm for which 
I am responsible is non-fatal: 
(3) Albert will be infected by the incurable debilitating Virus X 
next week if and only if I don’t pre-emptively infect him with it 
today. 
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(4) Bernard will be infected by Virus Y next week whether or not 
I infect him with Virus X today. Virus Y has identical symptoms 
to Virus X, but it will also completely inhibit Virus X if that virus 
is present in the host when Virus Y is contracted. 
What I do in (3) is not, I believe, more seriously objectionable than what I 
do in (4). Some support for this claim comes from the observation that if I 
had to infect just one of these men, I would have no more reason to choose 
Bernard. That is so even though only in Albert’s case would I be responsible 
for the event that is someone becoming debilitatingly ill for the rest of his 
life. Suppose, furthermore, that we re-imagine the cases so that the viruses 
are beneficial, rather than harmful, to their hosts. I would have no more 
reason to give Albert the beneficial Virus X*, on the assumption that he 
would anyway contract it next week, if I don’t, than I would have to give X* 
to Bernard, who will contract the superseding but equally beneficial Y* next 
week no matter what I do. Assuming that benefits and harms are analogous 
in the relevant way, this supports the claim that, in instances of non-lethal 
harming, the wrongness of one’s act is determined by the difference one 
makes to what happens to the victim, not by the effect on her for which one 
is responsible. Without a good reason not to, it seems to me that we should 
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generalise this result to lethal harms. The mere fact that killing someone 
causes the permanent cessation of her vital biological operations is not, I 
conclude, a factor in making it wrong.  
Instead of appealing to the permanence of death, one might try to show 
that killing is especially wrong by appealing to its irreversibility. It might be 
said that depriving someone of conscious life by killing her is more objection-
able than doing so by knocking her unconscious because the effect of the 
former on the victim cannot be undone. We can understand this claim to be 
about metaphysical, physical, or practical irreversibility. Consider first the 
proposal that killing is especially wrongful because it is either metaphysically 
or physically irreversible. Suppose I wilfully terminate all of a person’s men-
tal processes along with her biological life. Her condition is not metaphysic-
ally or physically irreversible, let us suppose, for I know that the drug that 
would revitalise her has been successfully manufactured in the past. However, 
I also know that all samples of the drug have been destroyed and the know-
ledge of how to manufacture it has been lost forever. It is both metaphysic-
ally and nomologically possible to make the drug again, so my victim’s condi-
tion is reversible in both those senses—it is just that I know that it will not 
be reversed. I believe that it would be no less wrong to end my victim’s life 
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in this case than it would be if the drug to revitalise her had never existed 
and indeed never could have existed.  
Consider next the claim that killing is especially wrong because death is 
irreversible in a practical sense. Killing a person, it might be said, is objec-
tionable in part because by doing so one makes it the case that there is no 
feasible way to bring that person back to life. Against this claim, suppose the 
revitalising drug exists, but the last remaining sample is owned by an inde-
pendently acting agent who I know will never use it to restore the life of my 
would-be victim. Assume that I know, too, that there is nothing I can do to 
change this fact. When I end my victim’s life in this scenario, my effect is re-
versible in the practical sense, because there is a real way to bring her back 
to life. Yet it seems to me that it would be no less wrongful to end her life in 
that scenario than it would be if the drug had never existed. Because this ar-
gument appeals to what I and another agent bring about, it may seem mis-
leading to focus on the wrongness of my action alone. But the mere fact that 
there is someone else who could revive my victim does not mitigate the 
wrongness of my own action in killing her, given that I know, when I act, 
that this other person will never in fact revive her and cannot be made to do 
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so. Ending her life would be no less wrongful if the reason the drug could not 
be used was some impassable natural obstacle instead of an agential one. 
I have argued that neither the permanence of death nor its irreversibil-
ity is a factor in making killing a person more wrongful than knocking 
someone unconscious until her death. Let us turn, then, to the more funda-
mental wrong-making feature of the Biological Conception: simply that it 
brings about the cessation of a person’s life-sustaining (or life-constituting) 
bodily operations. I believe that the fact that one act causes the cessation of 
a person’s bodily operations does not, on its own, make its performance more 
objectionable than another. Suppose that someone in a temporary and med-
ically non-serious coma will soon be connected to a life support system. 
While she is connected to the machine, if the parts of her brain that support 
her mental life are destroyed, her bodily operations will continue to function: 
her heart will pump blood, her lungs will inhale and exhale, and so forth. If 
those parts of her brain are destroyed while she is not connected to the ma-
chine the injury will also cause her biological death. If bringing about the 
cessation of a person’s vital biological operations were in itself wrongful, then 
it would be less objectionable to obliterate this person’s brain while she was 
on the life support system than to do so before she was connected to it, for in 
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the former case her biological operations would continue to function even 
after the totality of her mental life was gone. But it is very difficult to believe 
that these two acts differ in their degrees of wrongness. 
Earlier in this section, I postponed arguing that it is not in itself wrong-
ful to terminate a person’s existence if personal persistence is a matter of bio-
logical continuity. I take the preceding arguments to have now established 
that conclusion, too. Hence, on none of the mainstream accounts of the con-
ditions for our continuity is terminating someone’s existence a factor in mak-
ing killing wrong. 
To summarise, on neither the Existence Conception nor the Biological 
Conception of killing is there is an intrinsic moral difference between killing a 
person and knocking her unconscious until her death. Because these are the 
only two plausible conceptions of killing, and because one type of act is more 
wrong than another only if there is some morally significant property of the 
former that is not shared by the latter, I conclude that it is just as wrong to 
knock someone unconscious until her death as it is to deprive her of the same 
amount of conscious life by killing her. 
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3.4. The temporal irrelevance of knocking someone unconscious 
I turn now to the second premise in my argument against the Equal Wrong-
ness Thesis: 
(B) It is as wrong to deprive someone of a certain amount of 
conscious life by knocking her temporarily unconscious in the 
middle of her life as it is to deprive someone of the same amount 
of conscious life by knocking her unconscious until her death, other 
things being the same.  
Before proceeding, it is important to clarify two things about (B)’s 
ceteris paribus clause. First, it should be understood to exclude any differ-
ences in the prudential value for the victim of the conscious period of which 
she is deprived. It may be said that the last month of a person’s life would 
have been especially important because it would have allowed her to say her 
goodbyes, or to realise some end toward which she had been working. But 
these are contingent facts about a life, and anyway I suspect that for many 
people who will live until old age a month in the middle of their life is worth 
at least as much to them as the one at its end. Second, (B) should be under-
stood to exclude differences in the length of the victims’ counterfactual con-
scious lifespans. It is plausible that it is more wrong to deprive someone of a 
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given amount of consciousness the shorter her total conscious life would have 
been, but the premise applies only when that difference is factored out.  
To get a better sense of (B), consider the following illustration. Calvin 
and Dylan will both live for exactly 1,000 months (about 83 years). Calvin 
has lived for 500 months so far while Dylan has lived for 999 months. Apart 
from their ages, the two men differ in no morally relevant respect. Suppose 
that the prudential value of what would be Dylan’s 1,000th conscious month 
is the same as that of what would be Calvin’s 501st month. (B) says that the 
strength of the moral objection to knocking out either man for one month is 
the same.  
In a response to Lippert-Rasmussen’s article, Daniel Cohen and Morgan 
Luck have argued that the wrongness of depriving a victim of a given amount 
of consciousness is greater the nearer the victim is to the end of her conscious 
life.  More precisely, the authors defend the following principle: 31
The wrongness of rendering someone unconscious corresponds with 
the proportion of the victim’s remaining conscious life that is 
thereby removed, other things being the same.  32
 Cohen and Luck (2009), pp. 396–401. 31
 Ibid., p. 399 (emphasis added). 32
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Their argument for that principle involves imagining two alien species. 
Members of the first species (call them the “short-livers”) always live for just 
two years, while members of the second species (call them the “long-livers”) 
live for 1,000 years. The authors imagine coming across a newborn member of 
each species.  As they point out, it seems more seriously wrongful to render 33
the newborn short-liver unconscious for one year—half its remaining life—
than to knock the newborn long-liver unconscious for a year, leaving it to ex-
perience another 999 years when it awakens.  
Cohen and Luck’s principle gets the right answer in this case, since the 
short-liver is deprived of a greater proportion of its remaining conscious life 
(one year of two) than the long-liver is of his (one year of a thousand). But 
there is a simple variation on their case that shows that their principle has 
an implausible implication. The principle they defend would imply that it 
would be no more wrong to knock unconscious a short-liver who has been 
alive for one year than a long-liver who has already lived for 999 years, for in 
either case one removes the entirety of the victim’s remaining conscious life. 
But that is hard to believe. When we knock the short-liver unconscious we 
deprive it of half its total conscious life, whereas when we do so to a long-liv-
er we reduce its conscious life by just one one-thousandth.  
 Assume that members of both species are born full persons.33
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It might be thought that the ceteris paribus clause of Cohen and Luck’s 
principle is meant to factor out differences in how much conscious life the 
victim has so far enjoyed. But their conclusion is that a person’s age has no 
bearing on the wrongness of killing her, so their argument cannot go through 
if cases in which the victims differ in the amount of conscious life they have 
lived are not covered by their principle.  
Cohen and Luck’s newborn aliens case relies on the intuition that it 
matters, when knocking a person unconscious, how much future conscious life 
she loses out on. But as the variation I have just offered shows, it also seems 
to matter for its wrongness how much conscious life a person has so far en-
joyed. To account for both factors requires a middle ground. One plausible 
candidate is that the wrongness of knocking a person unconscious for some 
period corresponds not with that period’s proportion to the victim’s remain-
ing conscious life, but rather with its proportion to the total lifetime con-
scious experience she would otherwise have had.  
That new principle would be:  
The wrongness of knocking someone unconscious corresponds with 
the proportion she loses of the total amount of conscious life she 
would otherwise have enjoyed, other things being the same. 
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This principle gets the right answer in both of the two short- and long-lived 
alien cases. It also entails (B), which compares equally long deprivations of 
consciousness at different times within equally long conscious lives. 
I now turn to a positive argument for (B). In it, Calvin and Dylan again 
make an appearance. Suppose that I possess two drugs: a fast-acting drug 
that immediately knocks its taker unconscious for one month and a delayed-
acting drug that has no effect until one month before its taker’s death, when 
it will knock him unconscious for that final month.  Consider, first, the fol34 -
lowing case: 
Case One: I secretly slip the fast-acting drug into the coffee of the 
999-month-old Dylan and the delayed-acting drug into the coffee of 
the 500-month-old Calvin. 
It is not plausible that what I do to either man in Case One is more wrong 
than what I do to the other. I deprive each man of the very same amount of 
experience, at the very same location in his life, and in the very same man-
ner. It is true that the effect of my action takes place immediately for Dylan 
 McMahan considers an objection to the Equal Wrongness Thesis that involves fast- and 34
slow-acting poisons—causing either an immediate or a delayed death—which is the inspira-
tion for these cases (2002), p. 248.
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but is delayed by nearly forty years for Calvin. But it seems to me that mere 
temporal distance between an act and its effect could not be morally signific-
ant in itself.  
Next, consider: 
Case Two: Calvin has an identical twin, Caleb. I slip the delayed-
acting drug into Calvin’s coffee, and the fast-acting drug into 
Caleb’s. 
I do not think it is plausible that the acts in Case Two are wrong to different 
degrees. To dispute that claim, one cannot appeal to the proportion of re-
maining conscious life of which each man is deprived, for it is the same. The 
salient difference seems to be that only Calvin loses the final month of his 
conscious life. But since it is not the last month he has left, and since being 
deprived of that month of consciousness does not, as I have argued in the last 
chapter, constitute a greater non-comparative loss to him, it is hard to see 
why the mere fact that the month is at the end of his life should make its 
deprivation more wrongful. 
Taken together, these two equivalences—that in Case One and that in 
Case Two—show that it is morally irrelevant whether, when I deprive 
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someone of a month of conscious experience, I do so at the end of his life or 
its middle. If giving the fast-acting drug to the 999-month-old Dylan is mor-
ally equivalent to giving the delayed-acting drug to the 500-month-old Calvin 
(Case One), and the latter act is morally equivalent to giving the fast-acting 
drug to the 500-month-old Caleb (Case Two), then giving the fast-acting 
drug to the 999-month-old Dylan is morally equivalent to giving the 500-
month-old Caleb the fast-acting drug. That result, of course, is the same as 
the case with which we began this section: knocking out Calvin now, or 
knocking out Dylan now.  35
3.5. Conclusion 
It is now possible to bring together the pieces of my argument. The first two 
premises were 
(A) It is as wrong to deprive someone of a certain amount of 
conscious life by knocking her unconscious until her death as it is 
to deprive someone of the same amount of conscious life by killing 
her, other things being the same. 
 The same argument can be given for longer deprivations of consciousness than one month. 35
But even this specific equivalence is sufficient to undermine the Equal Wrongness Thesis. 
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And 
(B) It is as wrong to deprive someone of a certain amount of 
conscious life by knocking her temporarily unconscious in the 
middle of her life as it is to deprive someone of the same amount 
of conscious life by knocking her unconscious until her death, other 
things being the same.  
These two premises entail 
(C) It is as wrong to deprive someone of a certain amount of 
conscious life by knocking her temporarily unconscious in the 
middle of her life as it is to deprive her of the same amount of 
conscious life by killing her, other things being the same. 
(C) is sufficient to defeat the Equal Wrongness Thesis. Suppose we take the 
period of unconsciousness to be one month. We would then hold that 
knocking someone temporarily unconscious for one month in the middle of 
her life is as wrong as killing someone who has one month left to live. The 
Equal Wrongness Thesis tells us that killing a person who has one month left 
to live is as wrong as killing a person with fifty good years to live. Hence, the 
conjunction of the Equal Wrongness Thesis and (C) entails that, other things 
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being equal, knocking a person unconscious for a month in the middle of her 
life is just as wrong as killing a person with fifty good years ahead of her. 
This result is absurd. Whatever considerations might justify knocking 
someone out for a month in the middle of her life, those considerations 
cannot be as strong as the ones required to justify killing a person with fifty 
good years left to live. On pain of absurdity, therefore, we should reject the 
Equal Wrongness Thesis. 
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Chapter 4: Non-Compensable Harms 
It is more or less uncontroversial that when we harm someone through 
wrongful conduct we incur an obligation to compensate her. But sometimes 
compensation seems impossible: when the victim has been killed, for 
example. Other times, only partial compensation is possible. There may be 
little one can do for the person one has made permanently quadriplegic; or 
that a state can do for a person who has spent most of his life in prison on a 
wrongful conviction. Call any harm whose victim cannot be fully 
compensated by its perpetrator a “non-compensable harm”. 
Many authors have discussed the duties offenders have to compensate 
their victims. But to my knowledge few have asked how these duties change 
when full compensation is impossible. This chapter is an attempt to explore 
this largely unexamined issue. I will try to show the many interesting ques-
tions it raises, whose answers have important and far-reaching consequences 
for both theoretical and applied ethics.  
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 It will be useful to sort non-compensable harms into two categories. 
The first category comprises harms whose perpetrators cannot, at least bey-
ond a certain point, compensate their victims at all. In these cases, there is 
either nothing whatsoever that the perpetrator can do to improve the vic-
tim’s condition, or else nothing she can do once some threshold below full 
compensation is reached. On the controversial assumption that the living 
cannot improve the lives of the dead, the clearest example of this sort of non-
compensable harm is one in which the victim has been killed.  
The other category of non-compensable harms comprises those harms 
whose victims, while unable to be fully compensated, can nonetheless always 
receive more compensation. The victim’s capacity for compensation is 
“asymptotic”: the perpetrator can get closer to full compensation, but can 
never reach it. In many more typical cases, it is natural to assume that the 
marginal cost to a perpetrator of compensating his victim is roughly equal to 
the marginal benefit to the victim of being compensated. Non-compensable 
harms can involve cases where the cost of compensating and the portion of 
the harm compensation offsets differ dramatically. 
The bulk of this chapter is divided into two long sections, each corres-
ponding to one of these two categories of non-compensable harm. In section 
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4.1, I will defend a position I call the “Non-Compensable Harms Thesis”, 
which holds that to the extent that it is impossible for the perpetrator of a 
non-compensable harm to compensate his victim further, he acquires a new 
undirected duty to promote the impartial good.  
In section 4.2, I will explore the nature and extent of the duties of per-
petrators who cannot compensate their victims fully but can, eventually at a 
very high cost, still get closer to full compensation. These cases raise the is-
sue of the limits of proportionality in corrective justice. Because full com-
pensation is impossible, we have to ask how much compensation—if any—is 
enough.  
4.1. How to make up for what we cannot make up for 
It may understandably be wondered whether there really are perpetrators 
who cannot further compensate their victims. After all, isn’t there always 
something that can be done to improve the life a quadriplegic, however little 
the improvement may be? Couldn’t she always have better therapeutic 
treatment, more advanced medical care, a more comfortable bed? Indeed, on 
some popular theories of death and wellbeing, victims can be compensated 
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posthumously, for example by satisfying interests they once had in what 
happens after their deaths. If so, then it seems there is some room to 
compensate even the person one has killed. 
Even if this complaint were on target, there would still remain the im-
portant question of how far a perpetrator must go in these cases. That is a 
question I will consider in the chapter’s second main part, section 4.2. For 
even assuming posthumous compensation is possible, few of the perpetrators 
of lethal harms would be able to fully compensable their victims. The vast 
majority of most people’s interests require for their satisfaction that they re-
main alive, and, moreover, it is hard to believe that there is anything one 
could do for a victim posthumously to fully make up for the loss of, say, dec-
ades of happy life.  
Yet I am convinced that the category of non-compensable harms whose 
perpetrators cannot compensate their victims at all is both philosophically 
significant and widely applicable. For one thing, there is the obvious fact that 
on other popular theories of wellbeing, like hedonism, posthumous compensa-
tion is impossible. Conditional on those theories’ truth, it is impossible to 
compensate a person one has killed. Since lethal harming makes up an im-
portant portion of wrongful harming in general, it is important to examine 
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the duties perpetrators of lethal harms have if these theories of wellbeing are 
true. 
Secondly, my concern in this section is with is the perpetrator’s duty in 
cases of non-compensable harm. While it is probably true that a victim can 
always in principle be compensated, it is not always true that her perpetrator 
will be able to provide that full compensation. The perpetrator might be 
totally indigent, or simply irredeemably ignorant of where her victim is loc-
ated, or of how to even begin to benefit her. Even if posthumous compensa-
tion is possible, most of the interests of the victims of large-scale and indis-
criminate killings are probably unknowable in practice. 
Finally, there are cases in which the receipt of compensation from a 
perpetrator is strongly contrary to the wishes of the victim. Some victims of 
violence may simply want nothing whatever to do with their attackers, in-
cluding the receipt compensation from them. One thing this might mean is 
that it is actually impossible for the perpetrator to compensate the victim, 
since any attempt at improving the victim’s condition would in fact leave her 
worse off by virtue of being contrary to her interests. But even if compensa-
tion were not impossible in such cases, perpetrators ought to respect the 
wishes of their victims even at the cost of not fulfilling their prima facie du-
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ties to compensate them. I have defined a non-compensable harm as one 
whose victim cannot be fully compensated, but we might then understand 
“cannot” in a looser sense that means “cannot permissibly”. It is interesting 
and important to learn what duties a perpetrator has whose victim rejects 
compensation, and, as I hope will be clear shortly, these cases raise the same 
puzzles, and have the same answers, as those in which full compensation is 
actually impossible.  
I take myself to have defended the significance of a general treatment 
the duties of perpetrators who cannot do anything more to compensate their 
victims. I will therefore proceed to my main topic of inquiry, which is what 
those duties are.  
Let me begin by stating explicitly the thesis I will defend in this section: 
The Non-Compensable Harms Thesis: When one person wrongfully 
harms another, she acquires a duty to promote the impartial good 
in proportion to the amount of the harm that cannot be made up 
for by compensating the victim.  
Before pressing on, several elements of this thesis require some brief explana-
tion. For the purposes of this chapter, I will assume a counterfactual-compar-
ative account of harming, according to which an act harms a person just in 
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case, and to the extent that, it leaves her worse off than she would have been 
had the act not been performed. Correspondingly, I will say that an act com-
pensates someone for a harm to the extent that it leaves in a state that is as 
good as that in which she would have been, had that harm not been done. 
The counterfactual-comparative account is not, of course, the only conception 
of harm on the market. My arguments are compatible with alternative con-
ceptions of harm, however, because they will still require a corresponding ac-
count of compensation, and any plausible account of harm will allow for 
harms that are not fully compensable. 
By “the promotion of the impartial good” I mean the promotion of that 
which has intrinsic value, including the elimination of intrinsic disvalue. For 
the most part, I will remain neutral on what sorts of thing are intrinsically 
valuable. It is important to stress, however, that by “impartial” I do not 
mean non-person-affecting. Although it might be that the world is improved 
when it contains more knowledge or beauty, on any plausible axiology it is 
improved when its inhabitants enjoy more wellbeing or less suffering. Central 
to my argument is the assumption that possible worlds or states of affairs can 
be ordered in terms of better and worse overall, where this notion is concep-
tually independent of their being better or worse for a particular individual, 
Non-Compensable Harms |  152
and where one state of affairs is better than another just in case it contains 
more intrinsic value on balance. Although widely accepted, this view does 
have its detractors , and those who deny that we can make sense of one state 1
of affairs being better or worse simpliciter than another will not find my ar-
guments persuasive. 
4.1.1 THE NON-COMPENSABLE HARMS THESIS 
I turn now to a defence of the Non-Compensable Harms Thesis. Suppose 
Jones wrongfully breaks Smith’s finger. Jones has an obligation to fully 
compensate Smith for this by, for example, paying his medical bills and 
offsetting any pain and suffering or lost wages. But suppose Jones had 
instead chosen to kill Smith. Then there would be no way for Jones to 
compensate Smith.  So by “ought” implies “can”, Jones would have no duty 2
to compensate Smith. So, it seems that by committing a far more egregious 
act, Jones can ensure that he has no obligation to compensate his victim, 
instead of the costly one of compensating him for a broken finger. 
 For example Taurek (1977); Foot (1985).1
 I here assume that compensation is impossible because Smith is dead, but the same point 2
applies if compensating Smith is impossible or impermissible for any of the other reasons 
listed earlier.
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Of course, by killing Smith, Jones may owe compensation to Smith’s 
family or loved ones because his action also harmed them. And he may be 
required to submit to legal punishment on, for instance, grounds of fairness 
or political obligation. But these duties obtain in virtue of facts that are con-
nected only contingently to the original harm. There is no reason to think 
they will always obtain, or that when they do their strength will be greater 
than that of the compensatory duty that would have arisen had the less 
harmful act been performed instead, so we cannot appeal to them to avoid 
the result. For those who prefer tidiness, we can add that Smith has no fam-
ily or friends (or even that Jones killed them, too) and that the offence takes 
place in the state of nature. 
The same phenomenon arises when it is full compensation that is im-
possible. Suppose Wright wrongfully causes Edwards to be moderately dis-
abled for a year. Assume that, while doing so would be onerous and expens-
ive, it is possible for Wright to fully compensate Edwards. But suppose 
Wright had instead chosen to assault Edwards in a way that made him quad-
riplegic for life. There is still something we can do to improve the lives of the 
permanently quadriplegic. But it is unlikely that we can raise their wellbeing 
to the level it would have been at had they not been injured, and let me 
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stipulate for good measure that in the case of Edwards there is a point (relat-
ively easily reached) at which there is nothing more that can be done for him. 
Here, again, it seems we must accept that by perpetrating a much more seri-
ous harm a person can ensure that he incurs a far weaker obligation to his 
victim. 
In “A Difficulty Concerning Compensation”, Saul Smilansky considers 
several cases like these and concludes that they reveal an intractable “para-
dox of morality”.  His reason for thinking these cases paradoxical seems to be 3
that they are incompatible with the following principle: 
(A) Other things being equal, the strength of the obligation one 
incurs in virtue of wrongfully harming another correlates with the 
degree of harm done. 
As he puts it,  
if [a perpetrator’s] burden can be lightened (or even dismissed 
altogether) because of the increased harm to the victims, this 
situation is manifestly morally unsatisfactory, and indeed absurd.  4
 Smilansky (2013).3
 Ibid., p. 333. 4
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Seeing no alternative, Smilansky reluctantly concludes that we must abandon 
the intuitively attractive view represented by (A).  Instead of rejecting (A), 5
however, we could deny that 
(B) The obligations one incurs in virtue of wrongfully harming 
another are exhausted by the obligations one has to her. 
We could, instead, say that a perpetrator incurs an obligation that tracks the 
extent to which he has harmed the victim, rather than the extent to which it 
is possible for him to compensate her. Then the situation would no longer be 
absurd. In doing so, we might appeal to 
The Non-Compensable Harms Thesis: When one person wrongfully 
harms another, she acquires a duty to promote the impartial good 
in proportion to the amount of the harm that cannot be made up 
for by compensating the victim. 
Killing a person is, we can suppose, much more harmful than breaking his 
finger. So, the Non-Compensable Harms Thesis implies that Jones’s obliga-
tion in virtue of killing Smith is more demanding than his obligation in the 
world where he merely breaks Smith’s finger—it is just that the non-com-
 Ibid., p. 336.5
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pensable portion must be made up for elsewhere. Similar remarks apply when 
it is full compensation that is impossible. When Wright causes Edwards per-
manent full paralysis, the thesis implies that his overall obligation is more 
demanding than it would have been, had he instead caused him temporary 
moderate disability. 
Below I will consider a number of objections to the Non-Compensable 
Harms Thesis in general and to the argument just made in favour of it in 
particular. But it is worth registering that the thesis already enjoys at least 
some intuitive appeal. Many people, I suspect, would find it hard to accept 
that agent-neutral morality requires us to engage in highly demanding or 
risky activities to assist the less fortunate by, say, devoting several years of 
our lives to volunteering in the Peace Corps. But it is much easier to believe 
that Jones, who has killed an innocent person, could be morally required to 
do something of the kind. 
To be sure, one can uphold the general claim that the perpetrator of a 
wrongful non-compensable harm can incur an obligation that is not directed 
to her victim, while denying that the content of that obligation is the promo-
tion of the good. Two alternative ways of filling out that content are that it 
involves the duty to suffer for one’s wrongdoing, and that it involves the duty 
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to repent for it. The view that people should suffer for their misdeeds has 
some pedigree by way of the religious doctrine that evildoers should atone for 
their sins by engaging in penance, but it is not a serious rival to the Non-
Compensable Harms Thesis for several reasons. First, imagine Jones ends up 
enjoying his experience in the Peace Corps and becomes a happier and better 
person for it. We would not, I think, judge that he has failed to discharge the 
duty he incurred by killing Smith. Second, although many people believe that 
wrongdoers deserve to suffer, it is harder to believe that they could have a 
moral duty to suffer, such that it would be impermissible for them not to in-
flict suffering upon themselves.  
Finally, even if we do maintain that the perpetrator of a non-compens-
able harm is required to suffer for it, in fact it is not obvious that this view 
supports the claim that the content of the obligation is suffering rather than 
the promotion of the good. For, many people also consider the suffering of 
evildoers to be an intrinsically good state of affairs. Thus, even if perpetrat-
ors of non-compensable harms have a duty to suffer, this can be understood 
as the view that they have a special duty to promote the good. Because those 
who believe that it is good when wrongdoers suffer believe that the suffering 
of any wrongdoer makes things better impartially, it may seem that together 
Non-Compensable Harms |  158
with the Non-Compensable Harms Thesis this would imply, unpalatably, that 
the perpetrator of a non-compensable harm can discharge the duty she incurs 
by inflicting suffering on deserving others rather than on herself. But that is 
not so, for it is independently plausible that if a person has a duty to bring 
about some outcome then she ought to bear the costs of bringing it about, 
rather than impose them on others.  
A second possibility for filling in the duty acquired by the perpetrator 
of a non-compensable harm is that wrongdoers have a duty to repent. There 
are at least two problems with this view. The first is that it is not clear that 
the remorse one should feel for a wrongful action tracks its harmfulness 
rather than other factors like how malicious or callous it was. Second, wheth-
er one feels remorse is generally not under one’s control. The racist perpet-
rator of a lethal hate crime may feel no remorse; indeed, he may regret not 
having done more harm. Because one can have a duty to feel or express re-
morse only if one is able to do so, the present view would imply that these 
wrongdoers do not incur any obligation, while those who are capable of sin-
cere regret do. I think we should conclude that while we may justifiably think 
less of people who do not feel or express remorse for their misconduct, 
wrongdoers themselves do not have a duty to do so. 
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The Non-Compensable Harms Thesis avoids the morally absurd result 
that by doing more harm a wrongdoer can ensure that she acquires a less 
demanding obligation, and it does so in a way that is more plausible than 
rival ways of filling out the content of that duty. It also enjoys some inde-
pendent intuitive appeal. These considerations provide some reason to accept 
it. But they are not sufficient to justify the thesis for three reasons: 
i) Even if we can explain why the promotion of the impartial good can 
make up for non-compensable harms, we need an explanation for why com-
pensable harms cannot be made up for in that way. For I accept that when it 
is possible to compensate a victim for a wrongful harm done to her, no 
amount of good done elsewhere can count as discharging that duty. 
ii) We lack an account of the internal connection between the object of 
the moral violation (a particular individual) and the object of the duty it 
supposedly generates (the world in general). When it comes to the duty to 
benefit a victim, in contrast, that connection is clear. My victim has a claim 
against me, and I have a corresponding duty to her. But no similar link seems 
forthcoming for the move from harming a person to an obligation to do 
something that will likely have no effect on her. By implying that one per-
son’s loss in wellbeing can be made up for by increasing value elsewhere, the 
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Non-Compensable Harms Thesis may be thought to disregard the separate-
ness of persons.  
iii) We lack an account of why the content of the duty is the promotion 
of the good in particular. Again, in the case of compensation the analogous 
explanation is more or less plain. Compensating a victim is the way to rectify 
the harm one has done to her. But it is not yet clear how making the world 
better in ways that have no effect on one’s victim would go any way toward 
rectifying a wrongful harm done to her. 
The answer to all three issues, I shall argue, proceeds from the following 
premiss: 
(C) When a person wrongfully makes the world a worse place, one 
has an obligation to add value to the world to the extent that one 
has wrongfully removed it. 
The claim is not, I hope, too controversial. The reasoning is straightforward: 
when one does wrong, one has a duty to reset things as far as possible to the 
way they would have been if not for one’s wrongdoing. Indeed, this seems to 
be one rationale for the more familiar obligation to compensate victims in the 
first place. Joel Feinberg writes that the reason a perpetrator has a duty to 
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compensate his victim for the wrongful harm he has done to her is “not only 
to repair the damage but also to ‘restore the moral equilibrium’”.  According 6
to Feinberg, compensation “sets things straight” and calls for “the redressing 
of the moral balance or the restoring of the status quo ante culpum”.  It is 7
clear what these metaphors are meant to capture. The point of compensation 
is to make things as close as possible, normatively speaking, to the way they 
were (or would have been) in the absence of the wrongful harm. Both reasons 
Feinberg cites—repairing the damage and restoring the moral equilibrium—
apply mutatis mutandis to the redress of wrongdoing that makes the world 
worse impartially. So if, as seems plausible, Feinberg is right about one ra-
tionale behind the duty of offenders to compensate their victims, we should 
also accept that one has an obligation to restore to the world what impartial 
value one’s wrongdoing has eliminated from it. 
Let me now relate in more detail how (C) rationalizes the Non-Com-
pensable Harms Thesis, and how it resolves problems (i)–(iii) raised earlier. 
Some ways of making the world worse seem to be non-person-affecting, in 
that the reason why they make it worse is not any harmful effects on particu-
 Feinberg (1970), p. 74. Feinberg himself uses the term “rectification”, reserving “compensa6 -
tion” to refer to the redressing of only those harms whose infliction was not wrongful.
 Ibid., p. 76.7
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lar individuals. At least on their orthodox interpretation, non-identity cases 
are paradigmatic examples. But one can also make the world worse by behav-
ing in a way that is person-affecting. A world in which one more wrongful 
killing occurs is worse for someone, but on any plausible axiology it is also 
worse impartially. Therefore, (C) implies that when one person wrongfully 
harms another she incurs not one but two distinct duties, deriving, respect-
ively, from the personal and impartial aspects of her transgression. When and 
to the extent that a wrongful harm is compensable, the victim has a claim 
against the perpetrator for the full amount of that compensation. The per-
petrator’s duty to satisfy this claim is independent of her duty to restore im-
partial value to the world. However, by fully compensating her victim, a per-
petrator also makes the world as good, or nearly as good, as it would have 
been had the harm never been done. Accordingly, to the extent that one ful-
fils an obligation to compensate a victim, the duty to restore impartial value 
to the world is discharged incidentally. To the extent that a harm is non-
compensable, the duty to restore impartial value remains, and it is this re-
mainder that gives rise to the perpetrator’s obligation to promote the good. 
This explains why, as observed in (i), one cannot rectify a compensable 
harm by promoting the general good. That worry arose, I think, from the as-
Non-Compensable Harms |  163
sumption that the Non-Compensable Harms Thesis implies that when a vic-
tim cannot be compensated, the duty to compensate transforms into a duty 
to promote the impartial good. But, rather, the imperative to restore to the 
world the value one has wrongfully eliminated from it is independent of 
whatever obligations one has to one’s victims. So it makes sense that if one 
has an undischarged personal duty, promoting the impartial good does not 
count toward its fulfilment.  
Because it is the impartial aspect that generates the obligation to pro-
mote the good, this rationale for the Non-Compensable Harms Thesis avoids 
the charge posed in (ii)—namely, that by allowing that one person’s loss in 
wellbeing can be made up for elsewhere, the thesis fails to respect the separ-
ateness of persons.  
Because the obligation is given by the duty to restore the impartial 
value one has wrongfully eliminated, the account explains why the content of 
the obligation is the promotion of the good, thereby answering (iii).  
Furthermore, because the good required is proportional to the impartial 
disvalue of the non-compensable amount of the harm, it accords with (A), 
the principle that the obligations a perpetrator incurs in virtue of wrongfully 
harming another correlate with the amount of harm she has done. 
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(C) provides a normatively significant underlying rationale for the Non-
Compensable Harms Thesis. Before concluding, however, I should address an 
issues it raises. It may be objected that it lets some wrongdoers off the hook 
too easily. By some estimates, the current cost of saving a life in the more 
miserable parts of our planet is just several thousand pounds. The argument 
so far may therefore seem to imply that an affluent murderer can make 
amends by donating a relatively negligible sum to an effective charity.  
There are two things to notice about this objection. The first is that it 
depends on the facts that the perpetrator is well off and that there are many 
people alive who are very badly off and whose lives can be greatly improved 
at little cost to the wealthy. These facts are both contingent and almost cer-
tainly reflect pre-existing unfairness. The second thing to note is that the ob-
jection arises even for ordinary compensatory duties. How demanding it is for 
a perpetrator to compensate her victim almost always depends on how well 
off she is. It seems plausible, therefore, that what is problematic is not the 
Non-Compensable Harms Thesis, but rather the current distribution of those 
factors which determine how easy it is to add value to the world. 
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4.1.2. TWO PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
I have argued that the perpetrator of a wrongful, non-compensable harm has 
an obligation to promote the impartial good that is proportional to the 
amount of the harm that is not compensable. If we have committed wrongs 
in the past, then we may learn from this that we have a duty we did not 
know we had. I now want to briefly discuss two more specific implications of 
the Non-Compensable Harms Thesis. 
A. The Justification of punishment 
One of the more divisive issues in legal philosophy is the justification of 
criminal punishment. One family of justifications for punishment is 
retributivist, holding, roughly, that punishing wrongdoers is justified because 
they deserve to suffer for what they have done. Those who reject retributivist 
justifications typically adopt forward-looking rationales for state punishment, 
perhaps most prominent among them that punishment can serve to deter 
others from misconduct. But, at least for non-consequentialists, the 
deterrence justification has at least one implication that is difficult to 
swallow: it can recommend punishing the innocent. 
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In an influential recent book, Victor Tadros has developed an alternat-
ive justification for punishment, which he calls the “Duty View”.  The Duty 8
View aims to show how punishment can be warranted because of its de-
terrent effects without implying that punishing the innocent could be justi-
fied on those same grounds. In brief, Tadros argues that punishment can be 
justified when it would deter others from crime, but the reason it is justified 
is not consequentialist in nature but rather that wrongdoers owe their victims 
compensation. According to Tadros, that compensation is often best provided 
by protecting their victims from future harms, which in turn is best achieved 
by enduring sufficient harm to deter others from crime.  
Of course, it is highly improbable that the deterrence provided by a giv-
en criminal’s incarceration will benefit his own victim: one more incarceration 
is unlikely to deter prospective offenders to any appreciable degree and, even 
if it did, it is unlikely that the minute reduction in crime that resulted from 
would end up benefitting the particular individuals to whom the offender 
owes compensation. To answer this objection, Tadros argues that criminals 
have a duty to “pool” the compensatory obligations they owe to their vic-
tims. By all undergoing punishment, they together make it the case that each 
of their victims is expected to enjoy a safer, better life. 
 Tadros (2011).8
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A major hurdle faced by the Duty View, which Tadros acknowledges, is 
that it appears unable to explain why punishing offenders is justifiable when 
doing so will not provide any benefit to their particular victims. A murder 
victim, for example, seems to have nothing to gain from a reduction in crim-
inal activity. It is hard to see why, in these cases, the offender would be re-
quired to submit to punishment, since even by doing so together with many 
others he will not go any way toward benefitting his own victim.  
I shall not attempt to assess Tadros’s own answer to this objection, 
which is complex and turns on the “permissions and obligations that citizens 
have to transfer their right to protection to other citizens”.  I want to note, 9
instead, that the Non-Compensable Harms Thesis can provide an easier route 
to his desired conclusion. 
Tadros’s account has this difficulty because it appeals only to directed 
compensatory obligations—those wrongdoers have to their victims. It there-
fore has trouble accounting for cases where the victim of a crime is not in a 
state to be benefitted. The Non-Compensable Harms Thesis holds that in 
just these cases, an offender has an additional duty to promote the good. So, 
if the perpetrator of a non-compensable harm is best able to promote the 
good by submitting to state punishment to deter others from crime, then it 
 Ibid., p. 281.9
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can provide the necessary justification for punishing offenders whose own vic-
tims have nothing to gain.  10
B. Non-compensable harms and the state 
Many if not most modern states have committed historical atrocities. Many 
of the victims of those atrocities cannot be fully compensated, either because 
the atrocities involved killing (as in the case of contemporary unjust wars) or 
else because the victims have since died (as in the case of slavery). The Non-
Compensable Harms Thesis may imply that these states have a duty to make 
up for the wrongful harms they have committed in the past by way of pro-
moting the good. Because my aim here is only to draw out a potential im-
plication of the thesis, I sidestep two difficult further questions: the extent to 
which the individual citizens of a state can bear responsibility for its wrong-
doing, and whether, in the case in which that wrongdoing is in the more dis-
tant past, present-day citizens can have the responsibility to make up for the 
misdeeds of their forebears. 
Many people believe that affluent states already have some duty to as-
sist the unfortunate people in this world. They accept that the members of 
 Admittedly, this depends (as does Tadros’s justification) on the duty in question being 10
enforceable.
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those states ought to give up some of their wealth, collected by taxes, to for-
eign aid. But this proposition is typically defended, implicitly or explicitly, 
with one or more of what Robert Nozick called “current time-slice 
principles”—principles like equality, sufficiency, total utility, or the Difference 
Principle—as contrasted to historical principles, which appeal to and depend 
upon what rights have been violated in the past. The Non-Compensable 
Harms Thesis may imply that these states have additional duties of assist-
ance on the basis of the wrongs they have committed in the past.  
To make the point vivid, suppose for the sake of argument that the cur-
rent time-slice-given duty of assistance that those in affluent states have ex-
tends only so far as is required to bring others up to a level of wellbeing that 
is by some measure sufficient.  If an affluent state is also guilty of significant 11
non-compensable past wrongdoing, as many are, the Non-Compensable 
Harms Thesis may suggest that the overall duty of assistance that must be 
borne by its citizens is higher than that level. And insofar as the historical 
wrongdoings in question are gargantuan—mass slavery and genocide, for in-
stance—this duty may be much stronger than what is required by the correct 
current time-slice principle. 
 Frankfurt (1987; 2000); Miller (1995); Wiggins (1991). 11
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4.2. Compensation and proportionality 
The first part of this chapter concerned those cases in which the perpetrator 
of a non-compensable harm cannot or should not further compensate his 
victim. Those are the cases to which the Non-Compensable Harms Thesis 
applies. In this, the second part, I turn to those non-compensable harms 
whose perpetrators both can and may compensate their victims further. In 
these cases, the victim’s capacity for compensation by the perpetrator is 
asymptotic: she can always be compensated more, but never fully. Because 
full compensation is not possible, we need to ask how much compensation, if 
any, can be enough.  
I will attempt to show how this second category of non-compensable 
harms provides a way into the under-explored issue of the limits of propor-
tionality in the liability to compensate. The question of what limits propor-
tionality places on liability to compensate does not arise that often, because 
typically the answer to “When has the perpetrator contributed enough com-
pensation?” is simply, “When the victim has been fully compensated.” But 
when it is either strictly impossible or else prohibitively expensive for a per-
petrator to fully compensate his victim for a wrongful harm, we need to ask 
how much compensation he is liable to provide. In addition to its more direct 
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implications for the limits of the duty to compensate in a range of such cases, 
I shall show how the conditions under which a perpetrator has compensated 
enough have important consequences for proportionality in the ethics of self-
defence. 
4.2.1. PROPORTIONATE COMPENSATION 
No one but an overzealous pacifist would deny that we may sometimes use 
force to protect ourselves from those who threaten harm. That said, 
philosophers typically recognise two broad constraints on the right to harm 
others in self-defence. The first is that one may use only the minimum 
amount of force necessary to avert a given threat; there must be no way to 
save oneself from the same probability of the same amount of harm by 
inflicting a lesser harm on others. This is called the “necessity” condition. 
But sometimes one lacks the right to harm someone even when doing so is 
the only way to avert the threat she poses—it is impermissible for me to kill 
someone just to stop her from breaking my little finger, for example. 
Philosophers therefore recognise that even a defensive harm which satisfies 
the necessity condition can be impermissible if the harmful effect is by some 
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measure excessive in light of the harm it would prevent. This is known as the 
“proportionality” condition. Of course, sometimes a given use of defensive 
force is excessive not because of its effect on the attacker, but because of its 
effects on third parties. The question of how much harm is proportionate to 
inflict on the threatener is that of so-called “narrow” proportionality—
proportionality as it applies to the effects of an act on perpetrators and 
victims.  12
Just as a victim lacks the right to inflict more harm than is necessary to 
defend herself from a given threat, so a victim lacks the right to extract a 
greater cost than is necessary for her to be compensated to a given degree. 
Even if my total-loss car is the result of your reckless driving, I cannot justi-
fiably insist that you buy me an identical car from the more expensive of two 
dealerships. More importantly for our purposes, there is a limit to the 
amount of compensation it is proportionate to extract in compensation for a 
harm. If for some reason the only way for you to recover damages for your 
broken fence requires me to sell my kidney, you would probably lack a right 
that I do so. 
 For a useful recent overview of the literature on necessity and proportionality in defensive 12
harming, see McMahan (2018).
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Before moving on I should make a few preliminary remarks. First, I will 
here conceive proportionality as “internal” to liability, such that by definition 
a person cannot be liable to pay compensation that is disproportionate.  13
Second, I shall assume that a victim has a right against a perpetrator to be 
compensated for a given harm if and only if, and to the extent that, the per-
petrator is liable to compensate her for it. Third, since I will focus mainly on 
proportionality, I shall often simply take for granted that the necessity condi-
tion has been met. I will suppose, in other words, that for a given compens-
atory claim, it is not possible for the perpetrator to give the same benefit to 
the victim at a lesser cost to himself. Finally, because I am concerned primar-
ily with the limits that proportionality places on the compensation for which 
we are liable—rather than the conditions for being liable in the first place—I 
will often restrict my discussion to cases of fully culpable harm, for in these 
cases it is straightforward that the perpetrator can be liable to pay at least 
some compensation. 
It is easy to overlook the fact that compensation has its own propor-
tionality constraint for at least two reasons. First, as I noted earlier, in many 
cases of corrective justice we take for granted that if a perpetrator is liable to 
 For discussion of the parallel view in the context of defensive harm, see McMahan (2009), 13
pp. 8–10.
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compensate his victim at all, then he is liable to compensate her fully if he 
can do so.  
Second, unlike cases of defensive harming, in which the size of the harm 
necessary to stop an aggressor often differs greatly from the size of the harm 
he threatens, in cases of compensation we may take for granted that the 
magnitude of the cost to a perpetrator of providing compensation is roughly 
equivalent to the benefit to the victim of receiving it. If P unlawfully does 
£1,000 of damages to V’s property, by compensating V by only £700 instead 
of the full £1,000, P makes it the case that V ends up bearing an additional 
financial cost of £300. And it seems that, for a given fixed cost, it should be 
the perpetrator, not the victim, who bears it. But of course the benefit to P 
of £300 may well exceed the benefit to V of £300, in which case the cost to 
P of fully compensating V may be considerably greater than the cost to V of 
being less-than-fully compensated. Cases of non-compensable harms illumin-
ate this difference. In these cases, at some point, the marginal wellbeing-cost 
to the perpetrator of paying compensation will far exceed the cost to the vic-
tim of being deprived of additional compensation. It is primarily when these 
two variables diverge that full compensation can seem excessive. 
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Much later, in subsection 4.2.5, I will offer three arguments to the effect 
that proportionality in the liability to compensate is nothing more or less 
than the ex post flip-side of proportionality in the liability to suffer defensive 
harm. Hence, I claim, in every case in which a perpetrator is liable to suffer 
some measure of defensive harm to avert a threat he poses, he is also liable to 
the same cost if doing so is necessary to compensate his victim should the 
harm eventuate—and vice versa. I call this thesis the substantive symmetry of 
the liability to defensive harm and the liability to compensate. But whatever 
one thinks about the substantive symmetry, it is undeniable that there is a 
certain conceptual similarity between the two notions. And it is worth stop-
ping now to show that, just by acknowledging that there is also a proportion-
ality constraint on compensation, we are already well positioned to explain 
away cases that have sometimes been thought to be counterexamples to the 
substantive symmetry.  Consider: 14
Feinberg’s Cabin: A backpacker is trapped in a blizzard. He breaks 
into an unoccupied cabin and burns the furniture there to keep 
himself from freezing to death.  15
 McMahan (2008); Steinhoff (2016). Steinhoff focuses on yet a third case in the literature, 14
which involves a diabetic in need of insulin.
 Feinberg (1978), p. 102.15
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Vincent v. Lake Erie: Lake Erie Transport Company (defendant) 
tied its ship to Vincent’s (plaintiff) dock in the middle of a storm 
in order to safeguard the ship and crew. Doing so damaged the 
dock.  16
Almost everyone would accept that in both cases the offenders acted 
permissibly. The transport company was later ruled to have been acting un-
der the privilege of private necessity, as would the backpacker have rightly 
been. More importantly for our purposes, it is also true that it would have 
been impermissible for the homeowner to use defensive force against the 
backpacker to prevent him from entering his cabin, could he have done so, 
and it would have been impermissible for Vincent to forcibly prevent the 
transport company from mooring at his dock. 
Yet although it would have been impermissible for the owners to pre-
vent the offenders from trespassing, it is also reasonably clear that the of-
fenders incurred an obligation to compensate the injured parties after the fact 
by acting as they did. Feinberg wrote of his example that “almost everyone 
would agree that [the backpacker] owes compensation to the homeowner” , 17
 Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co. 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910).16
 Feinberg (1978). p. 102.17
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and Vincent, whose dock was damaged, later sued the transport company 
and was awarded $500 in damages.  18
Because in these cases the threatened party lacks a right to self-defence 
against a given harm ex ante, but retains a right to receive compensation for 
the same harm ex post, these examples may seem to challenge the substantive 
symmetry between the liability to defensive harm and the liability to com-
pensate. Thus McMahan writes that Feinberg’s case presents “[a]n obvious 
example in which the one form of liability does not entail the other”.  How19 -
ever, the correct defensive analogue of the homeowner collecting compensa-
tion is not preventing the endangered backpacker from entering his cabin, but 
rather forcing the backpacker to pay upfront for the damage that will be 
done to his property. Likewise, the correct defensive analogue of Vincent col-
lecting compensation would not be preventing the ship from mooring, but 
rather doing $500 worth of damage to it to spare the damage to his dock. 
Provided these pre-emptive acts would impose no additional danger on the 
offenders—as collecting compensation after the fact would not—neither de-
fensive action is disproportionate, so in fact there is no obvious asymmetry 
here. 
 Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co. 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910).18
 McMahan (2008), p. 233.19
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We can make this point from the opposite direction, too. The compens-
atory analogue of preventing the backpacker from taking refuge in his cabin 
would be the homeowner preventing the backpacker’s life from being saved in 
order to recover the damage to his property. Likewise, the compensatory ana-
logue of Vincent preventing the transport company from mooring is later 
preventing the ship and crew from being saved from a high risk of harm in 
order to recover $500. And everyone would agree that a moral theory which 
permitted these ways of extracting compensation is ludicrously draconian.  
In sum, accepting that there are limits to the liability to compensate, 
just as there are limits to the liability to defensive harm, such that a victim 
sometimes lacks the right to claim to full compensation, shows that cases like 
these are not counterexamples to the substantive symmetry of the two forms 
of liability. 
4.2.2. THE RECEIVED VIEW OF PROPORTIONALITY  
Again, I will postpone my full defence of the substantive symmetry of defence 
and compensation until much later. First, I want to turn to the question of 
what makes a given case of compensation disproportionate in the first place. 
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As I said earlier, because we often take for granted that wrongdoers are liable 
to fully compensate their victims, this question arises mainly when the only 
way for a victim to fully recover small damages would impose an enormous 
cost on the person responsible for them. The clearest cases are those of non-
compensable harms, in which a perpetrator lacks the means to fully 
compensate his victim. 
When, then, is the payment of some amount of compensation excessive, 
such that a perpetrator is not liable to pay it? According to the most ex-
treme answer to that question, no amount of compensation, however large, is 
excessive: if there is something more that the perpetrator can do for the vic-
tim, then there is something more that he should do for her. Peter Vallentyne 
has defended this view. But, as we have seen, this extreme answer is implaus-
ible. It is very hard to believe, for instance, that the homeowner would be 
permitted to recuperate the damage to his furniture by preventing the back-
packer’s life from being saved, or that Vincent could pay for the repairs to his 
dock by thwarting the prevention of a serious risk from befalling the com-
pany’s ship and crew. On the contrary, sometimes, even though a victim has 
not been fully compensated, she lacks the right that the perpetrator com-
pensate her further. 
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In light of both the implausibility of the extreme answer and the struc-
tural similarity of compensation and defensive harm, it is natural to suppose 
that the limits of proportionality in compensation are analogous to those of 
what I will call the Received View of proportionality in self-defence.  On the 20
Received View, to determine whether some defensive act in a choice set is 
disproportionate we first ask the extent to which he or she is responsible or 
culpable for it. Once we know this, we need look only at two features of the 
available acts: the magnitude of the harm to the victim that each act can 
avert, and the magnitude of the harm to the perpetrator that averting it will 
cause. The defensive act is disproportionate if and only if the harm it does to 
the perpetrator is too great relative to the harm it prevents.  21
The simplest plausible function relating these two variables is probably 
a ratio. A proponent of the Received View then holds that for a given degree 
of responsibility or culpability for some threat there is some multiplier M 
such that a self-defensive action to prevent the threat is proportionate if and 
 Two notable dissenters are Jonathan Quong (2015), whose view I discuss later, and 20
McMahan (unpublished). McMahan has recently entertained the view that when a victim 
stands to suffer an enormous cumulative harm only a tiny portion of which is done to her by 
a culpable aggressor, then that aggressor may be liable to suffer an enormous harm to pre-
vent his tiny contribution to the total harm. I restrict my own discussion of the Received 
View only to large harms and those for the total of which the perpetrator is responsible. 
 The probability of the harm will also need to be taken into consideration, though I will 21
here consider only cases of certain harm.
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only if the harm the victim visits upon the perpetrator does not exceed M 
times the harm to herself she prevents by doing so.  
It should now be clear how to transpose the Received View to the con-
text of compensation. The Received View of proportionality in the liability to 
compensate says that a perpetrator is liable to provide compensation only if 
the benefit to the victim of receiving it is not too small relative to the cost to 
the perpetrator of providing it. In what follows, I will sometimes use “Re-
ceived View” to refer to the view as it applies to both compensation and self-
defence, but context should make it clear which of the two I am discussing.  
4.2.3. AGAINST THE RECEIVED VIEW OF COMPENSATION 1:  
DEGREES OF WRONGDOING  
The Received View of proportionality in compensation can easily 
accommodate cases like Feinberg’s Cabin. The reason the backpacker is not 
liable to lose his life in order to restore the damage to the homeowner’s 
furniture, on this view, is that that cost is too great relative to the benefit to 
the homeowner of being compensated. The Received View also correctly 
implies that the backpacker is liable to pay for the damages he has done to 
the cabin and furniture after the fact. Despite these virtues, ultimately, as a 
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metric for proportionality in compensation, the Received View is false—or so 
I shall argue.  
I will focus on two ways in which the Received View of compensation is 
defective. The first holds that the view is at best incomplete, since it fails to 
account for the degree to which a harm wrongs its victim, which can affect 
how much compensation is owed. My second criticism charges the view with 
failing to account for how perpetrators fare relative to their victims, and, ac-
cordingly, lets perpetrators off far too lightly in cases in which the harm done 
is either non-compensable or compensable but very costly. Following these 
two criticisms of the Received View in compensation, I will defend the sub-
stantive symmetry of compensation and defensive harm, thereby establishing 
that both criticisms also apply to the Received View of proportionality in the 
ethics of defensive harming.  
Jonathan Quong has suggested that something akin to the extent to 
which an individual is wronged by an act is what determines proportionality 
in the liability to defensive harm.  Though I am sceptical that wrongness is 22
the only factor that is relevant (for reasons that will become clear later), 
 Quong (2015). Quong appeals to the stringency of the right violated, but we should leave 22
open whether an act that wrongs its victim to a greater extent necessarily violates a more 
stringent right of hers. One reason to leave this possibility open is that the alternative would 
seem to imply that for every token act that differs from other token acts, however slightly, in 
the extent to which it wrongs a victim, the victim has unique right against it. 
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what follows here can be seen as something of a development of that view as 
it applies it to compensation instead. Before embarking I should make two 
brief remarks about what it means for an act to vary in the degrees to which 
they wrong someone. First, this notion of the degree to which an act wrongs 
someone is not identical to that of the overall degree of wrongness of an act. 
To see the difference, note that while it is very plausibly more wrong to mali-
ciously break the arm of each of ten people at once than to break just one 
person’s arm, each individual person is wronged to the same degree by having 
her arm maliciously broken regardless of how many others are also wrongfully 
injured.  
Second, if the degree to which an act wrongs someone bears on the liab-
ility of the one doing it, then it is important that wrongness really does come 
in degrees. It is not enough that we are able to rank actions ordinally in 
terms of more and less wrongful. If wrongness is to bear on how much com-
pensation is owed we must also be able to say to what extent an act wrongs a 
person. Some may doubt that the notion of degrees of wrong done to others 
makes sense, but in fact we appear to make judgments like this all the time. 
“Stealing someone’s umbrella wrongs her a bit more than cutting in front of 
her in a queue, but murdering someone wrongs her a lot more than stealing 
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her umbrella.” This statement makes sense only if we intuitively understand 
comparisons of wronging to involve more than an ordinal ranking of the rel-
evant acts. 
Now, at least when it comes to defensive harm, it seems to me entirely 
correct that the limits of proportionality correlate with the extent to which a 
victim stands to be wronged by a given threat, other things being equal. 
Compare two cases: 
Assume that the harm to V of death is the same in both cases. It seems to 
me that if V could somehow stop the boulder from crushing her, but only by 
placing P in its path where it will crush him instead, she would be permitted 
to do so in (2) but not in (1). Granted that in these cases killing V consti-
tutes a greater wrong done to her than letting her die, this is evidence for the 
fact that a person can be liable to more defensive force the greater wrong his 
action does, or would do, his victim.  
(1) P could easily stop a loose boulder from rolling down a hill, 
where it will crush and kill the innocent V, but out of 
malice for V he chooses to allow it to roll by. 
(2) P intentionally and maliciously pushes a loose boulder down 
a hill where it will crush and kill V.
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Further, it seems to me that if, once the boulder started rolling, P could 
stop it, but only at some harm to himself by placing himself in front of it up-
hill from V, there is some cost such that he would be required to incur it to 
stop the boulder in (2) but would not be required to do so in (1). That seems 
to further establish that the permission of V to defend himself by killing P in 
(2) but not in (1) is grounded at least in part in P’s liability to suffer more 
harm in that case—rather than, for instance, considerations of retribution.  
If we accept my eventual suggestion that the limits of proportionality ex 
post mirror those of proportionality ex ante, the fact that P is liable to more 
defensive harm in (2) would, by extension, show that the wrongfulness to the 
victim of an act helps determine the degree of compensation the victim is 
owed. But I believe it is by itself intuitive that the amount of compensation 
owed varies according to the wrongness to the individual of the harm.  
When it comes to more typical cases of compensation this is easy to 
overlook. That is because we often take for granted that full compensation is 
owed. Consider: 
(3) P negligently sets off some fireworks in a residential area 
and they burn down V’s garden shed. 
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Most people would agree that what P does in (4) wrongs V to a greater de-
gree than what he does in (3). But it is also reasonably clear that P owes V 
full compensation in both cases and, further, that he will have fully dis-
charged his compensatory duty once he has replaced V’s shed.  Because vic23 -
tims do not have a right to claim more than full compensation from those 
who have harmed them, though, it is quite possible that P’s liability to pay 
full compensation for the more wrongful act he perpetrates in (4) is simply 
overdetermined, since he is also liable to pay full compensation in (3). 
The degree to which an act wrongs someone partially determines how 
much compensation is owed to her emerges primarily in cases in which it is 
an open question whether full compensation is owed. Consider: 
(4) P intentionally and maliciously burns down V’s garden shed 
thinking he can get away with it.
(5) P drives carelessly and above the speed limit and hits V with 
his car, severely disabling her. 
(6) P maliciously and intentionally runs down the innocent V 
with his car, severely disabling her.  
 Again, I set aside what other duties P may incur, like those to apologise, express remorse, 23
or submit to legal punishment.
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Suppose that P and V are each initially well off at a level of wellbeing of 100, 
and that by hitting V with his car P lowers her wellbeing to 75 in either case. 
Suppose, further, that it is extremely costly for P to compensate V, such that 
the marginal cost to him of compensating her far outweighs the extent to 
which the receipt of compensation offsets what harm she has suffered. Ima-
gine, for instance, that fully compensating V would require P to decrease his 
own wellbeing to a very low level that corresponds to 1.  
We can represent the possible distributions as a continuum from the 
situation immediately after P hits V to the situation in which P fully com-
pensates V, as illustrated by the following table. 
Table 1 






















1 100 Full compensation
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Let us assume, if only for the sake of argument, that in neither (5) nor (6) is 
P liable to fully compensate V. On that assumption, it seems clear to me 
that P must go further in the direction of Full compensation in (6) than in 
(5). This shows at minimum that, as applied to the liability to compensate, 
the picture given by the Received View is too simple. There is at minimum a 
third factor, apart from the magnitudes of the relevant harms, which helps to 
determine how much compensation a perpetrator is liable to pay. When it 
comes to non-compensable harms—in which full compensation is possible—we 
should therefore accept that the strength of the perpetrator’s duty to com-
pensate his victim depends in part on the extent to which the harm has 
wronged her.  
4.2.4. AGAINST THE RECEIVED VIEW OF COMPENSATION 2:  
RESPONSIBILITY FOR UNJUST UNFAIRNESS 
I will now turn to a distinct criticism of the Received View as it applies to 
proportionality in compensation. This criticism appeals not to a factor that 
the Received View fails to account for, but rather to a deeper issue with how 
it quantifies proportionality in the first place. It is my contention that the 
Received View gives the wrong judgment about what is and is not 
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disproportionate when the marginal cost to a perpetrator of paying 
compensation exceeds the marginal benefit to the victim of receiving it.  
 It is worth mentioning that the term “proportionality” can give the 
misleading impression that something like the Received View is the only pos-
sible view. For the term suggests that whether a given act is disproportionate 
is a matter of some ratio (proportion) between two variables. Yet there is no 
reason to assume a priori that this is the right test for when a certain cost is 
or isn’t excessive. The excessiveness of inflicting a certain cost on a perpet-
rator needn’t have anything to do with the relationship of that cost to the 
benefit secured, the harm prevented, or indeed anything else—all we are after 
is a test that delivers the right verdict for those acts we intuitively deem ex-
cessive or not (a more accurate, if clumsier term might have been “propor-
tionateness”).  
One would display no conceptual confusion, for instance, in maintaining 
that proportionality is just a matter of not imposing large costs on perpet-
rators, nothing more. Equally, one might appeal only to the effect on the vic-
tim: perhaps imposing a cost on a perpetrator is disproportionate just in case 
doing so would benefit the victim only slightly. (Suitably interpreted, both of 
these single-variable views could correctly imply that neither the backpacker 
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nor the transport company could be liable to risk their lives to repair the 
property they have damaged.) Neither of these alternative conceptions of 
proportionality is compelling in the end, but we should reject them because 
they are implausible, not because they are ruled out conceptually.  24
It is my contention that the Received View should be rejected because 
it can conflict with the following principle:  
Principle: When a perpetrator is fully culpable for making his 
victim worse off than himself, he is liable to compensate her at 
least until he is no better off than she is, unless the victim can be 
fully compensated at a lesser cost. 
When applied to cases in which the marginal cost to the perpetrator of 
providing compensation is great relative to the marginal benefit to the victim 
of receiving it, this principle rules as proportionate costs that would be ruled 
disproportionate by any specification of the Received View of compensation. 
For, if a perpetrator remains better off than his victim after he harms her, 
the principle implies that he can be liable to bear a very great cost, even 
 Appealing only to the cost to the perpetrator incorrectly implies that a very large com24 -
pensatory claim is disproportionate even when necessary to make up for an even greater 
harm done to the victim; appealing only to the size of the benefit to the victim incorrectly 
implies that all small claims are disproportionate.
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when doing so will do comparatively little to improve the victim’s condition. 
Suppose, for example, that you were previously able-bodied, and my wrongful 
act leaves you permanently quadriplegic, and there is no way for me to fully 
compensate you. According to the principle I am proposing, I can be liable to 
toil for the rest of my life only to transfer to you whatever goods I can pro-
duce beyond those necessary for me to maintain a relatively austere exist-
ence. That is so because I would prefer to toil for the rest of my life at little 
personal benefit than be permanently quadriplegic with whatever benefits I 
could feasibly receive in that state. We can represent a situation like this—in 
which a perpetrator visits a severe and non-compensable harm upon a vic-
tim—as follows: 
Table 2 
Again, it is my contention that in this situation, the perpetrator is liable to 
compensate the victim at least until the following state of affairs obtains, 
provided the necessity condition is satisfied: 
P V
Ex ante the harm 100 100
Ex post the harm 100 1
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Table 2 (continued) 
Because the gain to V of receiving compensation is very small relative to the 
cost to P of providing it, bringing about the state of affairs represented by 
Equality would be disproportionate on the Received View of compensation. 
So if I am right that P is indeed liable to bring about Equality, we should re-
ject the Received View. 
Why would P be liable to sacrifice so much just to improve V’s well-
being only slightly? The reason is that anything else would be manifestly un-
just. To show this, it will be helpful to first consider a variation on this case 
in which the unequal distribution represented by Ex post the harm in Table 2 
is due to natural causes. Suppose that V’s poor condition is the result of an 
unforeseeable accident. In this case, many distributive egalitarians would 
already hold that V has at least some right against P that he compensate 
her, on the grounds that it is unjust for one person to be worse off than an-
other through no fault of her own.   25
P V
Equality 2 2
 I here make the simplifying assumption that wellbeing—very broadly construed as 25
whatever a person has a self-interested reason to want—is the metric of distributive justice.
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Of course, only a very hard-nosed egalitarian would believe that when 
the unfairness is due to no fault of his, P has an all-things-considered duty to 
go so far as Equality. Few believe that morality could demand of a person 
that he make such an enormous sacrifice just for the sake of making the situ-
ation as fair as possible. Egalitarians can avoid that counterintuitive conclu-
sion in either of two ways. On the one hand, they can take what we might 
call an external line, according to which the reason why P is not required to 
go so far to correct the natural unfairness at hand is that there is a counter-
vailing consideration that tells against the requirement to do what justice 
demands.  
Two possible considerations come to mind. First, as G. A. Cohen has 
claimed, P may have an agent-relative prerogative not to fulfil his impartial 
obligation of justice, perhaps on the ground that he may give special weight 
to his own interests when they conflict with the demands of impartial moral-
ity.  Alternatively, there may be a separate aspect of impartial morality that 26
competes with justice, like the reason we have to maximise the good. On the 
credible assumption that equality is not the only good, perhaps P ought not 
 Cohen (2008), p. 61. Cohen does not entertain the alternative explanation that I have 26
called the “internal” line, possibly because of his stated commitment to value pluralism.
Non-Compensable Harms |  194
to bring about Equality because doing so would be sufficiently worse than not 
doing so, axiologically speaking, to outweigh what justice itself demands. 
On the other hand, those who wish to deny that P must compensate V 
until Equality is reached, even when he is in no way responsible for that in-
equality, may take an internal line. This holds that P would not be required 
to fully neutralise the unfair inequality not because there is some reason 
competing with justice, but because justice itself simply does not demand so 
much of a person.  27
Both lines provide plausible explanations for why a person’s all-things-
considered duty to correct natural unfair inequality is less than full. But 
neither is viable when it comes to rejecting the principle I have been defend-
ing in the case of wrongful harm. 
The external line is unsatisfactory because the existence of morally-rel-
evant reasons not to compensate a person do not show that one is not liable 
to compensate her. The strength of the victim’s right to be compensated by 
the perpetrator is not lessened on the grounds of the perpetrator’s agent-rel-
 The thought that there is an internal limit to what distributive justice demands of us is 27
familiar; see, for example, Fleurbaey (1995); Williams (2006); Olsaretti (2009); Stemplowska 
(2009). In the present context, this explanation of why P would not be required to bring 
about full equality recalls the “satisficing consequentialism” developed in reaction to the de-
mandingness objection to standard act consequentialism (by, for example, Slote and Pettit 
(1984)).
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ative permission not to compensate her. And the possibility that there is a 
competing aspect of morality, like the reason one has to maximise the good, 
is a matter of “wide” proportionality and does not affect the liability of the 
perpetrator to compensate.  
The internal line is unsatisfactory because the cases with which we are 
concerned do not involve natural unfairness; they are ones in which one per-
son is morally culpable for the fact that the other is much worse off than him. 
When asked to make such a great sacrifice when P himself bears no respons-
ibility for the unfair inequality that exists, P could reasonably say to V, 
“While I recognise it to be unfair that you’re worse off, you have no right to 
demand that I sacrifice so much for your small benefit.” But when the unfair 
inequality is the result of P’s wrongdoing, can he truly say something of the 
sort? He could not, I believe, justifiably say to V, “I know that I am fully 
culpable for the bad state you are in, but you have no right to demand that I 
make a great sacrifice for your own small benefit, even though by doing so I 
would end up in no worse a condition than the one in which I have wrong-
fully left you.” Could not V reply, at any point before Equality had been 
reached, “You’re fully responsible for this sad state of affairs. If anything, you 
should be worse off than me. So how could I lack a further right that you 
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improve my condition, while you still remain better off than I am?” I believe 
V would be justified in responding in that way. 
The central case we have been considering involves a very large harm 
that carries with it the possibility of only minor compensation. I have 
claimed that even when doing so would come at great cost to the perpetrator 
and provide little benefit to the victim, the perpetrator is nevertheless liable 
to do so at least until he is no worse off than she. Perhaps, however, when 
the amount of benefit V can derive is truly minuscule this is just too hard to 
accept. For the principle implies that a perpetrator can be liable for arbitrar-
ily small increases (ϵ) to the victim’s wellbeing that can only be compensated 
by arbitrarily large decreases in his own, as in the following case: 
Table 3 
Though I would maintain that, even in this case, in virtue of his act P be-
comes liable to compensate V at least until Equality is reached, it may be 
P V
Ex ante the harm 1,000 1,000
Ex post the harm 1,000 1
Equality 1+ϵ 1+ϵ
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hard to believe that V retains a right to that compensation. If so, that may 
be because V herself has an obligation to give P what amounts more or less 
to a costless benefit. We are typically morally required to confer large benefits 
on others—even those who are already better off than us—when we can do so 
at negligible cost to ourselves. It is a corollary of that principle that we lack a 
right that others relinquish the benefits in question even if they are inde-
pendently liable to do so.  
The arguments in this section indicate, I suggest, that we should reject 
the Received View of proportionality in the liability to compensate. On that 
view, recall, proportionality is a matter of the relationship between the mag-
nitude of the cost to the perpetrator of compensating and the benefit to the 
victim of receiving compensation. Accordingly, whether a compensatory claim 
is disproportionate, and hence whether the perpetrator is liable to pay it, is a 
question which can be answered without knowledge about how well off the 
relevant parties are relative to one another. The principle I have defended 
implies that, as it pertains to proportionality in compensation, the Received 
View is false. For the principle implies that a sufficiently well-off perpetrator 
can be liable to compensate his victim to a very small degree, even at a great 
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cost to himself—a cost which would be deemed disproportionate by any spe-
cification of the Received View. 
4.2.5. THE SUBSTANTIVE SYMMETRY OF COMPENSATION AND SELF-DEFENCE  
On the assumption that the liability to defensive harm and the liability to 
compensate are substantively symmetrical, the conclusion of the preceding 
subsection has important implications for proportionality in defensive harm. 
If the substantive symmetry is correct, a perpetrator who culpably threatens 
to make someone worse off than himself is liable suffer an enormous harm to 
prevent even a small portion of the threat he poses. For example, an able-
bodied aggressor who culpably threatens to make another able-bodied person 
permanently paralysed could be liable to suffer permanent paralysis himself 
even when doing so would serve no greater purpose than rendering the 
victim’s own paralysis a little less severe. That is a result that would be 
deemed disproportionate on any version of the Received View of 
proportionality in defensive harming.  
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Suppose we are reluctant to reject the Received View of proportionality 
in the liability to defensive harm. We then face a trilemma. On pain of incon-
sistency, we must reject one of the following theses: 
I have argued that we should accept the principle expressed by (I). Someone 
who finds my arguments to that end persuasive, but who is reluctant to 
abandon the Received View, will want to deny (III), the substantive sym-
metry. That person may insist that, as McMahan has said, “one cannot infer 
that a person is liable to defensive action ex ante from his being liable to pay 
compensation ex post.”  28
I shall argue that rejecting the substantive symmetry is not a viable op-
tion, however, and I shall do so on three counts. First, doing so has implaus-
(I) When a perpetrator is fully culpable for making his 
victim worse off than himself, he is liable to compensate 
her at least until he is no better off than she is, unless 
the victim can be fully compensated at a lesser cost; 
(II) The Received View of proportionality in self-defence; 
(III) Proportionality in the liability to defensive harm mirrors 
proportionality in the liability to pay compensation. 
 McMahan (2008), p. 233.28
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ible implications. Second, grounding liability to defensive harm in duties of 
redistributive justice makes it less plausible that there could be substantive 
differences between the two types of liability. And third, a more nuanced un-
derstanding of the contingent differences between the two types of liability 
reveals that, when comparisons between them are properly equalised, any 
substantive difference that remained could be based on nothing but timing.  
Firstly, then, suppose for the sake of argument that the symmetry 
between the two types of proportionality did not hold. Then the highest pro-
portionate cost one would be permitted to inflict on an attacker in self-de-
fence against a given threat would sometimes differ from the highest propor-
tionate cost one could extract from him in compensation should that same 
threat eventuate. If in a given instance these costs did differ, we would then 
need to ask on which of the two sides it is higher. But if, on the one hand, it 
is higher on the defensive side, this would unjustifiably favour those who have 
the ability to defend themselves over those who do not. And if, on the other 
hand, it was higher on the corrective side, then in some cases (such as non-
compensable harms) a victim would have the perverse incentive to allow her-
self to be harmed, for then she could permissibly extract more compensation 
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and thereby end up better off overall. Neither result is easy to accept, which 
provides some support for the substantive symmetry. 
My second argument draws on the theoretical underpinnings of propor-
tionality in defensive harming generally. Obviously enough, sometimes when 
we harm others we also wrong them. When harming a person is both neces-
sary for the sake of some end and (narrowly) proportionate, however, then it 
does not wrong the person to inflict that harm for the sake of that end, by 
which I mean that doing so neither violates, nor merely infringes, his rights.  29
It is difficult to see how one could inflict harm upon another person without 
even infringing his rights unless he also had a moral obligation to suffer that 
harm. So it follows that imposing a cost on someone is (narrowly) propor-
tionate only if they have a duty to bear that cost. 
What could explain why a responsible threatener could have a duty to 
bear some or all of the cost a potential victim can impose upon him? A 
plausible rationale that has been suggested is that the duty is one of redis-
tributive justice.  In cases of self-defence, if the necessity condition is met 30
then some cost will be borne by someone. A natural way to explain why the 
 See Thomson (1986), p. 51; (1990), p. 122.29
 For the suggestion that right to defensively harm is grounded in considerations of the just 30
redistribution of costs, see McMahan (2005b), p. 395; Montague (2010).
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perpetrator often has a duty to bear the bulk of the cost in question is that 
he is responsible for the fact that someone must bear a cost. Because people 
have a duty not to excessively externalise the costs of their choices onto oth-
ers without those others’ consent, responsible threateners have a duty to in-
ternalise a greater portion of the total cost that must in the end be suffered 
by someone.  
If this is right, and the duty not to externalise the costs of one’s choice 
is what explains the duty to internalise them, then it is hard to see how the 
limits of what proportionality permits could differ between the liability to 
self-defensive harm ex ante and the liability to pay compensation ex post, 
when other things are equal. The choice of the perpetrator and the potential 
cost someone stands to bear are the same, and it seems unlikely that, when 
other things are equal, the cost he is forbidden to externalise onto others 
could depend on whether he did so directly (through an un-averted threat) or 
indirectly (through unpaid compensation). 
My final argument for the substantive symmetry involves identifying 
and factoring out a contingent difference between many cases of self-defence 
and those of collecting compensation. To that end, it is necessary to distin-
guish two different modes of correcting for harm, or for the prospect of harm: 
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negating and offsetting.  An act aims at negating a harm when the outcome 31
it would bring about aims to approach the possible world in which the harm 
was not done in the first place. In the context of corrective justice, the res-
toration to a victim of lost property (rather than compensation for it) aims 
at negating (rather than offsetting) a harm. On the other hand, an act aims 
at offsetting a harm when it aims to bring about an outcome that is merely 
as good as the possible world in which the harm was not done. Again in the 
context of corrective justice, monetary compensation paid to a physically in-
jured party for damages aims at offsetting (rather than negating) harms.  
Now, one manifest difference between self-defence and compensation 
that has not, to my awareness, been hitherto acknowledged is this: while 
paradigmatic acts of defence aim to negate harm, those of compensation aim 
to offset it. And attending to that difference helps reveal the deeper structur-
al relationships between the two types of act. The ex post analogue of defens-
ive harm is restoration, not compensation. And the ex ante analogue of com-
pensation is offsetting a harm before it occurs, not defending oneself against 
it.  
 For accounts of this distinction in the context of corrective justice only, see Goodin (1989); 31
Gardner (2011), pp. 28–37; Slavny (2014); Gardner (2018), pp. 102–124.
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We should begin, therefore, by properly equalising cases, such that we 
are comparing a case of defensive harm with one of negating the harm ex 
post, or a case of compensating a harm with one of offsetting the harm ex 
ante. It is easiest to do so by way of some unrealistic examples. In the follow-
ing cases, I enter the scene having already lost my left leg for unrelated reas-
ons, and you act so as to cut off my right leg. Assume that you and I are 
equally well off ex ante, that the prudential value for me of keeping my right 
leg is equal to that of having a left leg and that I am indifferent between hav-
ing either, and that there is only one corrective action available to me in each 
of the cases (that is, if I am able to defend myself, I am not able to claim 
compensation, and vice versa).  
Compare, first, two cases of negating: 
And next, two cases of offsetting: 
(1) Self-defence: Before you are able to act, I can prevent you 
from cutting off my right leg, though doing so will cause you 
to suffer some harm H. 
(2) Restoration (ex post negating): After you cut off my right leg 
I can, with minimal pain and effort, reattach that same leg in 
full working order, though doing so will cause you to suffer H. 
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Since the effect on you of my acting (i.e., H) is the same in all four cases, we 
can distinguish in the following way the four outcomes in which I act: 
  
Table 4 
When we compare any one of these four acts with its analogue in the same 
column, it seems to me that the difference between them could not make a 
difference to proportionality. This is clearest when we compare cases of offset-
ting: ex ante offsetting a harm is just collecting compensation for it before it 
eventuates. If that is the only way for the victim to have restitution, it is 
(3) Ex ante offsetting: I cannot stop you from cutting off my 
right leg, but before you are able to attack me I have the op-
portunity to proactively regrow my left leg, though doing so 
will cause you to suffer H. 
(4) Compensation: I cannot reattach my right leg, which you 
have just cut off, but I can regrow my left leg, though doing 
so will cause you to suffer H.
Negating the harm Offsetting the harm
Ex ante (1) Self-defence 
Keep my right leg.
(3) “Ex ante offsetting”  
Regrow my left leg.
Ex post (2) Restoration 
Lose and regain my right leg.
(4) Compensation 
Regrow my left leg.
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hard to believe that whether H is proportionate or not could depend on 
whether the compensation is collected before or after a threat eventuates.  
Provided the threat is already engaged and certain to occur, the differ-
ence is nothing but a matter of timing. Consider an analogue of Feinberg’s 
Cabin. Suppose the cabin is on a mountain frequented only by wealthy and 
over-prepared hikers who always take with them a credit card. If the 
homeowner is entitled to compensation for damages, then surely he could 
permissibly install a credit card machine on his cabin door such that, in the 
event of a blizzard, endangered hikers would need to pay upfront the estim-
ated cost of the damages they will do by entering, assuming the necessity of 
paying would impose no additional risk on the hikers (which compensation ex 
post likewise does not).  
When it comes to negating harms there is, however, one disanalogy 
between doing so ex ante and doing so ex post. Restoration almost always will 
involve an unavoidable temporary loss of the good in question, while success-
ful defensive harm can mean that not even a temporary loss occurs. Could 
that difference itself imply that the limits of liability to self-defence differ 
from those to provide restoration? I believe it could not. For we ought to 
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view a claim to restoration ex post as an instance of defence against the per-
manent loss of the relevant good.  
Thus, consider a variation on (1) (Self-defence) in which a temporary 
loss is unavoidable: 
The difference between (1*) and (2) (Restoration) really is just one of timing, 
and it is accordingly highly implausible that there is any value of H such that 
inflicting H on you is proportionate in the one case but not in the other.  32
Of course, when a victim can, by engaging in necessary self-defence, en-
sure that she incurs not even a temporary loss, then the amount of harm the 
attacker is liable to bear may well differ from the amount he would be liable 
to bear in order to negate the injury ex post. For, in the latter case, the vic-
tim will also have suffered a greater setback. But that is not an argument 
against the equivalence of ex ante and ex post negating; rather, it is a matter 
(1*) Whatever I do, you will soon cut off my right leg, but if 
and only if I strike first, the severed leg will be preserved so 
that it can be easily reattached thereafter, though striking 
first will cause you to suffer H. 
 Though I shall not pursue the matter, depending on when the relevant events occur, their 32
temporal order may not be preserved across inertial reference frames. Certain views of the 
metaphysics of time therefore imply that there is not even a stance-independent fact of the 
matter about whether my act constitutes defence or restoration. The same goes for the com-
parison between compensation and ex ante offsetting.
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of the threat of harm being smaller in a case in which it can be averted than 
in a case in which it eventuates and can only be negated ex post. And that 
difference would typically call for additional restitution. So the limits of liab-
ility can sometimes differ between negating by defence and negating by res-
toration, but the difference here would not be based on when the negating 
occurred.  
These observations cast serious doubt on the notion that proportionality 
ex ante could differ from proportionality ex post when we keep constant 
whether the comparison is between instances of negating or instances of off-
setting. The other step in this argument for the substantive symmetry is to 
show that what proportionality demands also does not differ on the basis of 
whether an act involves offsetting or negating. 
The equivalence of negating and offsetting harm would be easy to estab-
lish if I could show that the harm some act does to a victim is fungible, in the 
sense that its moral relevance qua harm is just the extent to which it impacts 
the victim’s wellbeing. Then negating and offsetting would be interchangeable 
in the requisite way, for what cost the perpetrator is liable to bear would be 
independent of the manner in which he is required to bear it (whether by off-
setting the harm or by negating it). But I do not believe that harms are fun-
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gible in that way. If harm were in this way fungible, then it would be up to a 
perpetrator whether to restore the goods he has wrongfully taken from his 
victim or merely compensate her for their loss. But it seems clear that the 
perpetrator is, in the first place, liable to negate a harm, and may com-
pensate his victim for a harm instead only when negating the harm is im-
possible or she consents to him doing so. Nor, moreover, may a victim unilat-
erally claim compensation for a harm when the perpetrator can negate it and 
prefers instead to so. In short, if negation is possible, then the perpetrator is 
liable to do so and only to do so.  
Be that as it may, it is very hard to believe that the amount of cost a 
perpetrator is liable to bear to offset a given amount of his victim’s lost well-
being could differ from the amount he is liable to bear to negate the same 
loss, other things being equal. To see this, it is helpful to compare cases of 
harm that cannot be fully rectified and in which the perpetrator can go some 
way toward making up for it only by partially negating it, with those in 
which the perpetrator can do so only by partially compensating for it. It 
seems that the highest cost a perpetrator can be liable to bear to offset his 
victim’s loss to a given extent could not be higher than the cost he would 
have had to bear to negate it to that same extent, for what would circum-
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scribe the perpetrator’s liability to offset a harm, if not the extent to which 
would have been liable to negate it, were doing so possible? But it also seems 
that the highest cost a perpetrator is liable to bear to offset a victim’s loss to 
a given extent could not be lower than that which he would have had to bear 
to negate it, if doing so had been possible. Surely wrongdoers cannot get 
away with less, merely because the best way to make up for the harm they 
have done—negating it—is unavailable. 
I have offered three separate arguments for the substantive symmetry of 
the liability to defensive harm and the liability to compensate. I conclude 
that to the extent, and only to the extent, that a perpetrator is liable to de-
fensive harm ex ante, he is also liable to pay compensation ex post. 
4.2.6. A SUMMARY OF SECTION 4.2 
We have covered a lot of ground in this section. Before concluding this 
chapter, it may be helpful to briefly summarise the points I have made and 
the arguments I have given. The springboard for this second section was that 
class of non-compensable harms whose victims are nonetheless compensable 
to some extent—those for which there is no point at which the perpetrator 
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has more to give but the victim nothing more to receive. I began by 
illustrating that compensation has its own proportionality constraint and 
showing how this helps to answer some putative counterexamples to the 
substantive symmetry of the liability to defensive harm and the liability to 
compensate.  
I then discussed the Received View of proportionality as it applies to 
both defensive harm and compensation, according to which given a certain 
degree of responsibility or culpability for some harm, the variables relevant to 
determining the limits of proportionality are the cost imposed on the perpet-
rator and the cost to the victim that is prevented. Following this, I offered 
two arguments against the Received View as it applies to compensation. The 
first was that it does not account for the relevance to proportionality of the 
extent to which a given harm has wronged its victim; the second was that it 
fails to account for the relative conditions of the perpetrator and victim 
which, as a matter of distributive justice, ought to count—and therefore lets 
perpetrators off far too lightly in certain cases, especially those of non-com-
pensable harm.  
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I then focused on the latter thesis (i.e., that for claim (I) in the tri-
lemma below), and noted that we must reject at least one of the following 
three claims: 
Finally, I argued that rejecting (III) is not a viable option: other things being 
equal, the cost a perpetrator is liable to suffer to avert the threat he poses 
can be neither more nor less than the cost he is liable to bear to compensate 
his victim ex post. We must therefore choose between (I) and (II). My sug-
gestion is that we reject (II), departing even further from the Received View 
of proportionality in the ethics of self-defence. 
(I) When a perpetrator is fully culpable for making his 
victim worse off than himself, he is liable to compensate 
her at least until he is no better off than she is, unless 
the victim can be fully compensated at a lesser cost; 
(II) The Received View of proportionality in self-defence; 
(III) Proportionality in the liability to defensive harm mirrors 
proportionality in the liability to pay compensation. 
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4.3. Conclusion 
Often the steps required to rectify wrongdoing are straightforward, at least in 
principle. When wrongful harms to others are fully compensable and the 
costs to their perpetrators of compensating for them is not prohibitively 
expensive, what is owed is usually just full compensation. But things are not 
always so straightforward, even in principle. One sort of case in which they 
are not is the one in which a perpetrator cannot or may not compensate his 
victim, at least beyond a certain threshold that is below full compensation. I 
have defended the thesis that the remainder of what would have been his 
compensatory obligation had compensation been possible must be discharged 
in the service of the impartial good.  
The second less straightforward case occurs when further compensation 
is both possible and permissible, but the marginal cost to the perpetrator of 
compensating his victim is significantly greater than the marginal benefit to 
the victim of being compensated. Among other claims, I have defended the 
thesis that when a perpetrator is culpable for the fact that his victim is worse 
off than him, he can be liable to compensate her at least until they are 
equally well off. This means that perpetrators must sometimes bear great 
costs even to provide small benefits to their victims.  
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I would like to close by asking how the two main theses I have defended 
might interact. Early in this chapter’s second section, I rejected the most ex-
treme view of what proportionality in compensation demands, according to 
which there is in principle no upper limit to how much compensation a culp-
able perpetrator can be liable to provide. Provided we reject that view, then 
although in some cases the upper limit is very high, there is a point at which 
a perpetrator can be said to have done enough and at which a victim lacks 
the right to further compensation notwithstanding the fact that she has not 
been fully compensated. In these cases, the duty described by the Non-Com-
pensable Harms Thesis surfaces, for this perpetrator would not have wholly 
discharged his pro tanto duty to restore the impartial goodness he has wrong-
fully eliminated from the world.  
There are cases in which a given amount of cost or effort on the part of 
a perpetrator would go further toward bettering the world impartially if de-
ployed elsewhere than it would go toward compensating his victim if he used 
it instead to benefit her. About these cases, my own intuition is that the duty 
to further compensate one’s victim has some priority, but not lexical priority, 
over one’s duty to restore impartial value to the world. 
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It is worth keeping in mind, however, that this need not mean that 
whenever a perpetrator has the opportunity to compensate his victim, and is 
liable to do so, that this is what he all-things-considered ought morally to do. 
For one thing, an offender may well have pre-existing duties of beneficence or 
justice which are stronger than any compensatory obligations he has toward 
his victims. That he should fulfil these other duties instead of compensating 
his victim is most likely when his own victim is unjustly well off relative to 
other prospective beneficiaries, for then he already has an independent reason 
of justice to redirect potential benefits away from his victim and toward those 
others. Furthermore, it may be that one can sometimes permissibly fail to 
discharge a pro tanto duty one has in order to promote the greater good in-
stead, even when doing the latter would be supererogatory taken on its own. 
How we should balance these various competing considerations when they 
conflict is a difficult question that a complete theory of the rectification of 
wrongdoing, whether compensable or not, must eventually address. 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